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This Article is an in-depth exploration of the impacts of an Indian tribe
deciding to pursue environmentally destructive forms of economic
development. The Article makes two principal contributions. First, it
establishes the Navajo Nation’s decision-making role. Prior mineral resource
forms of development may have been formally approved by the tribe, but the
agreements did not truly belong to the Navajo Nation. Extensive research into
earlier agreements shows the heavy influence of the federal government and
mining interests historically. Existing scholarship on reservation
environmental harm tends to deflect tribal responsibility, attributing such
decisions to outside forces. Without denying the challenges the Navajo Nation
is facing, the Article calls for recognition, despite the romanticism that
surrounds Indians and the environment, of tribal agency and responsibility
for the proposed environmental destruction. Second, the Article argues that
environmental organizations that make use of federal environmental review
processes are complicit in the systematic denial of Indian sovereignty that
federal primacy entails. Although there is a strong theoretical argument that
the only limits appropriate for Indian nations are those of nation-states under
international law, the Article concludes that the relationship between
environmental organizations and Indian nations ought to be guided by
international human rights law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Environmental degradation occurring on Indian reservations cannot be simply
written off as yet another example of Indians getting screwed.1 Instead, some tribes
have begun, through their sovereign governments, deliberately seeking out the
exploitation of their land and natural resources.2 By choosing to prioritize economic
development over the environment, Indian nations are challenging the instinctive
“love” that progressives have for all things Indian.3 Forced to choose between
1

As Sam Deloria explains with his characteristic directness,

We must, of course, hold the government to standards of trusteeship and identify instances in which
it shirks its responsibility. But if that analytical role slips into one of invariably passing all the blame
to the federal government, the economic system, or the society at large, then Indian selfdetermination becomes a concept of power without responsibility.
Philip S. Deloria, The Era of Indian Self-Determination: An Overview, in INDIAN SELF-RULE: FIRSTHAND ACCOUNTS OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 191, 195 (Kenneth R.
Philp ed., 1995) [hereinafter INDIAN SELF-RULE].
2 See Judith V. Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy
Development, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065, 1066 (2008) (describing natural resource development
as a major source of economic development on many Indian tribes’ reservations).
3 The affection progressives have for Indians is perhaps a continuation or the next generation’s
version of “the fascination of the hippie culture with the red man.” WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED
MAN’S LAND / WHITE MAN’S LAW: THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 230 (2d
ed. 1995). If tribes are successful in pushing their economic development priorities against non-Indian
opposition, this may change. Professor Lenora Ledwon argues that “[t]he increasing popularity of all
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attacking the decisions of Indian nations on the one hand and turning a blind eye to
harmful environmental policies on the other, progressives are faced with a classic
apples-and-oranges dilemma. For their part, Indian governments pursuing
economic development through environmental destruction have to grapple not only
with non-Indian opponents—a familiar role for tribal governments—but also with
tribal members less willing to make such a trade-off or adversely impacted by
particular proposed projects.
Things were a lot simpler when Indians could easily and rightly be identified
as the good guys and whites as the bad guys on environmental issues.4 It is still the
case, I believe, that such a mental shortcut is largely justified on most issues, from
poverty to land rights to recognition of sovereignty, but it is becoming more
complicated with regard to the environment. To explain why that is so, it is worth
thinking about the broad trends that have defined the relationship between
environmental destruction and Indian nations. For much of American history, the
relationship was an oppressive one. Whites—whether in the form of the U.S.
government, companies, or as individuals—simply took natural resources from
Indian tribes or, by subordinating Indian agency, simultaneously exploited both
Indian land and tribal members.5 Later, recognition that tribes should at least
formally play a role in approving natural resource use and extraction changed the
relationship from oppressive to inequitable. Tribes were compensated for their
environmental goods, but Indians received less and lost more than they should
have.6 Bad faith in the form of the failure of the United States to live up to its trust
obligations, or a mere pro forma role for tribal leaders in decisions with an
environmental impact, led to inequitable compensation for Indian tribes.7 The
relationship between tribes and environmental destruction is now entering the
modern period, one in which the terms of such destruction are tribally accepted
even if the relationship is not entirely tribally defined. Besides challenging
romantic notions of Indians as the first environmentalists, tribal activities that harm
the environment undermine the position of some Indian advocates that Indian
policies should not be subject to critique or limitation because of the inherent
sovereignty of Indian nations.
This Article makes two principal contributions. First, it establishes that the
Navajo Nation freely chose to pursue an environmentally destructive form of
economic development. Prior mineral resource-based development may have been
formally approved by the Navajo Nation Council, but the agreements did not truly

things Indian is in inverse proportion to tribal autonomy.” Lenora Ledwon, Native American Life Stories
and “Authorship”: Legal and Ethical Issues, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 77 (1996); see also Stephen D.
Osborne, Special Feature, Protecting Tribal Stories: The Perils of Propertization, 28 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 203, 204–05 (2003) (noting that “Indians are hot” and that many Indians “view the continuing
popularity of all things ‘Indian’ with more than a little skepticism”).
4 Tellingly, the Diné—the language of the Navajo tribe, who call themselves “Diné,” meaning “the
people”—word for white people is “Biligaana,” which is a shortened version of biłdà ahiigaani which
means “those who we fight.” E-mail from Zelma King to Ezra Rosser, Assoc. Professor, Am. Univ.
Wash. College of Law (Aug. 13, 2009, 08:55:29 EST) (on file with author).
5 Jerry C. Straus, Foreword to PETER H. EICHSTAEDT, IF YOU POISON US: URANIUM AND NATIVE
AMERICANS, at ix, ix (1994).
6 Id.
7 Id.
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belong to the tribal government. Extensive research into the nature and royalty rates
of the extraction agreements made up until the Navajo Nation’s coal-fired power
plant proposal shows the heavy influence of the federal government and mining
interests. Prior scholarship on reservation environmental harm tends to deflect
tribal responsibility, attributing such decisions to outside forces. Without denying
the challenges the Navajo Nation is facing, the Article calls for recognition, despite
the romanticism that surrounds Indians and the environment, of tribal agency and
responsibility for the proposed environmental destruction. Second, I argue that
environmental organizations that make use of federal environmental review
processes are complicit in the systematic denial of Indian sovereignty that federal
primacy entails. Although there is a strong theoretical argument that the only limits
appropriate for Indian nations are those of nation-states under international law, the
Article concludes that the relationship between environmental organizations and
Indian nations ought to be guided by international human rights law.
With environmental awareness on the rise and non-Indian governments
increasingly voicing concern about various forms of pollution,8 resolving the
apples-and-oranges, incomparable goods problem is becoming an imperative for
tribes and environmentalists alike. Instead of disagreement with regard to
prioritizing sovereignty or the environment giving way to confrontation and
litigation, it is imperative that Indian advocates and environmentalists accept two
core principles. First, Indian nations have the right to deviate from non-Indian
organizations and governments when it comes to environmental decisions. Simply
identifying a group of people, tribal members or not, harmed by a tribe’s choices
should not be enough to halt projects opposed by environmentalists. Second, the
relational aspects of sovereignty limit what Indian nations can and should be able to
do as far as environmental destruction that impacts non-Indians. Thinking about
tribes as nations under international human rights law arguably provides the best
way of recognizing the appropriate bounds on sovereignty when it comes to
environmental destruction. While strong environmentalists will reject the first
principle and Indian law advocates will be troubled by the second, the two are
needed in order to prevent paralysis or backsliding on both fronts. Importantly, a
human rights approach is an appropriate guide for environmental organizations and
for tribes, regardless of whether the legal structure of environmental permitting
remains federally defined.
Inspired by a reporter’s question of whether it was good that the Navajo
Nation is now developing its own coal-fired power plant, this Article explores the
evolving relationship between environmental destruction and Indian nations. The
Navajo tribe’s experiences with this relationship provide the primary window on
this relationship, but other tribes’ histories and decisions are also included.9 In Part

8

See infra Part V.B.
The focus on the Navajo Nation is not entirely coincidental. I grew up in part on the Navajo
Nation and my tie to—and understanding of—the Navajo Nation is stronger than to other tribes. The
same is true of my personal interests. As Professor Frank Pommersheim notes, “This notion of
homeland [tied to the austere beauty of the prairie and the land] is not, of course, unique to Indians
alone, and despite the obvious irony, it is valued by many non-Indians, including non-Indian residents of
the reservation.” Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D. L.
REV. 246, 251 (1989).
9
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II, the often oppressive, and imposed, forms of environmental destruction of Indian
land are presented, with a focus on coal leasing. Part III focuses on the stereotype
of Indians as environmentalists and explores how, even after tribes formally
regained some measure of decision-making power, inequities in bargaining and
outcomes continued to exact forms of environmental injustice upon Native peoples.
The Article shifts in Part IV to the current interplay between reservation poverty
and environmental harms, focusing on the Desert Rock power plant proposal as an
example of tribal acceptance of certain environmental costs in return for needed
government revenue and reservation job creation. Three alternatives regarding
tribal power—federal primacy, cooperative agreements, and nation-state
treatment—are then explored. In Part V, I argue that the participation of
environmental organizations in federally defined environmental oversight processes
of reservation development reflects a denial of tribal sovereignty by such
organizations. The Article concludes that treating Indian nations as subject to
international human rights law provides the best way of respecting Indian
sovereignty while also putting an outer limit on sovereignty when it comes to the
environment.
II. OPPRESSION AND EXPLOITATION
The Manhattan Project and America’s nuclear weapons program left its mark
on the Navajo Nation. While shocking in its lasting impact on Diné workers and
families, the effects of unprotected uranium mining are but reflections of a larger
pattern of oppressive natural resource extraction.10 As one former worker noted,
Navajo miners were treated as “expendable,” were not informed of the dangers
involved, and suffered grave health consequences.11 Another ex-miner wondered

10 The first paragraph of Jerry C. Straus’s foreword to Peter H. Eichstaedt’s If You Poison Us:
Uranium and Native Americans attests to the larger pattern of oppression:

The history of our nation’s relations with American Indians is one of ignorance, indifference,
exploitation, and broken promises. When land occupied by the Indians was needed by settlers, or
for some other public purpose, it was seized and the Indians herded onto apparently barren
reservations. Then, when these reservation lands turned out to be rich in minerals and other
resources, they were leased to mining companies, ranchers, and others, with little or no regard
for the rights of the native inhabitants, their livelihood, or the long-term effects on the land.
Often, only token payments were made for these extractive uses and sometimes none at all
because the secretary of the interior, the designated federal trustee, failed to ensure payment.
Straus, supra note 5, at ix.
11 Timothy Benally, Sr., Navajo Uranium Miners Fight for Compensation, IN MOTION MAG., Sept.
20, 1999, http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/miners.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). A study
conducted long after the mines closed found “excess mortality for lung cancer, pneumoconioses and
other respiratory diseases, and tuberculosis for Navajo uranium miners.” Robert J. Roscoe et al.,
Mortality Among Navajo Uranium Miners, 85 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 535, 539 (1995). For example, lung
cancer or various forms of fibrosis killed 133 of the 150 Navajo uranium miners who worked at KerrMcGee’s Shiprock uranium mine until 1970. SALEEM H. ALI, MINING, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND
INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT CONFLICTS, at xx (2003); see also Jessica Barkas Threet, Testing the Bomb:
Disparate Impacts on Indigenous Peoples in the American West, the Marshall Islands, and in
Kazakhstan, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 29, 32 (2005) (“Driven by poverty, and ignorant of the risks to
their health, tribal members made up the majority of the miner population. They have been stricken with
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why they were never warned of known health risks and asked, “Are we disposable
to the government?”12 Apparently so. As the New York Times reported, “Of all the
chapters of the cold war and its aftermath in the United States, there are none,
perhaps, quite as chilling as what happened to a generation of Navajo men and their
families.”13 Even long after the more than one thousand mines closed or were
abandoned,14 Navajos inhaled radioactive dust blown off of open-air uranium piles,
drank contaminated water, and even slept on floors constructed of waste material.15
On April 19, 2005, the Navajo Nation Council passed the Diné Natural
Resources Protection Act,16 forbidding uranium mining “within Navajo Indian
Country.”17 Signed into law ten days later by Navajo President Joe Shirley, Jr., the
Act declared that uranium mining was antithetical to Navajo Fundamental Law
regarding protection of the Nation’s natural resources and to the teachings of
medicine peoples regarding “harmony and balance in life and a healthy
lung cancer and other ailments from working in the midst of uranium dust and radon gas, often with
little or no filtration systems.” (footnote omitted)).
12 MEMORIES COME TO US IN THE RAIN AND THE WIND: ORAL HISTORIES AND PHOTOGRAPHS OF
NAVAJO URANIUM MINERS & THEIR FAMILIES 8 (3d ed. 2000) (quoting Floyd Frank of Oakspring,
Arizona). A suit by former miners alleging that the United States negligently regulated uranium mining
given its awareness of the health risks was dismissed because of the national security imperative
associated with such uranium mining. Begay v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 991, 1011–13 (D. Ariz.
1984) (providing a history of the health studies conducted). The United States Supreme Court later held
that given the national interests at stake, the tribal court exhaustion rule did not apply in a suit against a
uranium mining company by Navajos living near an open pit mine who used polluted waters for a
number of things, including drinking. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 477, 486–88
(1999).
13 Keith Schneider, A Valley of Death for the Navajo Uranium Miners, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1993, at
A1 (“The Government promised good wages but, Federal records show, did nothing to warn the men of
the excessive levels of radiation in the uranium mines.”). For a brief overview of uranium mining and its
consequences for Navajo miners, see Doug Brugge & Rob Goble, A Documentary History of Uranium
Mining and the Navajo People, in THE NAVAJO PEOPLE AND URANIUM MINING 25 (Doug Brugge et al.
eds., 2006). For a more complete account, see EICHSTAEDT, supra note 5.
14 Doug Brugge et al., “So A Lot of the Navajo Ladies Became Widows,” in THE NAVAJO PEOPLE
AND URANIUM MINING, supra note 13, at xv, xv (noting additionally that there the Navajo Nation had
four uranium mills).
15 Judy Pasternak, Blighted Homeland: A Peril that Dwelt Among the Navajos, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2006, at 1, available at 2006 WLNR 20073872 (providing the first in a four-part series published by
the Los Angeles Times looking at the effects of uranium mining on the Navajo reservation). A photo of a
hogan, the traditional Navajo house, with a contaminated foundation is included in the most recent
Navajo Nation five-year contamination plan as an example of the legacy of uranium mining. U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF URANIUM CONTAMINATION IN THE
NAVAJO
NATION:
FIVE-YEAR
PLAN
2
(2008),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/region09/superfund/navajo-nation/pdf/NN-5-Year-Plan-June-12.pdf;
see
also
JAMES M. GRIJALVA, CLOSING THE CIRCLE: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 62–69
(2008) (describing the problem of leaking uranium tailings near Church Rock, New Mexico, and
subsequent proposals to further develop mining in the area); Bill Donovan, Navajos Lack Cash to Study
Tainted Homes, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 26, 1985, at B1 (reporting on the lack of funding to evaluate
homes “that may have been built out of abandoned uranium-mill tailings,” and on a United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development decision to reverse, once the problem’s large extent
was known, a decision to provide emergency funding to relocate people whose homes were radioactive).
16 Diné Natural Resources Protection Act of 2005, NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1301–
1303 (West 2005).
17 Navajo Nation Council Res. CAP-18-05 (2005), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/
Resolutions/CAP-18-05.pdf; see also NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 1303 (West 2005).
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environment.”18 The Act was also a condemnation of the “social, cultural, natural
resource, and economic damage to the Navajo Nation from past uranium mining.”19
Though the actions of the tribe were in opposition to the energy strategy of thenPresident George W. Bush, those opposed to nuclear energy and uranium mining
celebrated the tribe’s uranium ban.20 With mining companies attempting to set up
shop on the borders of the reservation, it is too early for the tribe to declare
victory.21 But it is remarkable that, at least for now, “the Saudi Arabia of
uranium,”22 the Navajo Nation, is foregoing uranium-based jobs and royalties.
At the same time that the tribe is fighting to prevent uranium mining, the
Navajo Nation is plowing ahead with a plan to build a new coal-fired power plant.23
The proposed Desert Rock power plant would be a mine-mouth “clean coal” power
plant built on the Navajo Nation, just south of two existing Four Corners area
power plants.24 Backing the plant are Diné Power Authority, an entity of the
Navajo Nation, and the tribe’s partner, Sithe Energy, an off-reservation energy
company eighty-percent owned by the Blackstone group, a large, publicly traded

18 Navajo Nation Council Res. CAP-18-05 § 1301. “Diné Bi Beenahaz’áanii — the Foundation of
the Diné, Diné Law, and Diné Government” became law on November 13, 2002. See Navajo Nation
Council Res. CN-69-02 (2002), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/Resolutions/ CN-6902Dine.pdf (codified at NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 1, §§ 201–206 (West 2005)). The codification
of Navajo customary law into Navajo Fundamental Law is analyzed in Kenneth Bobroff, Diné Bi
Beenahaz’áanii: Codifying Indigenous Consuetudinary Law in the 21st Century, TRIBAL L.J., 2004–2005,
http://tlj.unm.edu/tribal-law-journal/articles/volume_5/_dine_
bi_beenahazaanii__codifying_indigenous_consuetudinary_law_in_the_21st_century/index.php
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2010).
19 Navajo Nation Council Res. CAP-18-05 § 3.
20 For more on the history of uranium mining on the reservation and the relationship between the
ban and the Bush Administration’s energy policies, see Bradford D. Cooley, Note, The Navajo Uranium
Ban: Tribal Sovereignty v. National Energy Demands, 26 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 393, 393–
97 (2006).
21 In 2006, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission denied a petition to reconsider the
final environmental impact statement approving Hydro Resources Inc.’s proposed uranium mines
bordering the reservation at Church Rock and Crownpoint in light of the Diné Natural Resources
Protection Act. Hydro Resources, Inc., 64 N.R.C. 417 (2006); see also Cindy Yurth, New Life for the
Yellow
Ore?,
NAVAJO
TIMES
(Window
Rock,
Ariz.),
Mar.
19,
2009,
http://navajotimes.com/news/2009/0309/031909uranium.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (discussing the
uranium claims that surround the Navajo Nation).
22 Judy Pasternak, Blighted Homeland: Mining Firms Again Eyeing Navajo Land, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
22, 2006, http://articles.latimes.com/2006/nov/22/nation/na-navajo22 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mark Pelizza, Vice President of Uranium Resources Inc.).
23 See Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Issues Air Permit for Desert Rock Energy
Facility
(July
31,
2008),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb852
57359003fb69d/8331e0972492f17c85257497005a37fb!OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
24 For overviews of the Desert Rock proposal, see id. (describing the project); San Juan Citizens
Alliance, Desert Rock Power Plant, http://www.sanjuancitizens.org/air/ desertrock.shtml (last visited
Apr.
18,
2010)
(same);
Sithe Global,
Desert
Rock
Energy
Project,
http://www.sitheglobal.com/projects/desertrock.cfm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (same).
Given the costs of transporting coal, “[m]ine-mouth conversions to electricity or ‘clean’ synthetic
fuels appear to be practical means of employing [western coal] as their low energy-to-weight ratios
usually prohibit long-distance transportation.” Donald W. Clements, Recent Trends in the Geography of
Coal, 67 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 109, 119 (1977).
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New York equity company.25 As a mine-mouth plant, Desert Rock would be built
right next to a reservation open-pit mine and the tribe would receive over fifty
million dollars annually in taxes and in royalty payments for the extracted coal.26
Additionally, under the agreement with Sithe Global, which is providing the startup capital, the tribe has an option to purchase a share in the power plant itself.27
In the 2008 State of the Navajo Nation Address, Navajo Nation President Joe
Shirley, Jr. highlighted Desert Rock’s significance: “[It] was envisioned as a way to
make use of our abundant resource of coal, and bring economic prosperity to our
people. . . . [T]his Project remains the most important economic, environmental,
and energy challenge that the Navajo Nation has ever undertaken.”28 The proposal
is not without controversy: The State of New Mexico, a number of Navajo and nonNavajo environmental organizations, and even a Facebook group are united in
opposition to the power plant.29 The project’s future is uncertain, according to the
Navajo Nation President, “because of the enviros . . . the doomsday advocates . . .
[who] worry more about the ferrets, the squirrels, and the frogs, and the spotted
owl, rather than the endangered Navajo people.”30
That President Shirley and the Navajo Nation Council have taken such strong
stances on Desert Rock and on uranium mining attests to the relatively empowered
sovereignty now enjoyed by the Navajo Nation. Though not necessarily
incompatible positions,31 the very fact that the tribe decided to aggressively go

25 The Blackstone Group purchased its 80% ownership stake in Sithe Global in 2005, after the
Desert Rock proposal had begun. Press Release, Sithe Global, Blackstone Capital Partners, Together
with Bruce Wrobel and Management, Acquires a Majority Interest in Sithe Global Power, a Leading
Power
Development
Company
(Oct.
5,
2005),
available
at
http://www.sithe
global.com/press/BlackstonePressRelease.pdf. Blackstone is owned by Stephen A. Schwarzman, number
53 on the Forbes list of the 400 richest people in America in 2008. Stephen A. Schwarzman Profile,
Forbes, http://people.forbes.com/profile/stephen-a-schwarzman/78312 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). His
total compensation in 2008 was over $1.3 billion. Id.; see also Blackstone’s Chief Received $350 Million
in Pay in 2007, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2008, at C2 (noting that amount does not include $4.77 billion in
stock received when Blackstone went public, $1.2 billion of which immediately vested).
26 Desert Rock Energy Co., Navajo Nation, http://www.desertrockenergyproject.com/navajo_
nation.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
27 The Navajo Nation would have the option of obtaining an ownership stake of “25% outright, up
to an aggregate of 49% depending on extent of other equity investment.” Letter from Joe Shirley, Jr.,
President, Navajo Nation, to Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 2 (Sept. 20, 2007),
available
at
http://navajo-nsn.gov/News%20Releases/George%20
Hardeen/July08/State%20of%20the%20Navajo%20Nation%20Address%20%20July%2021%202008.pdf.
28 Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, State of the Navajo Nation Address at the 21st Navajo
Nation Council 5 (July 21, 2008), available at http://opvp.org/cms/kunde/rts/opvporg/ docs/81720984607-25-2008-17-00-46.pdf.
29 See infra notes 372–75 and accompanying text.
30 Webcast: Conference on Indian Nations and Institution Building, held by the American
University Washington College of Law (Feb. 16, 2009), available at http://media.wcl.american.edu/
Mediasite/Viewer/?peid=2fa4f3dacd5948d585262246a90504bb (quoting Joe Shirley, Jr., President,
Navajo Nation, from minutes 45:45–47:20 in the webcast). For a representative example of President
Shirley’s support of Desert Rock, see Letter from Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, to Gerardo
C. Rios, Chief, Air Permits Office, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 10, 2004) (on file with author) (“The
Office of the President and Vice President of the Navajo Nation fully support the Desert Rock project.”).
31 Navajo opposition to uranium seems to be based primarily on the health effects experienced by
miners and not on ideological opposition to nuclear power. See infra notes 430–45 and accompanying
text.
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forward with one type of mining and energy development while spurning another
highlights the impact of tribal decision making on American energy and
environmental policy. The views of the Navajo Nation and non-Indian governments
and organizations will inevitably conflict at times and, given the linkages between
the tribe and non-Indians as well as the spillover effects of tribal choices, it is
important to establish ex ante principals for resolving such conflicts. Historically,
potential conflict was avoided by simply imposing non-Indian natural resource
policies and environmental choices upon tribes, an imposition that, while
straightforward in application, ignored or undermined tribal rights to selfdetermination.32
The “permanent home” of the Diné was formally recognized by the United
States through an 1868 treaty.33 “Diné” can be translated literally from the
Navajo/Diné language as “the people” and commonly is not used as a term for
“government,” which is instead called “the tribe” or the Navajo Nation.34
Originally the Diné occupied territory defined by four sacred mountains (Mt.
Blanca to the East, Mt. Taylor to the South, San Francisco Peaks to the West, and
Mt. Hesperus to the North),35 but following contact with non-Indians, their
recognized land holdings have shrunk.36 Nevertheless, now roughly the size of
West Virginia, the Navajo Nation spans parts of Arizona, Utah, and New Mexico,
and contained within its borders are Chaco Canyon, Monument Valley, and Canyon
de Chelly.37 It is a “beautiful, austere, and varied country,” with a population of
32

See EICHSTAEDT, supra note 5, at 14.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, U.S.-Navajo, June
1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667 [hereinafter 1868 Treaty].
34 OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DEMOGRAPHIC AND
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NAVAJO 4 (1973).
35 The importance of place to the Diné comes across from the Gary Witherspoon’s description:
33

Navajoland is the Holy Land of the Navajo people. It is circumscribed by sacred mountains,
and is described as being beautiful. Essential parts, as well as the land itself, are called mother.
For a Navajo, there is no safer, more secure, and more wonderful place to be than close to Earth
Mother within the boundaries of the sacred mountains, which represent parts of her body. . . .
Some non-Navajo have seen Navajoland as a bleak, lonely, and forbidding place. On the
contrary, Navajoland is thought by its people to be as sacred and secure as motherhood itself.
GARY WITHERSPOON, NAVAJO KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE 68 (1975); see also OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL,
supra note 34, at 4 (noting the relationship between the Diné creation story and “[t]he land between
these four mountains [that] is the area the Navajo calls home”).
36 OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 34, at 8, 10.
37 The land base of the Navajo Nation consists not only of land included in the 1868 treaty but also
land subsequently added by various acts of Congress, judicial opinions, and a long series of executive
orders. J. LEE CORRELL & ALFRED DEHIYA, ANATOMY OF THE NAVAJO INDIAN RESERVATION: HOW IT
GREW (rev. ed. 1978). The need for Navajos to have more land in order to survive was colorfully
described in an 1879 letter written by John C. Pyle, an Indian agent:
The Navajo would not exchange his desert home for the most favored spot elsewhere and if
the Reservation is found to be too limited for his necessities, why not give him more desert? But
I suppose it would be worse than folly to ask for more territory for any tribe, however deserving,
from a Government that does not secure to the Indian the peaceful possession of lands already
guaranteed to him by solemn treaty stipulation.
DANE COOLIDGE & MARY ROBERTS COOLIDGE, THE NAVAJO INDIANS 247 (1930) (quoting from
John C. Pyle’s 1879 letter to the Bureau of Indian Affairs at Washington).
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more than 180,000, of whom only three percent are non-Indian.38 An independent
nation whose sovereignty is recognized by the U.S. government, the Navajo Nation
has the most land of any tribe, and also the largest government bureaucracy.39 From
the capitol of Window Rock, Arizona, Navajo Nation President Joe Shirley, Jr.
governs, along with the Navajo Nation Council and Navajo Nation Supreme
Court,40 in much the same way, and must confront similar challenges, as do those
who work out of Washington, D.C.
It has not always been this way. The United States signed two treaties with the
Navajo tribe, one in 1849 and the second in 1868.41 The Treaty at Fort Sumner in
1868 marked the end of a particularly bad period for the Diné. After an 1864
military defeat at Canyon de Chelly at the hands of Kit Carson, Navajos were
rounded up and forced on what became known as the Navajo Long Walk to Fort
Sumner and the surrounding Bosque Redondo reservation where they were held
captive.42 They were only allowed to escape the bad conditions that characterized

The Navajo Nation has also used primarily mining revenues to purchase additional land. See
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 34, at 10. One particular tribal purchase, that of Big
Boquillas Ranch, would ultimately lead then-Tribal Chairman (the title was subsequently changed to
Navajo Nation President) Peter MacDonald to be thrown out of office and imprisoned for accepting
bribes connected to the land deal. See United States v. Brown, 763 F. Supp. 1518, 1520–24 (D. Ariz.
1991) (containing a brief overview of the nature of the bribery), aff’d, 979 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1992);
Navajo Nation v. MacDonald, 885 P.2d 1104, 1109, 1113 (1994) (affirming liability in a civil suit
following the criminal conviction of defendants on 14 counts). For Peter MacDonald’s side of the story,
see PETER MACDONALD, THE LAST WARRIOR: PETER MACDONALD AND THE NAVAJO NATION 278–
341 (1993). The Navajo Nation recently announced plans to build a $200 million, 85-megawatt wind
farm on the Big Boquillas Ranch. Cyndy Cole, Navajo Wind Farm Set, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, Dec. 28,
2009, http://azdailysun.com/ news/local/article_0a9abe65-e473-50dc-aa78-464f4b6b9210.html (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010).
38 RICHARD WHITE, THE ROOTS OF DEPENDENCY: SUBSISTENCE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL
CHANGE AMONG THE CHOCTAWS, PAWNEES, AND NAVAJOS 225 (1983) (describing the reservation);
Div. of Econ. Dev., Navajo Nation, An Overview of the Navajo Nation—Demographics,
http://www.navajobusiness.com/fastFacts/demographics.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (providing
population figures).
39 Navajo Nation, History Page, http://www.navajo.org/history.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010)
(proudly proclaiming that “Navajo government has evolved into the largest and most sophisticated form
of American Indian government”); see also ROBERT H. KELLER & MICHAEL F. TUREK, AMERICAN
INDIANS & NATIONAL PARKS 186 (1998) (“The continued vitality of the Navajo language, survival of
traditional culture, and rich legends combine with a sense of place to produce a tribal sovereignty
beyond rhetoric. Navajos own and control their homeland.” (emphasis added)).
40 Harrison Lapahie, Jr., Window Rock, http://www.lapahie.com/Window_Rock_Capitol.cfm (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010); Navajo Nation Office of the President & Vice President, President of the Navajo
Nation,
http://www.opvp.org/content.asp?CustComKey=33998&CategoryKey=33999
&pn=Page&DomName=opvp.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
41 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians, U.S.-Navajo, Sept.
9, 1849, 9 Stat. 974 [hereinafter 1849 Treaty]; 1868 Treaty, supra note 33.
42 For more on the Navajo Long Walk, see generally L.R. BAILEY, THE LONG WALK: A HISTORY
OF THE NAVAJO WARS, 1846–68 (1964); THE DINÉ OF THE E. REGION OF THE NAVAJO RESERVATION,
ORAL HISTORY STORIES OF THE LONG WALK: HWÉELDI BAA HANÉ (1991).
Some Diné, including members of my step-mother’s family, avoided capture by hiding in the
mountains and canyons in northern parts of Diné territory. Though they could only come out of hiding
and reunite with those at Fort Sumner following the treaty signing, those who avoided the long walk
played an important role in revitalizing the tribe’s economy after 1868. PETER IVERSON, DINÉ: A
HISTORY OF THE NAVAJOS 57 (2002).
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their captivity and return to a diminished version—no longer extending to the four
sacred mountains—of their homeland with the signing of the Treaty at Fort
Sumner.43 By the treaty, the reservation was “set apart for the use and occupation of
the Navajo tribe” and was established as “their permanent home.”44 Although treaty
ratification is an inherent recognition of tribal sovereignty, in practice the United
States, until recently, treated the Navajo reservation as an area whose natural
resources could be extracted or developed with only a limited say from a
government representing the Diné.45 The results were unjust and arguably tragic:
The Diné suffered a range of environmental harms without benefiting as they
should have, and the Navajo Nation’s ability to protect its citizens and afford them
opportunities was significantly undermined for more than a century.46
The United States and non-Indian business interests were determined to
extract natural resources located on reservations, including the Navajo.47 Poor soil
quality and infrequent rain limited the agricultural potential of the land,
diminishing the impact white land greed had on the Navajo Nation relative to many
other tribes.48 Non-Indians, with the important exception of Indian traders and

43 Of the more than eight thousand Navajos “detained at Bosque Redondo” in 1864, two thousand
died by 1868. OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, supra note 34, at 7–8.
44 1868 Treaty, supra note 33, arts. II, XXIII, 15 Stat. at 668, 671. Author’s note: Navajo is usually
spelled with a j, but sometimes is spelled with an h; both spellings refer to the same tribe.
45 The U.S. Congress formally ended the practice of making Indian treaties in 1871, though this
attempt by Congress to limit the government’s Indian treaty-making powers is arguably
unconstitutional. See David P. Currie, Indian Treaties, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 445, 445, 449–51 (2007).
46 GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 77 (describing the detrimental approach to natural resource
extraction experienced by tribes generally).
47 According to Professor James M. Grijalva, whose work on environmental justice informs much of
this Article, business and governmental interests jointly sought Indian natural resources:

The federal government also induced non-Indian natural resource development companies to
locate in Indian country in the mid-1900s. As trustee, the federal government was legally
obligated to manage tribal resources for the benefit of the tribes, but on occasion its zeal for
revenue and the political connections of non-Indian companies led to below market lease and
royalty payments. Prospects for increased profit margins, possible insulation from state taxation,
and comparatively weak federal regulation helped spur strip and pit mines, clear-cut timber
harvests, and power plants.
Id.
48 As Robert H. Keller and Michael F. Turek explain, “Anglo-Americans once considered the
Southwest the most inhospitable and uninhabitable quadrant of the United States, a perception that
perhaps explains the large size of the Navajo Reservation.” KELLER & TUREK, supra note 39, at 188; see
also J.W. Hoover, Navajo Land Problems, 13 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 281, 284 (1937) (“From the
standpoint of utilization, the Navajo country is marginal land.”).
In particular, the Navajo Nation did not suffer from allotment the way other tribes did, even
though it was contemplated in the 1868 treaty. See 1868 Treaty, supra note 33, art. V,
15 Stat. at 668. Devised as a strategy to turn reservation Indians into yeoman farmers and to turn over
surplus land to non-Indians, allotment lasted from 1881 to 1934 and resulted in tribal land loss without
noticeable economic gains. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 6 (1995).
The leading article on the lasting effects of allotment is Royster, supra.
The limited agricultural utility of the reservation means that the on-reservation Diné population
vastly exceeds the number of people—estimated at 35,000—who could be supported at a subsistence
level through agriculture. KENT GILBREATH, RED CAPITALISM: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAJO
ECONOMY 4 (1973).
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church groups, did not particularly push to live on the Navajo reservation.49 But
though not wanting to live in Navajo country, non-Indians did and do covet the
natural resource holdings of the tribe.50
A. Black Mesa Coal
In 1909, “[a] rapid reconnaissance was made by wagon” of the coal beds of
Black Mesa by M.R. Campbell and H.E. Gregory.51 While acknowledging the
“fragmentary” nature of their data, they reported that “there is considerable coal in
this field” and that it was of good quality.52 They also reported that a small mine,
producing 2500 tons annually “to supply fuel for the Indian school,” was already in
49 The Treaty of September 9, 1849, authorized trading posts among the Navajo. 1849 Treaty, supra
note 41, art. VIII, 9 Stat. at 975. Trading posts were and are an important part of reservation life:

The Reservation trading post became one of the most necessary and influential institutions of the
Reservation system. The Navaho Reservation was so vast and so isolated that until the early
[1930s], government officials had very little contact with the Indians, leaving the trader as the most
important, often the only white man in the native community.
Jesse L. Nusbaum, Introduction to ELIZABETH COMPTON HEGEMANN, NAVAHO TRADING DAYS, at vii,
ix (1963) (providing a first-person account of trading post life); see also FRANCES GILLMOR & LOUISA
WADE WETHERILL, TRADERS TO THE NAVAJOS: THE STORY OF THE WETHERILLS OF KAYENTA (1934)
(providing a narrative of a trader family on the reservation). In 1968, Southwestern Indian Development,
Inc., under the leadership of future Navajo President Peterson Zah, published a highly critical report on
trading post operators, their pricing policies, and the Bureau of Indian Affair’s lack of oversight:
The institution of the trading post, admittedly, has played an essential part in the development
of modern Indian society in its role as mediator between the Navajo and Anglo world, yet this
does not give them the unquestioned “right” to exploit and dominate to the fullest extent those
very people who provided their livelihood.
SW. INDIAN DEV., INC., TRADERS ON THE NAVAJO RESERVATION: DRAFT REPORT 26 (1970) (on file
with Rogers College of Law Library, University of Arizona).
The land upon which their trading posts or other businesses sit, as well as the land held by many
religious organizations, is often an island of fee land surrounded by trust land. These islands of nonIndian fee land create special problems for tribes seeking to regulate conduct within their reservation,
and the Supreme Court has blocked various assertions of tribal sovereignty over these businesses. See
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (preventing the Navajo Nation from assessing a
hotel occupancy tax on a non-Indian hotel located on the Navajo Nation despite significant ties between
the business and the tribe).
50 KELLER & TUREK, supra note 39, at 186 (“Once considered marginal terrain, Navajo land
contains coal, oil, and gas, plus 500,000 acres of timber.”). What is true for the Navajo Nation also holds
for Indian landholdings in general. Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indian Resources and the National
Economy: Business Cycles and Policy Cycles, in NATIVE AMERICANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 193, 215
(Fremont J. Lyden & Lyman H. Legters eds., 1992) (noting the relative richness of Indian-held oil, coal,
and uranium natural resources); see also Carol A. Markstrom & Perry H. Charley, Psychological Effects
of Technological/Human-Caused Environmental Disasters: Examination of the Navajo People and
Uranium, in THE NAVAJO PEOPLE AND URANIUM MINING, supra note 13, at 89, 103 (referring to
natural resource extraction as a form of colonialism and noting that “[t]he irony is that these lands were
not known to be resource-rich at the time reservation lands were allotted to tribes. Indeed, in many
cases, seemingly the least inhabitable lands were designated for reservations” (emphasis added)).
51 M.R. Campbell & H.E. Gregory, The Black Mesa Coal Field, Arizona, in CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ECONOMIC GEOLOGY (SHORT PAPERS AND PRELIMINARY REPORTS): PART II.—MINERAL FUELS 229, 229
(U.S. Geological Survey, Bulletin 431, 1909).
52 Id.
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operation at Keams Canyon.53 The ability of turn-of-the-century explorers to locate
the coal field owed itself in part to the relative shallowness, as little as six meters in
depth, of the “overburden” separating the buried coal from the surface.54 Black
Mesa is located in northern Arizona and includes contested portions of the Navajo
and Hopi reservations.55 Later surveys would confirm the existence of a
considerable amount—400 million tons—of strippable coal at Black Mesa.56 But
coal development on the Navajo reservation was slow for almost fifty years. In the
1930s, small-scale, cottage-industry-type family truck mines, employing between
seven and nine men, emerged across the Navajo Nation.57 This gave way to more
formal commercial explorations only in the 1950s.58 The first large lease, finalized
in 1957, was between the Navajo tribe and Utah Construction and Mining
Company for 24,320 acres in the eastern part of the reservation.59 Large lease
agreements signed in 1964 with Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company for
11,157 acres near Window Rock, Arizona, and with Peabody Coal Company for
24,858 acres on Black Mesa, symbolize the “unprecedentedly intense commercial
interest” of the early 1960s in Hopi and Navajo coal.60 By 1971, Black Mesa alone
was annually producing over one million tons of coal.61
The development of Black Mesa has not been without controversy. Winona
LaDuke has called Black Mesa “the mother of all ecologically destructive mining
complexes.”62 In 1971, the Sierra Club and other environmental groups purchased
full-page protest ads in papers such as the New York Times.63 The headline: “Like
Ripping Apart St. Peter’s, In Order to Sell the Marble.”64 The body of the ad was
53

Id. at 236.
Mark Schoepfle et al., Navajo Attitudes Toward Development and Change:
A Unified Ethnographic and Survey Approach to an Understanding of Their Future,
86 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 885, 885 (1984).
55 Known as the 1882 Executive Order Area or Joint Use Area, the conflict over which tribe and
whose tribal members were entitled to live in the area evolved into the multigenerational Navajo-Hopi
land dispute. For an overview of the history and legal cases involved in the dispute, see Eric Cheyfitz,
Theory and Practice: The Case of the Navajo-Hopi Land Dispute, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y &
L. 619, 623–30 (2002); see also DAVID M. BRUGGE, THE NAVAJO-HOPI LAND DISPUTE: AN AMERICAN
TRAGEDY 2, 3, 47, 55, 62–63 (1994) (providing a history of the dispute).
56 Brian Jackson Morton, Coal Leasing in the Fourth World: Hopi and Navajo Coal Leasing, 1954–
1977, at 1 (May 17, 1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on file
with Boise State University Library) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SOUTHWEST ENERGY STUDY:
REPORT OF THE COAL RESOURCES WORK GROUP app. J (1972)).
57 COLLEEN O’NEILL, WORKING THE NAVAJO WAY: LABOR AND CULTURE IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 30–54 (2005) (describing the development and characteristics of truck mines of the 1930s).
58 Morton, supra note 56, at 7–9. This is not to say that coal exploitation only began in the last
century. PHILIP RENO, MOTHER EARTH, FATHER SKY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: NAVAJO
RESOURCES AND THEIR USE 106 (1981) (“Remains of ancient campsites indicate that coal was burned
one thousand years ago by Indian people . . . .”). Between 1300 and 1600 A.D., Black Mesa “production
may have totaled 100,000 tons.” DONALD L. BAARS, NAVAJO COUNTRY: A GEOLOGY AND NATURAL
HISTORY OF THE FOUR CORNERS REGION 171 (1995).
59 Morton, supra note 56, at 8.
60 See id. at 9–10.
61 Id. at 56.
62 WINONA LADUKE, RECOVERING THE SACRED: THE POWER OF NAMING AND CLAIMING 35 (2005).
63 Black Mesa Def. Fund et al., “. . . . . Like Ripping Apart St. Peter’s, In Order to Sell the
Marble.,” N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1971, at 31 (paid advertisement).
64 Id.
54
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similarly strong, noting that instead of being near the growing cities of California
and Las Vegas, the mining and associated power plants were being “put . . .
elsewhere, where no one will complain,” where they will face “[n]o ‘important’
opposition.”65 Though framed as the destruction of sacred Hopi and Navajo sites,
the environmental groups dedicated the bulk of the ad’s discussion of the harms to
Indians to publicizing Hopi resistance to mining on Black Mesa.66 But before
discussing Hopi resistance and the Navajo experience, it is important to set the
stage with the development of oil leasing, which preceded the rise of coal.
B. Oil and the Formation of the Navajo Nation Council
The Navajo Nation Council owes its existence to the discovery of oil on the
Navajo reservation in 1922.67 By the time coal leases were being worked out for
Black Mesa, the Navajo council was firmly in place and the tribe did not suffer
the same division between traditionalists and the tribal council as the Hopi
tribe.68 Today, the Navajo Nation Council concerns itself with all aspects of tribal
governance; “[i]n its infancy, however, the group was associated almost
exclusively with oil development.”69 The first meeting was held on July 7, 1923,
and immediately the council approved a fast track oil leasing arrangement.70 This
single-minded focus was deliberate: The Navajo Nation Council “was organized by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs in order to produce a ‘legitimate’ body of Navajo who
could lease Navajo lands to oil companies for drilling.”71 According to Ward
65 Id. In 1974, Reid Chambers and Monroe Price wrote of the “considerable controversy”
surrounding “the development of immense fossil-fuel power plants and the strip mining of coal for these
plants . . . . designed to meet the needs of Tucson, Phoenix, Los Angeles, Albuquerque, and other
southwestern metropolises.” Reid Peyton Chambers & Monroe E. Price, Regulating Sovereignty:
Secretarial Discretion and the Leasing of Indian Lands, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1974); see also
Floyd Harvey Dove, Groundwater in the Navajo Sandstone: A Subset of “Simulation of the Effects of
Coal-Fired Power Developments in the Four Corners Region” 1 (Nov. 21, 1973) (unpublished Ph.D
dissertation, University of Arizona) (on file with Pence Law Library, American University) (“Economic
progress may cause change in the immediate environment but may also accelerate environmental change
in areas remote from the central core of economic activity. Such is the case . . . in the Southwest portion
of the United States.”).
66 Black Mesa Def. Fund et al., supra note 63.
67 CAROL J. MCCABE & HESTER LEWIS, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE NAVAJO NATION:
AN AMERICAN COLONY 17 (1975); RENO, supra note 58, at 123 (noting that oil was first found near
Hogback in 1922).
68 See infra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
69 KATHLEEN P. CHAMBERLAIN, UNDER SACRED GROUND: A HISTORY OF NAVAJO OIL 1922–1982,
at 29 (2000).
70 Id. at 29–30. The approval of the leases came only after two similarly purposed prior Bureau of
Indian Affairs–directed gatherings of Navajo men voted to reject the lease; the first such group voted 75 to
zero against the proposed mining lease. JERRY MANDER, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE SACRED: THE
FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE SURVIVAL OF THE INDIAN NATIONS 278 (1991).
71 WITHERSPOON, supra note 35, at 69; see also MCCABE & LEWIS, supra note 67, at 17 (noting that
the tribal council was “created in part so that oil companies would have some legitimate representatives
of the Navajos through whom they could lease reservation lands on which oil had been discovered”).
“[T]he urge to establish a puppet government as a medium for control of the Tribe” had been around
since internment at Fort Sumner, but that first attempt failed. ROBERT W. YOUNG, A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF THE NAVAJO TRIBE 36 (1978). The Washington Office of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in
1915, upon hearing word from an agent based on the reservation that a council might be forming (the
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Churchill, this handpicked council marked the start of tribal self-governance.72
The tribal council’s role, in the words of the first council’s chairman,
Jake Morgan, “is like an inner part of a sandwich. It comes between the Navajo
tribe and the United States government.”73
Professor Kathleen Chamberlain’s excellent history of Navajo oil
development powerfully documents the ties between oil companies, non-Indian
governments, and Navajo leaders.74 Some Navajos had misgivings about the effect
drilling would have on the earth,75 but Chee Dodge, the first person selected to be
tribal chairman, assured former New Mexico territorial governor Herbert J.
Hagerman that the Navajos, accustomed to being under the U.S. government “for
years and years,” wanted “to do what the government says” regarding oil
development.76 This, despite the fact that high production nationwide at the time
Navajo land was to be opened up meant that the auctions held were arguably
“against the welfare of the Indian owners.”77 Significantly, on the question of
whether to distribute the oil funds on a per capita basis to individual members or to
have the tribal government hold and control the funds, the council decided not to go

agent ended up being proven wrong), wrote the agent that “so long as the council can be used and
controlled . . . it should be of great benefit to the Indians.” LAWRENCE C. KELLY, THE NAVAJO INDIANS
FEDERAL
INDIAN
POLICY:
1900–1935,
AND
at 49 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted). The effort to form a new council in 1923 was sparked
by the decision of Navajos called to a March 1922 gathering to not approve new leases. See id. at 52.
What was true of the formation of the Navajo Tribal Council holds for other tribes as well:
During the New Deal, “tribal councils were organized largely to ‘rubberstamp’ the [Bureau of Indian
Affair’s] approval of mineral leasing on the reservation.” Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy
in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge,
21 VT. L. REV. 225, 301 (1996).
72 Ward Churchill, American Indian Self-Governance: Fact, Fantasy, and Prospects for the Future,
in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 37, 41 (Lyman H.
Legters & Fremont J. Lyden eds., 1994) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY]. Given that the
University of Colorado fired Ward Churchill on what the university claims are academic misconduct
grounds, in citing his work it is perhaps important to also include the citations tied to that controversy.
See REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH
MISCONDUCT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO AT BOULDER CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS OF
ACADEMIC MISCONDUCT AGAINST PROFESSOR WARD CHURCHILL 3, 94 (2006), available at
http://www.colorado.edu/news/reports/churchill/download/WardChurchillReport.pdf; WARD CHURCHILL,
SUMMARY OF THE FALLACIES IN THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE REPORT
OF MAY 9, 2006 (2006), available at http://wardchurchill.net/files/ churchill052006.doc; Eric Cheyfitz,
Framing Ward Churchill: The Political Construction of Research Misconduct, WORKS & DAYS, 2008–
09, at 231 (providing a strong defense of Churchill and a critique of the committee’s report); see also
John P. LaVelle, The General Allotment Act “Eligibility” Hoax: Distortions of Law, Policy, and History
in Derogation of Indian Tribes, WICAZO SA REV., Spring 1999, at 251, 251–52 (1999) (providing a
critique of Churchill’s scholarship that pre-dated the Investigative Committee’s report and was used by
the committee); Scott Jaschik, Ward Churchill Fired, INSIDE HIGHER ED, July 25, 2007,
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/07/25/churchill (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (providing an
overview of the allegations and events).
73 GEORGE A. BOYCE, WHEN NAVAJOS HAD TOO MANY SHEEP: THE 1940S, at 89 (1974) (quoting
Jake Morgan).
74 See generally CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69.
75 Id. at 30.
76 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
77 Id. at 32.
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the per capita route.78 Though with time oil was largely replaced by other natural
resources, relegating funds to the tribe “served as the financial core of the future
Navajo Nation government,” and is an important legacy of the oil development of
the 1920s.79
At the peak in the late 1950s, royalties associated with oil leasing totaled
$27.7 million and represented ninety percent of the tribal budget.80 Royalty money
allowed the tribe “to generate even more improvements and achieve quasiautonomy.”81 In 1955, a “rich find,” the Aneth Strip in southern Utah, occurred.82
“Aneth meant oil—Big oil!”83 According to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the
Navajo Nation’s auction of rights to the land the following year was the biggest
sale in BIA’s history up to that time.84 But despite the size of the Aneth oil field
and the high quality of Hogback and Rattlesnake crude, the tribe’s return on its oil
was just “one-eighth (or one-sixth) of the assessed value of the oil produced.”85
Diné living in southern Utah benefitted very little from the Aneth Strip’s oil wealth,
despite congressional acts requiring that Utah use 37.5% of its royalties to improve

78 Id. at 36. Chamberlain subsequently describes this as a “far-sighted choice.” Id. at 84. The ability
of tribes to make per capita payments of funds held in trust by the Secretary of the Interior was
reaffirmed by Congress in 1983. Pub. L. No 98-64, 97 Stat. 365 (1983). As early as a 1968, a Harvard
Law Review note highlighted distribution of tribal resources to individuals as “a particularly divisive
issue.” Warren H. Cohen & Philip J. Mause, Note, The Indian: The Forgotten American, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 1818, 1827 (1968). More recently, gaming has exacerbated the challenges inherent in per capita
payments, and membership issues come to the fore when per capita distributions become as significant
as they can be with a successful casino. Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How
IGRA Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y &
L. 381, 422 (1997) (“Tribal membership often becomes an issue. Not surprisingly, everyone wants a part
of the jackpot of Indian gaming.”). Such payments have inspired some to call for limits on tribal
sovereignty. E.g., Eric Reitman, Note, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of Federally Recognized
Indian Tribes’ Sovereign Power Over Membership, 92 VA. L. REV. 793, 801–30 (2006) (arguing that
tribal authority over membership should be limited to protect tribal members from being wronged by
tribal disenrollment decisions often driven by per capita payments). Contra Carole Goldberg, American
Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943, 958–66 (2002) (defending tribal
sovereign authority over membership).
79 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 36.
80 Morton, supra note 56, at 272 (basing amounts on figures from 1958 and noting that the peak in
oil revenues to the tribe occurred in 1957). The actual royalty amount may be higher. See Robert S.
McPherson & David A. Wolff, Poverty, Politics, and Petroleum: The Utah Navajo and the Aneth Oil
Field, 21 AM. INDIAN Q. 451, 454 (1997) (giving a figure of $34.5 million in royalties from the Aneth
oil field alone in 1956).
81 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 93 (stating Navajos established a college scholarship program
and provided money for the needy, irrigation and soil conservation projects, and renovation of chapter
houses).
82 RENO, supra note 58, at 124.
83 BAARS, supra note 58, at 162.
84 McPherson & Wolff, supra note 80, at 454.
85 Barsh, supra note 50, at 211 (providing a percentage based on the period from 1880–1970). Oil
companies argued that they should not have to pay more for the higher quality of Hogback and
Rattlesnake crude because, they claimed, “the high quality was a curse, not a blessing” because “high
gas content made the petroleum more volatile.” CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 54; see also MICHAEL
JOSEPH FRANCISCONI, KINSHIP, CAPITALISM, CHANGE: THE INFORMAL ECONOMY OF THE NAVAJO,
1868–1995, at 70 (1998) (reporting that for the over $2 billion exported from the Navajo Nation by
1978, the tribe had received only $300 million).
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the welfare of area Navajos.86 But they remained poor, with neither the state of
Utah, which squandered money that should have gone towards area Navajos, nor
the tribe, which used royalty money for the general tribal budget, seeming to do
much for those in the area.87
In 1977, southern Utah Diné rebelled, setting up roadblocks and “shut[ting]
down operations” at the Aneth oil field.88 The unrest began initially with forty to
fifty Diné seizing control of a pumping unit, but the “occupying force” eventually
“swelled to one thousand” people.89 The Coalition for Navajo Liberation, a grass
roots organization supporting the people of the Aneth region prior to the
occupation, provided the institutional support for the protestors.90 The occupation
was sparked by a shooting—an oil worker “shot at” a Diné sheepherder on
horseback, a story confirmed by empty shell casings on the scene—but ended up
being an expression of frustration directed at the oil companies and local
governments.91 Though a compromise was eventually reached, addressing many of
the protestor concerns and ending the oil field takeover, tensions remained high:
The next year residents threw rocks at oil employees working to identify new well
sites.92
The occupation of the Aneth oil fields was but a local, dramatic example of a
generalizable truth regarding oil on the reservation and the Diné: “[T]he
underground wealth of their land has not meant a better or easier life.”93 From the
first approval of oil leases, the tribe has had an uneasy relationship with oil
extraction; the Aneth occupation was not the first rebellion against oil company
operations on the reservation. Chamberlain reports that in 1933, “Navajos passed a
resolution to cancel all oil or gas leases, even those extended by council in 1926
and renewed in 1931.”94 Such a quick reversal is impressive considering that the

86 In 1933 Congress expanded the reservation, adding the Aneth strip/extension to the existing
reservation and providing for the 37.5% dedication of royalties. Act of Mar. 1, 1933, 72 Pub. L. No.
403-160, 47 Stat. 1418 (1933). Because the dedication requirement of the 1933 Act was not actually
leading to money reaching area Navajos, Congress confirmed the requirement in a 1968 amendment to
the Act. Act of May 17, 1968, 90 Pub. L. No. 306, 82 Stat. 121 (1968).
87 Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Comment, Protecting Profits Derived from Tribal Resources: Why the
State of Utah Should Not Have the Power to Tax Non-Indian Oil and Gas Lessees on the Navajo
Nation’s Aneth Extension: Texaco, Exxon, and Union Oil v. San Juan County School District—A Case
Study, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329, 345 (1997) (noting that an audit in 1992 found that of $61 million
that should have been in a royalty-based trust fund from payments from 1960–1990, only $9.5 million
could be properly accounted for and “the state confessed that it had recklessly squandered $51.5
million”); McPherson & Wolff, supra note 80, at 460–61.
88 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 111.
89 Id.; McPherson & Wolff, supra note 80, at 458–60 (discussing the first moments of
the occupation).
90 McPherson & Wolff, supra note 80, at 463.
91 Id. at 460 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 Id. at 464. Prior to the occupation, the Navajo Times had reported similar rock throwing by
residents. CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 112.
93 RENO, supra note 58, at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing this as the complaint
of Aneth occupiers).
94 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 65 (stating the resolution failed to have effect because the
council’s ability to cancel such leases depended on the companies being in breach of contract).
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council was formed in part to approve such leases.95 The reversal also reflects the
practical limits on the supposed authority of tribes during this period.96 Laying
blame squarely on the federal government, Chamberlain argues that “from 1923
forward, the Interior Department repeatedly failed to maximize revenues.”97
Ultimately the history of oil leasing on the Navajo Nation, though both
commencing and peaking earlier, mirrors that of Black Mesa coal leases.98
C. Hopi Resistance
Opposition to the Black Mesa mining made public a long-standing power
struggle between the traditional form of Hopi governance and the centralized tribal
council that had approved the leases.99 In 1934 Congress passed the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA).100 The brainchild of Associate Solicitor of Indian
Affairs Felix Cohen and Commissioner John Collier, the IRA on its face officially
ended the disastrous allotment policy and offered tribes a structure for once again
having their governance rights recognized.101 The IRA had a centralized, corporate,
secular vision of tribal governance, and tribal approval was required before an IRA
government was established.102 The Diné voted against the IRA, but it was
approved—part of what Professor Charles F. Wilkinson considers Collier’s
“biggest error”—by one third of the eligible Hopi voters.103 The Kikmongwi, the
traditional religious leaders of the various Hopi villages, mostly opposed the
change to a centralized government, and the majority of Hopi chose to not vote in
the BIA election that put in place a new tribal IRA constitution.104 By replacing
separate Kikmongwi village-based leadership with a centralized government, the
IRA facilitated greater access to natural resources on Hopi land,105 but not without
95 The council may have been dissatisfied that one of the promises made in return for approving the
leases—that they “would receive government aid in securing new lands”—had not been kept. KELLY,
supra note 71, at 69. Despite its democratic and institutional failings, the tribal council “was not simply
a ‘yes-man’s’ organization.” Id. at 194.
96 Writing of reorganization-era mineral leasing, Professor Judith Royster explains, “[T]ribes had
more authority over resource development on paper than in practice.” Judith V. Royster, Practical
Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination
Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1065, 1074 (2008).
97 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 113.
98 See FRANCISCONI, supra note 85, at 69 (“Oil had a history similar to coal.”).
99 Charles F. Wilkinson, Home Dance, the Hopi, and Black Mesa Coal: Conquest and Endurance in
the American Southwest, 1996 BYU L. REV. 449, 467–69 (1996).
100 Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461–
479 (2006)).
101 See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 104 (1993) (listing features of the
Indian Reorganization Act).
102 See id.
103 See Wilkinson, supra note 99, at 457–58.
104 Id. at 458.
105 Id. (“The 1936 election was a watershed event. The creation of a Tribal Council eliminated the
impediments to mineral leasing that had previously flowed from village autonomy and a lack of any
written governmental structure. Most basically, there was now one official body to sign a lease.”).
Mining companies were the beneficiaries of this change. See SUZANNE GORDON, BLACK MESA: THE
ANGEL OF DEATH 22 (1973) (reporting that, after being asked how the company could ignore the true
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cost: The tribal council was seen as the “white man’s government,”106 as an
“imposed” secular and central authority,107 and as such it lacked legitimacy.108
In their resistance to mining on Black Mesa, Hopi traditionalists would
challenge a federal judge’s characterization of the tribe as “a timid and inoffensive
people, peaceable with outsiders.”109 The Hopi Tribal Council’s lease with Peabody
was orchestrated by a non-Indian attorney ostensibly representing the tribe but who
had close, ongoing ties to Peabody, an obvious conflict of interest, the details of
which were uncovered by Professor Wilkinson.110 The Kikmongwis’ protest
eventually entered the court system, but the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit treated their objections as if they were simply those of “62 dissident
traditional Hopis.”111 In resting its dismissal of the case on the sovereign immunity
of the tribal council, the court was equally dismissive of the Kikmongwis’
challenge to the tribal council’s legitimacy and its power to enter into such an
important lease.112
The lease signed by the Hopi Tribal Council in 1966 was an oppressive one.
It contemplated a thirty-five-year lease with no “reopener, a standard provision
allowing renegotiation after an agreed period, usually ten years.”113 As a result,
until it was renegotiated by Reid Chambers in 1987, the Hopi Tribe was receiving
far less than even coal leases on public land produce.114 Additionally, the Hopi
were not protected from, nor adequately compensated for, the water use—three
million gallons per day—needed to connect the mine with an associated power
plant by coal slurry.115 The power struggle between the Hopi Tribal Council and the
Hopi leadership, a Peabody public relations vice president, William L. Stockton, “commented that it
would be too difficult for Peabody to go to every village chief and get his permission to lease the land.
Peabody needed a quick, easy way of securing leases, and the Tribal Council, created by the Department
of the Interior, was a convenient solution”).
106 Wilkinson, supra note 99, at 459 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Pat Sekaquaptewa, Dir., Native Nations Law & Policy Inst., Univ. of Cal.–L.A., Statement at the
Meeting of the National Congress of American Indians (Nov. 17, 2006), in Conference Transcript: The
New Realism: The Next Generation of Scholarship in Federal Indian Law, 32 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1,
121 (2007).
108 See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 105, at 17 (“Hopi leaders and a great majority of the tribe have
boycotted the Tribal Council, which has brought not democracy, but rather great divisions in the tribe
between ‘Progressives,’ who favor the white man’s ways, and the ‘Traditionals,’ who prefer the old
ways.”).
109 Healing v. Jones, 210 F. Supp. 125, 134 (D. Ariz. 1962) (dividing the mineral rights to the
contested portions of the 1882 Executive Order area equally between the Hopi and Navajo tribes).
For more on the maneuverings of the Navajo and Hopi attorneys that led up to Healing v. Jones, see
JOHN REDHOUSE, GEOPOLITICS OF THE NAVAJO HOPI ‘LAND DISPUTE’ (1985),
http://www.angelfire.com/art/hoganview/Geopol.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
110 Wilkinson, supra note 99, at 459–67, 469–72.
111 Lomayaktewa v. Hathaway, 520 F.2d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir. 1975).
112 Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1326. The court took the position of energy companies who explained
Hopi opposition as “dissidents spurred on by outside agitators.” GORDON, supra note 105, at 19 (quoting
David Fogarty, Vice President of Southern California Edison, as saying “in any organized society there
is always one sector that’s unhappy with the leadership, elected or appointed, or however they got there”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
113 Wilkinson, supra note 99, at 471.
114 Id. at 471, 480.
115 Katosha Belvin Nakai, When Kachinas and Coal Collide: Can Cultural Resources Law Rescue
the Hopi at Black Mesa?, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1283, 1290 (2003) (giving water usage amounts); Wilkinson,

GAL.ROSSER.DOC

456

6/23/2010 2:50 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 40:437

traditional Kikmongwi form of Hopi governance drew attention to the lack of
meaningful Hopi approval or involvement in the original lease.116 Together,
Peabody and the United States were intent on getting Hopi coal and they did, using
formal approval to mask the oppressive nature of the lease in terms of both process
and compensation.117 The initial lease for mining on Black Mesa was approved by
the United States Department of the Interior “[w]ithout even consulting the
tribes,”118 a tellingly open claim by the Interior Department to Black Mesa coal that
“was still subject to the joint concurrence of the Navajo and Hopi tribal
councils.”119
D. Navajo Experience
The Navajo Nation, perhaps because Black Mesa makes up a relatively
smaller portion of the entire reservation compared to the Hopi or perhaps because
the Navajo Nation Council enjoyed greater legitimacy, did not experience the same
internal upheavals as a result of the leasing of Black Mesa. In her study of Black
Mesa mining operations, Suzanne Gordon quotes Peter McDonald, former
chairman of the Navajo Nation Council, as saying, “Strip mining doesn’t really
bother me . . . because, first of all, any resource that is on the reservation under
the ground is for the Navajo to utilize.”120 Gordon went on to note that McDonald,
unlike fifty-three families that had to be relocated, could tolerate the mine because
of the geographical distance between the mine—it was “not in his backyard”—and
Window Rock.121 Black Mesa transitioned from a traditional rural, extended-family,
herding-and-farming community located a great distance from formal sector

supra note 99, at 480 (comparing the water usage rates under the original lease, $1.67 per acre-foot, and
the second lease, $300 per acre-foot). The coal slurry “is approximately 275 miles in extent” and moves
“at a velocity of about 5 miles per hour.” Dove, supra note 65, at 43 (citing BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT, NAVAJO PROJECT 87 (1972)). The slurry is
“the only one of its kind in the United States.” ALI, supra note 11, at 106. In order to supply the
necessary water, six Peabody wells ranging from 3535 to 3737 feet deep pump Black Mesa
groundwater. Dove, supra note 65, at 44. The annual water use stands at “1.3 billion gallons of pristine
water.” LADUKE, supra note 62, at 38. As Philip Reno describes, “the water as well as the coal is being
mined and shipped away.” RENO, supra note 58, at 59; see also NANCY GREIG, SECONDARY BUSINESS
AND JOB DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO THE COAL GASIFICATION PLANTS AND THE NAVAJO INDIAN
IRRIGATION PROJECT 101 (1974) (on file with U.C. Berkeley Library) (noting that water used by coal
companies ends up polluting other waterways). The coal slurry was supplemented in 1974 by a
dedicated train line running from Black Mesa to another power plant, Navajo Generating Station, near
Page, Arizona. RENO, supra note 58, at 108.
116 Brian Jackson Morton argues that resolving the power struggle in their favor and consolidating
authority explains the tribal council’s decision to approve the lease more so than the council’s desire to
respond to reservation poverty. Morton, supra note 56, at 283.
117 See GORDON, supra note 105, at 14.
118 Id.
119 REDHOUSE, supra note 109.
120 GORDON, supra note 105, at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 Id. Navajos in the areas affected by mining had to be relocated, an effort that, according to one
study, required “the conceptual gap between Navajo perceptions and conventional economic
development formulations” to be bridged. Schoepfle et al., supra note 54, at 888.
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employment to an area that by 1985 had staved off depopulation in large part
because of mining.122
The difference between the vocal Hopi resistance and the somewhat more
muted Navajo reaction to the initial Black Mesa lease arguably reflects the different
position of the tribal council in the two tribes.123 Though tribes are subject to limits
on their sovereignty, the central Navajo government plays a more important and
expanded decision-making role with regard to the direction of the tribe than was the
case in prior generations.124 Traditionally the tribe was organized according to
extended family groupings, but though the clan system continues to have an
important place in Diné society and in Navajo private law, the Navajo government
has taken on many Anglo traits.125 During the New Deal, the Navajo people voted
against having their government formed according to Washington’s prescribed
corporate structure, so unlike the Hopi they never approved an IRA constitution.126
Nevertheless, their chosen form of governance has tended to centralize authority in
Window Rock.
Efforts to decentralize and devolve government authority to local chapters
more reflective of “tribal federalism” and the tribe’s form of dispersed governance
precontact have met with only limited success.127 Such a concentration of authority
122 David F. Aberle, Education, Work, Gender, and Residence: Black Mesa Navajos in the 1960s, 45
J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 405, 426 (1989). Robert Begay, writing in 2001, reported that 700 Navajos
were employed by Peabody on Black Mesa. Robert Begay, Doo Dilzin Da: Abuse of the Natural World,
25 AM. INDIAN Q. 21, 22 (2001).
123 This is not to imply that there were not many of the same problems of a “heavy hand of
government oppression” in pushing the leases on the Navajo Nation. REDHOUSE, supra note 109 (noting
that the then-attorney for the tribe complained in 1965 to the press of “a not-too-subtle implied threat on
the Navajo Tribe that they had better do what [Secretary of the Interior] Udall wishes” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
124 Though the nature of the tribal council’s formation might suggest otherwise, “it would be
inaccurate to say that the current Navajo Nation government is simply a rubber stamp for the federal
government or other outsiders bent on access to Navajo resources. The council is an integral and highly
active part of public life on the Navajo Nation.” JOHN W. SHERRY, LAND, WIND, AND HARD WORDS: A
STORY OF NAVAJO ACTIVISM 22 (2002); see also MANDER, supra note 70, at 279 (crediting Peter
MacDonald’s tenure as Tribal Chairman with making the Council cease to be a “rubber stamp for the
BIA”).
The nature and extent of the Navajo Nation’s sovereign powers reflect the Supreme Court’s
Indian law jurisprudence, a jurisprudence that recently has harmed the tribe in numerous ways by
severely limiting tribal authority over non-Indians. Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty:
Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1195 (2005) (“The
Supreme Court’s decisions that divest tribes of categories of jurisdiction over non-members are doing
the most mischief.”). Professor Sarah Krakoff has written an excellent article exploring the role of the
Supreme Court decisions on Navajo sovereignty; she singles out for special condemnation the Court’s
limitations on tribal jurisdiction. See id.
125 REDHOUSE, supra note 109. Navajo society was traditionally organized as a matriarchy, with
women controlling land and property and in which it was not uncommon for a woman to have multiple
husbands. See RUTH M. UNDERHILL, THE NAVAJOS 8, 43, 48 (1967); WITHERSPOON, supra note 35, at
42–43, 74–75. The Anglo influence and assumption that tribes should have male leadership has broken
down parts of this matriarchy, with men assuming the political leadership roles. DINE POLICY INST.,
NAVAJO NATION CONSTITUTIONAL FEASIBILITY AND GOVERNMENT REFORM PROJECT 56 (2008).
126 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 76 (“On June 15, 1935, Navajos rejected IRA by 7,679 to
8,197, a very close vote.”).
127 The Navajo Nation Local Governance Act, NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1–3, 101–103,
1001–1004, 2001–2005 (West 2005), aimed “to recognize governance at the local level.” Id. § 1(B)(1).
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is not entirely a matter of changing internal norms; rather, it reflects the heavy
historical and logistical hand that outside influences have had on Navajo selfgovernance. External and logistical forces involving the relationship between tribes
and the United States propel tribes to centralize authority even if traditionally tribal
governance was more local.128 (The challenges the Hopi Kikmongwi village leaders
have had getting their authority recognized by the United States attests to this.)129
Logistically, for ease of administration and perhaps for equal treatment reasons, the
U.S. government, reflecting the same general cultural bias, has long sought to treat
tribes as if they were interchangeable.130 This manifests itself in one-size-fits-all
approaches as well as a related indifference to cultural distinctions across, and
within, tribes that might suggest alternative, individualized, policy approaches.131
For a tribe attempting to get particular issues resolved, not only would it be
counterproductive to have more than one voice on tribal matters, but also the United
States may be unwilling to listen to more than one centralized tribal government.132

The Navajo Nation Council wanted to allow “chapters greater autonomy in governmental decisionmaking.” Eric Lemont, Developing Effective Processes of American Indian Constitutional and
Governmental Reform: Lessons from the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, Hualapai Nation, Navajo
Nation, and Northern Cheyenne Tribe, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 147, 163 (2002). Yet, more than 10 years
after the Local Governance Act was passed, only 10 chapters had completed the steps necessary to be
certified to take on Local Governance Act authority. Div. of Cmty. Dev., Navajo Nation, Certified
Chapters,
http://www.nndcd.org/
content.asp?CustComKey=292717&CategoryKey=295197&pn=Page&DomName=nndcd.org
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2010).
128 See DUANE CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL CHANGE AND CULTURAL CONTINUITY AMONG NATIVE
NATIONS 335 (2007) (“Native political arrangements are decentralized, egalitarian, and negotiated,
while colonial tribal governments and Western political forms are hierarchical, centralize power and
decision making, and are geared for greater political competitiveness.”).
129 Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d 1324, 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1975).
130 Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country: A Paradoxical Trade, 12
LAW & INEQ. 267, 325 (1994) (“Second, American culture tends to essentialize vastly diverse Native
American cultures, treating them all as uniformly ‘Indian.’”). Professor Saikrishna Prakash argues
convincingly that the Court ought to recognize tribal differences rather than treat all tribes as
synonymous with one another. Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
1069, 1070–72 (2004). Greater contextualism, according to Professor Robert Clinton, may also prevent
larger tribes from seeing their rights diminished by the workings of “unrealistic claims by tribes on
heavily allotted reservations” and federal Indian law’s universalist logic. Robert N. Clinton, Reservation
Specificity and Indian Adjudication: An Essay on the Importance of Limited Contextualism in Indian
Law, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 543, 596–97 (1985); see also Ezra Rosser, Ambiguity and the Academic: The
Dangerous Attraction of Pan-Indian Legal Analysis, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 141, 141 (2006), available
at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/rosser.pdf (arguing that this same phenomenon of
wrongly ignoring tribal differences extends to Indian law academics).
131 As Director of the Smithsonian’s National Museum of the American Indian, and former Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs in the U.S. Department of the Interior, Kevin Gover notes,
At some point, the Montana tribes or the Alaska tribes may choose to pursue their own interests
without regard to whether the tribes of other states receive the same consideration. Indian policymaking necessarily becomes more complex at that point, but it also becomes more sensible when
it is customized to meet the particular circumstances of each tribe.
Kevin Gover, Federal Indian Policy in the Twenty-First Century, in AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS:
YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND TOMORROW 187, 206 (George Horse Capture et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter
AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS].
132 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 99, at 458.
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When convenient, the United States has shown its willingness, as in the Hopi case,
to use multiple sites or possibilities of legitimate tribal governance as a way to
recognize only those leaders supportive of U.S. policies.133 Similarly, when internal
tribal dissent or disagreements between traditional and modern tribal authorities
cause reservation instability or seem to threaten U.S. interests, the United States
shows little toleration.134 The message—replicate our strong central authority,
particularly executive authority—has not been lost on the Navajo Nation. The
Navajo Nation consists of 110 chapters, and while these chapters, each with its own
chapterhouse, are local governments with some local control, there has been a rise
in the importance of the central tribal bureaucracy.135 Such centralization reflects
the need—acknowledged as early as 1920 by tribal leaders—for a single tribal
voice when dealing with BIA and other parts of the U.S. government, especially
when it comes to natural resources.136
The Navajo Nation Council’s 1964 initial Black Mesa lease arguably is not as
oppressive as the lease signed by the Hopi. Even if the Navajo Nation received the
same royalty rights as the Hopi—something not in fact true137—the approval by the
tribally accepted government perhaps saves this lease from an “oppressive”
characterization.138 But just barely, or at least that is the on-reservation view
according to the United States Commission on Civil Rights’s 1975 report, The
Navajo Nation: An American Colony.139 The Commission quoted Navajo Nation
President Peter MacDonald’s take on the coal leases: “Well, we, the Navajos did
not have an opportunity to even discuss the pros and cons of strip mining when it
was put to us, that we leased the coal to the companies and that they were going to
mine it, surface mining or strip mining.”140 Without the opportunity to discuss
mining, much less engage in meaningful debate about leasing, the Commission’s
summary of development at the time as “no more than exploitation, with profits
133

Lomayaktewa, 520 F.2d at 1327.
Id.
135 Navajo Nation, History Page, http://www.navajo.org/history.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). The
chapter system was created in 1928 to deal with “internal or local issues,” with the Council left to address
“matters raised by the dominant society.” CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 75–76.
136 The relationship between Washington’s control over the tribe and a single Navajo leader is
highlighted in a 1920 letter noting the need for Washington approval of the form of Navajo governance.
Atsidi Nez argued, “All the Navahos in every direction want to have but one boss,” but he prefaced his
position by saying that a gathering of Navahos would have to “write to Washington, and then
Washington can decide whether we can have one boss for all the Navahos or not.” Letter from Atsidi
Nez to Father Anselm Weber (Dec. 31, 1920), in “FOR OUR NAVAJO PEOPLE”: DINÉ LETTERS, SPEECHES
& PETITIONS, 1900–1960, at 160, 161–62 (Peter Iverson ed., 2002).
137 See DAVID E. WILKINS, THE NAVAJO POLITICAL EXPERIENCE 164–65 (rev. ed. 2003).
138 But see REDHOUSE, supra note 109 (calling the Navajo Tribal Council of 1968 “the puppet
council[]”). Perhaps part of the explanation for the difference in Hopi and Navajo reactions can be
attributed to geography: Window Rock is several hours away from Black Mesa and governs a more
extensive territory than do the Hopis, for whom Black Mesa plays a larger relative role. See Wilkinson,
supra note 99, at 463. An anthropological article on Navajo attitudes regarding development notes, for
example, that attitudes are likely to vary across regions and “be formed partly as a result of personal
experience . . . . This should be especially true of such disruptive social changes as strip mining.”
Schoepfle et al., supra note 54, at 895.
139 MCCABE & LEWIS, supra note 67, at 30.
140 Id. (quoting Testimony: Hearing Before the U.S. Comm’n on Civil Rights 27 (Oct. 22–24, 1973)
(testimony of Peter MacDonald, Chairman, Navajo Tribal Council)).
134

GAL.ROSSER.DOC

460

6/23/2010 2:50 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 40:437

flowing off the reservation” seems fairly accurate.141 Scholars who have focused on
Navajo resource development tend to agree—laying blame on the federal
government, federal attorneys, and BIA—that the leases did not adequately
compensate the tribe.142
An argument can be made that the leases did reflect market rates, though
structural and market forces depressed the amount the Navajo Nation received for
its coal. The United States subsidizes coal development of public lands by opening
up such land to coal extraction at bargain basement rates.143 This essentially caps
the amount the tribe can demand of coal companies given the ability of companies
to choose between tribal and public land leasing.144 Even though tribes control a
disproportionate amount of U.S. coal deposits, their holdings are not enough to
counteract the public land subsidies.145 In his Ph.D. dissertation looking at Navajo
and Hopi royalty rates, Brian Jackson Morton rejects the “hypothesis of buyer
dominance,” pointing to the fact that the tribes received rates above the statutory
minimum rate.146 For those who accept market pricing as the definition of whether
the Navajo Nation received adequate compensation, Morton’s claim that the leases
gave Navajos the “prevailing rates” might seem dispositive.147 Morton, however,
argues that federal coal management shaped “the opportunity set facing the
tribes.”148 Federal public land and coal leasing policies controlled supply,
ensuring both record profits for coal companies and tribal coal royalties that were
small and suboptimal from a tribal perspective.149
How should the federal shaping of the “opportunity set” regarding the Navajo
Nation’s leases be understood? For structuralists with a pro-Indian orientation, the
low rates fit squarely into the larger “history of unmitigated malfeasance” on the

141

Id. at 7.
See CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 97 (“Thanks to federal attorneys, who were either incompetent
or unconcerned, Navajos did not receive adequate recompense.”); DONALD L. FIXICO, THE INVASION OF
INDIAN COUNTRY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: AMERICAN CAPITALISM AND TRIBAL NATURAL
RESOURCES 147 (1998) (“Tribes endowed with energy resources are also angered by the lack of proper
supervision by [BIA] in protecting Indian interests and by [BIA’s] urging of tribes to accept inadequate
leases.”); FRANCISCONI, supra note 85, at 70 (faulting the federal government); WILKINS, supra note 137, at
164 (arguing that the discoveries of additional natural resources led mining interests to negotiate “with the
tribe, or more accurately, with the BIA” which then lobbied the Tribal Council to act without deliberation in
approving the leases).
143 See RENO, supra note 58, at 113.
144 Id. As Professor Michael Joseph Francisconi explains, “The federal government was not in
business to make a profit, and therefore leased lands below market prices.” FRANCISCONI, supra note 85,
at 68 (identifying this as the most important way in which the U.S. government controlled “[t]he supply
side of Diné resources”). Russel Lawrence Barsh argues that with companies getting the same effective
discount rate until the 1970s for Indian lands as public lands for the sake of national development, the
lease discounting served as “a confiscatory transfer from the poorest few to the many.” Barsh, supra
note 50, at 213.
145 See Morton, supra note 56, at 118–19.
146 Id. But see ALI, supra note 11, at 82 (arguing that the leases “gave unprecedented concessions to
the coal company,” with coal royalty rates 20% of the federal royalty rate at the time and “‘laughable’”
water use rates (quoting Wilkinson, supra note 99, at 471)).
147 Morton, supra note 56, at 115.
148 Id. at 294.
149 Id. at 198–99; RENO, supra note 58, at 114 (“[I]n 1975 the rate of profit for coal mining was the
highest of any industry in the United States—running at 20 percent of equity in 1974.”).
142
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part of non-Indians.150 The Commission on Civil Rights’s general conclusion in
1975 regarding development was that “the federal government, faced with several
alternatives, has consistently opted for the one of least benefit to the Navajo people
and their land and the one most likely to perpetuate a welfare existence on the
reservation.”151 The Commission’s conclusion seems to reflect Sam Deloria’s
criticism of the scholarly “tendency to find a devil to blame” in the Indian resource
development policies of the 1960s.152 But even taking into account Deloria’s
concern, whether or not there were sinister motives does not change the fact that
federal policies and market choices diminished Navajo returns on their coal.153
Cheap public land, limited competition in bidding on Indian leases, a preference for
leasing to non-Indian businesses, and a concentration of power in a few oligarchic
firms combined to keep royalty rates low.154 As a result, the Navajo Nation, having
been “led into these prejudicial agreements by the federal government,” was “not
getting a fair return on its energy resource leases.”155 Under the first lease the tribe
was compensated at a royalty rate of 37.5 cents per extracted ton, or about two
percent of gross proceeds.156 The rate was “artificially low,” even when compared
with coal leases in the third world.157
In 1987, the Navajo Nation and Peabody Coal amended the royalty rate
associated with Black Mesa leases.158 The agreement that was reached did not
reflect the value of the coal extracted and instead exploited the bargaining position
of the Navajo Nation,159 with the full knowledge of the Secretary of the Interior,
who was charged with signing off on the agreement.160 In 1985, Peabody Coal,
aware that an Interior Department determination that the appropriate rate should be
increased ten times from that of the initial lease, from 2% to 20%, decided to lobby
the Secretary of the Interior David Hodel to delay release of this tribally supportive
determination.161 Stanley Hulet, a personal friend of Secretary Hodel, was paid
$13,000 for a thirty-minute ex parte meeting with the Secretary, after which Hodel
intervened on behalf of Peabody and “derailed the lease adjustment” that would

150

Morton, supra note 56, at 255 (describing, but not arguing in favor of, this perspective).
MCCABE & LEWIS, supra note 67, at 25.
152 Deloria, supra note 1, at 195.
153 Morton, supra note 56, at 256–57.
154 GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 25 (“[F]ederal policies for reservation economic development in the
1950s and 1960s relied almost exclusively on non-Indian exploitation of tribal lands and natural
resources.”); Morton, supra note 56, at 101, 246–47.
155 RENO, supra note 58, at 116.
156 United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation I ), 537 U.S. 488, 495 (2003).
157 FRANCISCONI, supra note 85, at 67.
158 Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 493.
159 See id. at 496–98 (explaining the allegations that Peabody Coal forced the tribe back to the
bargaining table under “severe economic pressure” by delaying the Secretary of the Interior’s
adjustment of the royalty rate by meeting with him in secret (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2001))).
160 The requirement of a final sign-off by the Secretary of the Interior “traces back to the
Nonintercourse Act, first enacted by the first Congress in 1790, and unchanged since 1834.
The Nonintercourse Act provides that no lease or other encumbrance of Indian land is valid under United
States law without the consent of the federal government.” Royster, supra note 96, at 1077.
161 Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 496–97.
151
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have supported a 20% royalty rate.162 This forced “the economically desperate
Tribe to return to the bargaining table,” and ultimately to accept an offer far below
what the lease adjustment would have been: The rate slipped from 20% to
12.5%.163
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. Navajo Nation
(Navajo Nation I ) that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938164 did not provide
the necessary grounds for monetary damages under the Indian Tucker Act.165 On
remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found a breach
of trust based upon the federal role created by a web of applicable statutes.166 In
2009, the Supreme Court again heard arguments on the case and, as could be
predicted from the oral argument, decided to once again absolve the United States
of financial responsibility for breach of trust.167 After disparagingly introducing the
plaintiff as “the Indian Tribe known as the Navajo Nation,”168 Justice Scalia made
sure that this time the court of appeals would not find an alternative ground upon
which to find the United States liable by declaring that the “case is at an end.”169
Little solace could be found in Justice Souter’s weak—one paragraph—cry in
concurrence that he was “not through regretting” that his position “did not carry the
day” in Navajo Nation I.170
But regardless of the Supreme Court’s holdings in 2003 and 2009, Justice
Souter’s dissent in Navajo Nation I identifies the exploitative aspects of the
government’s collusion with Peabody: “The purpose and predictable effect of these
actions was to induce the Tribe to take a deep discount in the royalty rate in the
face of what the Tribe feared would otherwise be prolonged revenue loss and
uncertainty.”171 Professor Royster rightly labels this an “egregious case,” yet the
Supreme Court twice immunized the U.S. government for the “overt breach of a
common-law trustee’s duties.”172 Thus, despite the coal being worth far more than
162 Id. at 520 (Souter, J., dissenting); Ezra Rosser, The Trade-Off Between Self-Determination and
the Trust Doctrine: Tribal Government and the Possibility of Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291, 311–12
(2005) (explaining the details of Stanley Hulett’s meeting with Secretary Hodel).
163 United States v. Navajo Nation (Navajo Nation II ), 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1553 (2009). For more on
the facts surrounding the royalty rates and the origins of the litigation, see Bill Donovan, Case Closed:
U.S. Supreme Court Kills Bid to Hold Interior Accountable for Coal Royalty Deceit, NAVAJO TIMES
(Window Rock, Ariz.), Apr. 9, 2009, http://navajotimes.com/news/2009/ 0409/040909coal.php (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010).
164 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a–396g (2006).
165 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2006); Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. at 511, 514.
166 Navajo Nation v. United States, 501 F.3d 1327, 1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 1547
(2009).
167 Navajo Nation II, 129 S. Ct. at 1551. During oral argument, Justice Ginsburg was particularly
quick to indicate that she felt Navajo Nation I was determinative. Adam Liptak, On Return, Ginsburg Is
Quick to Question, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, at A12; see also Posting of Matthew L.M. Fletcher to
Turtle
Talk,
Commentary
on
the
Navajo
Nation
Oral
Argument,
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2009/02/24/commentary-on-the-navajo-nation-oral-argument (Feb.
24, 2009, 09:40) (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (noting that the oral arguments “did not go very well” for
the tribe).
168 Navajo Nation II, 129 S. Ct. at 1551.
169 Id. at 1558.
170 Id. at 1558 (Souter, J., concurring).
171 Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. 488, 520 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting).
172 Royster, supra note 96, at 1085; Navajo Nation II, 129 S. Ct. at 1551.
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the agreed-upon rate according to United States’s own experts,173 Peabody and the
United States together used the tribe’s dependant position and lack of information
to push through and approve a lease amendment known to be exploitative.174
Getting a fair price for coal would be a challenge for the Navajo Nation even
in the absence of the federal policies or practices—from subsidized public land to
trust violations—of the last fifty years that have favored mining companies.175
Navajo coal is valuable coal. Changes in federal law in 1969 to 1970 that limited
the desirability and utility of high-sulfur coal typical of Appalachia or the East
helped make Navajo low-sulfur coal more desirable to the energy industry.176
Environmental regulations thus favor western coal, which “averages less than one
percent sulfur by weight compared to five percent for Illinois coal,” making it “less
of a pollutant when burned.”177 Moreover, strip mining enjoys technological
advantages over shaft mining that allow greater efficiency in extraction.178
Balancing out these advantages were severe constraints on tribal leaders. Economic
development through natural resource development will be discussed in more detail
later in this Article, but suffice it to say that the possibility that mining might
relieve some of the poverty on the reservation undercuts the tribe’s position in
negotiations.179 Tribal leaders are in a bad position to hold out too long since
mining royalties are a critical source of funding for Navajo government
administration and social services.180 In his study of the Navajo economy, Professor
Michael Joseph Francisconi likens the tribe’s reliance on money from mining
royalties to “self cannibalization.”181
While a generalization, it is fair to say that mining companies have had “easy
access” to Indian coal, and the U.S. government has encouraged mineral leasing by
173 See Brief for Respondent at 12, Navajo Nation II, 129 S. Ct. 1547 (No. 07-1410), available at
http://www.narf.org/sct/usvnavajonation/brief_for_respondent.pdf (presenting the conclusions of Dr. Rai
who, based in part on Bureau of Mines’s studies, “rejected the notion that the customary 12½% rate for
federal coal should be adopted” because the contract did not include a bonus to reflect the
“extraordinary value of the tribal coal”).
174 The Secretary of the Interior can take a more protective and paternalistic approach: In 1976, the
Secretary refused to approve the Burnham mine lease until the original agreement was renegotiated with
improved terms for the Navajo Nation. ALI, supra note 11, at 65.
175 FRANCISCONI, supra note 85, at 67–69 (describing the history of coal extraction on Navajo land);
RENO, supra note 58, at 113.
176 GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 112 (arguing that emissions limitations and “new strip mining
technologies” under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006), together contributed to
making the mining industry focus its attention on Indian coal around 1976); see Clements, supra note
24, at 114.
177 Jeff Radford, Stripmining Arid Navajo Lands in the US: Threats to Health and Heritage,
11 AMBIO 9, 10 (1982).
178 FIXICO, supra note 142, at 150 (“In the West, draglines can strip-mine 100 tons of coal per manday of labor, more than eight times the rate from the deep Appalachian shaft mines.”).
179 See infra Part III; see, e.g., W. Roger Buffalohead, Self-Rule in the Past and Future:
An Overview, in INDIAN SELF-RULE, supra note 1, at 265, 272–73 (“It was not Collier but later
commissioners of Indian affairs and reservation Indian leaders looking for a quick fix to economic
poverty who brought uranium mines and polluting coal development and many other economic
enterprises to Indian reservations.”); Morton, supra note 56, at 269 (“Enduring poverty formed the
context of the tribe’s coal leasing in general.”).
180 FRANCISCONI, supra note 85, at 67–69. The tribe employs the majority of the wage earners on the
reservation. Id. at 68.
181 Id. at 74.
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tribes.182 The shenanigans—really the wrongful actions of the federal government
and Peabody Coal—surrounding the Navajo Nation’s renegotiations of the royalty
rate in the mid-80s suggests that Peter MacDonald was being optimistic when, in
1976, he used the past tense regarding the nature of exploitation of Navajo natural
resources: “Until quite recently, mineral development on Indian lands was by
industry with the assistance of the federal government. Industry selected the area to
be developed and the federal government dictated the terms, conditions and
procedures of the proposed development. This arrangement left the Indians with
little or no control.”183 Though Navajo coal is “a highly demanded, limited, and
exhaustible resource,” to date the Navajo Nation has at best exercised partial
control over the exploitation of coal on the reservation.184
III. ROMANTICISM AND TRIBAL CHOICE
Natural resource exploitation on reservations is antithetical to the stereotype
of Indians as environmental stewards. With the publication, in print and as a public
service television commercial in 1971 to 1972 of a stoic Indian crying because of
pollution, “Indian and environmental concern became synonymous, and public
discussion turned to whether America might somehow tap native wisdom in
solving the environmental problems facing Mother Earth.”185 The notion that
Indians are by definition also environmentalists pervades popular culture and is
thought by many academics to have explanatory power when considering
reservation development.186 This mental shortcut raises the challenge of any other
stereotype—namely that although the romantic notion of tribes as environmental

182 FIXICO, supra note 142, at 151 (“The Department of the Interior could persuade tribal officials to
lease land to companies, thereby easing the exploitation of Indian lands.”).
183 Peter MacDonald, An Indian View of Minerals Development on Indian Lands, in INST. ON INDIAN
LAND DEV., OIL, GAS, COAL AND OTHER MINERALS 1-1, 1-3 (1976), quoted in Morton, supra note 56,
at 189. In his autobiography, MacDonald was more direct, describing the mid-70s leases as forms of
environmental and financial “rape,” and linking these leases to the formation of the Council of Energy
Resource Tribes. MACDONALD, supra note 37, at 229.
184 GREIG, supra note 115, at 5. The Supreme Court acknowledged, but did not find dispositive with
regard to damages for breach of trust, the pervasive federal control over Navajo coal in Navajo Nation
II. 129 S. Ct. 1547, 1557–58 (2009).
185 GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 19–20; see also POLLUTION: KEEP AMERICA BEAUTIFUL—CANOE
(Ad Council 1971), http://www.aef.com/misc_video/adcouncil/indian_in_canoe_60.mpg. The Keep
America Beautiful and Ad Council advertisement won multiple awards, and Iron Eyes Cody, the actor,
eventually was honored with a Hollywood Walk of Fame star. AD COUNCIL, POLLUTION PREVENTION:
KEEP
AMERICA
BEAUTIFUL—IRON
EYES
CODY
(1961–1983)
(2003),
http://www.aef.com/exhibits/social_responsibility/ad_council/2278 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). The ad
“appeared widely in print and on television” and was so successful because it “cleverly manipulated
ideas deeply engrained in the national consciousness.” SHEPARD KRECH III, THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN:
MYTH AND HISTORY 15 (1999). Robert Yazzie, former Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation, criticizes the
ad as “totally false because it is based on the stereotyping of Indians as being ‘stoic’ and without
emotions.” Robert Yazzie, Air, Light/Fire, Water and Earth/Pollen: Sacred Elements that Sustain Life,
18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 191, 191 (2003).
186 Armstrong Wiggins, Indian Rights and the Environment, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 345, 354 (1993)
(“Although Indian communities, like all others, have difficult decisions to make about their
development, there is good reason to believe that if Indians are permitted to chart their own future they
will continue to serve not only themselves, but also the global environment.”).
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stewards does not hold for all tribes or for all points in time, the stereotype
nevertheless is grounded on some element of truth.187
Professor Frank Pommersheim’s aptly titled The Reservation as Place
illustrates the challenge of simultaneously accepting and rejecting the stereotypes
of Indians as environmentalists.188 In it, Professor Pommersheim first
unequivocally states, “Land is inherent to Indian people; they often cannot conceive
of life without it. They are part of it and it is part of them; it is their Mother. Nor is
this just a romantic commonplace.”189 But, after saying that the relationship that
many have with reservation land has changed, Pommersheim cautions against the
“disturbing utopic visions that endlessly romanticize the people and the land.”190
Similarly, Armstrong Wiggins, a lawyer with the Indian Law Resource Center,
argues that “sustainable development is part of the cultural and religious heritage of
most Indian peoples,” but adds that it is “a mistake, however, to take too romantic a
view.”191 Professor Robert Laurence goes further, arguing that “romanticizing
‘Indianness’ can come very close to condescension and insult.”192
What is the stereotype? Born out of the idea that Indians are somehow different
and less civilized, the stereotype is at once a description of Indians and also, by
contrast, of non-Indians. In the early 1970s, Indians were popularly thought of “as the
continent’s first conservationists.”193 The romantic conception of Indians preceded
the birth of the environmental movement; as early as the 1830s Indians were thought
of romantically as “children of Nature,” unburdened by the troubles of civilized
society.194 In American Indians & National Parks, Robert H. Keller and Michael F.
Turek provide a nice summary of the stereotype, namely that “Indians had always
lived in harmony with nature, revered Mother Earth as sacred, and offered a special
wisdom to non-Indians.”195 More subtle versions of the stereotype assume, for

187 Robert H. Keller and Michael F. Turek note the dangers of the generalizing nature
of stereotypes:

[T]he “Indian as Environmentalist” evokes powerful reactions. Like most stereotypes, its shard
of truth can cause more harm than good. Indians who ride motorcycles instead of ponies, who
fish with nylon gillnets instead of wooden weirs, who clear-cut tribal forests rather than seek
visions . . . find that non-Indians, including environmentalists, can react with dismay, anger, and
disbelief. The ecological mandate freezes Indians as an idea and artifact, a static and quaint
people who have few economic needs.
KELLER & TUREK, supra note 39, at 178.
188 Pommersheim, supra note 9, at 246.
189 Id. at 350.
190 Id. at 368.
191 Wiggins, supra note 186, at 348.
192 Robert Laurence, A Memorandum to the Class, in Which the Teacher Is Finally Pinned Down and
Forced to Divulge His Thoughts on What Indian Law Should Be, 46 ARK. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
193 GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 19; see also RENO, supra note 58, at 3 (“Indians have . . . been called
the first American ecologists . . . .”); Jace Weaver, Introduction: Notes from a Miner’s Canary, in
DEFENDING MOTHER EARTH: NATIVE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES ON ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 1, 4
(Jace Weaver ed., 1996) (noting that “worshipful Whites” saw Indians as “the first environmentalists”).
194 MARK DAVID SPENCE, DISPOSSESSING THE WILDERNESS: INDIAN REMOVAL AND THE MAKING
OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 11–12 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
195 KELLER & TUREK, supra note 39, at 177. They add that the thought behind such a stereotype is
that “unless people heed the Indian, Western civilization may destroy the planet.” Id. at 178.
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example, that Indians will necessarily reach better decisions than non-Indians or
always favor preserving the environment over economic development.196
There is some truth to the stereotype. As Donald Fixico observes,
“the ‘Mother Earth’ concept is one of the few universal concepts among American
Indians.”197 The “Indian ‘heritage’ of ‘environmental sensitivity’” positively has
facilitated tribal takeover of environmental protection responsibilities, while also
legitimizing arguably racist U.S. environmental policies.198 Simply rejecting the
stereotype risks ignoring the truths it contains. Professor Rebecca Tsosie argues
that “[t]he cultural connections between Native peoples and the land” should not be
dismissed “as a ‘romanticized’ notion that is of limited utility in a modern era.”199
And studies confirming or making note of the central place of nature and land in
Indian belief and value systems are ubiquitous.200 What is required is to reject the
stereotypes and the “environmental myths” surrounding Indians without
“suppressing their historical associations with the land.”201
Given that the stereotype on its face seems a positive one, why must it be
rejected? The answer is that the stereotype is too readily accepted as truth both
when it is deployed to explain environmentally protective decisions and when it is
used to block a tribe’s decision to participate in or cause environmental harms. The
stereotype confines Indians to an ahistorical moment and potentially deprives tribes
of their sovereignty. It is ahistorical because, while it is surely true that some tribes
balanced concerns for the environment with economic development differently than
196 See, e.g., Collins & Hall, supra note 130, at 326 (“Many environmentalists homogenize and
romanticize all Native Americans as environmentalists who desire to keep their land free of all
economic development.”); Wiggins, supra note 186, at 354 (“Although Indian communities, like all
others, have difficult decisions to make about their development, there is good reason to believe that if
Indians are permitted to chart their own future they will continue to serve not only themselves, but also
the global environment.”); Carl H. Johnson, Note, Balancing Species Protection with Tribal
Sovereignty: What Does the Tribal Rights–Endangered Species Order Accomplish?, 83 MINN. L. REV.
523, 558 (1998) (arguing that because of their values, “tribes are more motivated to protect habitat” than
non-Indians).
197 FIXICO, supra note 142, at 145. This holds true for traditional Navajos. Begay, supra note 122, at
24.
198 VALERIE L. KULETZ, THE TAINTED DESERT: ENVIRONMENTAL RUIN IN THE AMERICAN WEST 97
(1998) (discussing the U.S. Nuclear Negotiator and U.S. environmental policy).
199 Rebecca Tsosie, How the Land Was Taken: The Legacy of the Lewis and Clark Expedition for
Native Nations, in AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS, supra note 131, at 246; see also Sarah Krakoff,
American Indians, Climate Change and Ethics for a Warming World, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 865, 868
(2008) (“American Indian people are not hard-wired to be any closer to nature or more environmentally
sensitive than non-Indian people. But their traditional religious and cultural systems of meaning revolve
around the earth and its values, and these long-held beliefs have influenced how American Indians view
and interact with the land and the natural world.”).
200 John P. LaVelle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice by Restoring the Great
Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux Nation, 5 GREAT PLAINS NAT.
RESOURCES J. 40, 96 (2001) (“Many commentators have noted the high solicitude for conservational
values and ecological balance manifested in traditional American Indian tribal societies.”). For more on
traditional Indian environmental beliefs and relations with the land, see Tsosie, supra note 71, at 272–
87.
201 KELLER & TUREK, supra note 39, at 240; see also LaVelle, supra note 200, at 96, 98 (arguing
that “one should avoid endorsing conventional stereotypes about Indians and the environment” but also
“recognize that environmental stewardship and reverence for nature are central, pervasive, and normal
attributes of tribal societies”).
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non-Indians, it is impossible to reduce the history of every, or even any, tribe so
neatly in this way.202 It is also ahistorical because in order to accept the stereotype,
the pretension that Indian societies are static and have not always changed with
time must also be accepted.203 The stereotype is “dehumanizing” and “masks
cultural diversity.”204 It operates independent of reality, such that a “romantic
conception of what ‘Indians’ should be is frequently inconsistent with what
‘Indians’ actually are today.”205 The stereotype of Indians as nature’s protectors
should be corrected, according to Professors Robert Cooter and Wolfgang
Fikentscher, because it is “misleading.”206
With regard to development, “misleading” is an understatement.
The stereotype is not neutral with regard to the tradeoffs between the environment
and industry; as a consequence, the construction “Indian = environmentalist”
lends itself to manipulation.207 Those who want to derail particular
environmentally destructive development on reservations embrace the stereotype
and claim that what is being proposed is not keeping with tribal values.208 It is
worth quoting at length Nancy B. Collins and Andrea Hall’s powerful rejection of
such use of the stereotype in their article, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country :
Environmentalists, in pursuit of “Indian’s best interests” may engage in stereotypical
thinking, characterized by romanticism, which effectively deprives Native Americans
of the right to make their own decisions about accepting waste on their lands. It is
important to break down this malignant romanticism into its major component
stereotypes so that we recognize them and strip them from our law and policy. Some
of these stereotypes include viewing “real Indians” as historical, primitive,
unsophisticated, and rapidly on their way to extinction; essentializing the hundreds of
Indian tribes into one group; assigning Indians the role of guardian of our environment
as well as theirs; failing to recognize Native American tribes as modern, twentieth
century sovereign nations within the United States; and viewing Indians as dependent
and in need of our protection and guidance.209

Though Collins and Hall focus on tribal acceptance of waste products, the
above critique holds for other tribally accepted and environmentally destructive
202 Conceits that rely upon “ahistorical” ideas of Indians as people who live in an eden-esque state of
nature are not limited to the area of Indians and the environment. See Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling
Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1620–
21 (2001) (disproving the idea underlying allotment that Indian societies did not recognize property
rights in individuals).
203 TERRY L. ANDERSON, SOVEREIGN NATIONS OR RESERVATIONS? AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
AMERICAN INDIANS, at xiv (1995) (“American Indian institutions were far from static but evolved in
response to environmental and market conditions. . . . Indians readily adapted their institutions to meet
changing economic and environmental conditions even before contact with Europeans.”).
204 KRECH, supra note 185, at 26–27.
205 Jana L. Walker et al., A Closer Look at Environmental Injustice in Indian Country, 1 SEATTLE J.
SOC. JUST. 379, 379–80 (2002) (focusing on conceptions of environmentalists).
206 Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, American Indian Law Codes: Pragmatic Law and
Tribal Identity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 29, 47 (2008).
207 For an extended discussion of Indians as environmentalists, see FIXICO, supra note 142, at 205–
18.
208 Collins & Hall, supra note 130, at 326.
209 Id. at 325.
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choices. The challenge such choices present is that they do not necessarily fit
within the Indian as victim paradigm. Separating good from bad and right from
wrong is easy when tribes are suffering from the policies or practices of nonIndians, without tribal involvement, that reflect environmental racism or
environmental injustice.210 It is much harder to know if environmental racism or
injustice is involved when a tribe itself makes “an affirmative and informed
decision to undertake an environmentally controversial project.”211 But the full
meaning of sovereignty is such that it cannot be the case that tribal choices depend
on “satisfying the emotional needs of a romantic tradition.”212
A. Environmental Justice
The environmental justice movement provides some perspective on how
harms suffered by and caused by tribes should be viewed.213 Reports documenting
the disproportionate environmental risks suffered by minority groups as a result of
siting choices that concentrated industry, waste, and other harmful activities in
minority communities led to recognition of environmental justice issues.214 With
race, for example, being “the most important variable associated with the siting of
hazardous waste facilities nationwide,” there was a need to address the problem.215
In 1991, at the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, a
broad concept of social justice that recognized “both public health and economic
opportunity as indispensible aspects of the quality of life” emerged.216 Those at the
summit concluded that “people should not be faced with choosing between an
unsafe livelihood and unemployment.”217 In 1994, President Clinton put the
imprimatur of the President on the movement when he signed Executive Order

210 Dean Suagee, Panel I: Tribal People and Environmentalists: Friends of Foes?, 7 GREAT PLAINS
NAT. RESOURCES J. 3, 4 (2002) (“[T]he easy case is dealing with environmental issues that arise outside
of the reservation boundaries.”); see also GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 160 (noting that a proposal by
non-Indians to build a landfill over a tribe’s objections makes environmental justice issues “more
obvious” than when a tribe proposes a landfill).
211 A. Cassidy Sehgal, Note, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and Waste Disposal Regulation, 5 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L.J. 431, 454 (1994).
212 Deloria, supra note 1, at 206; see also KELLER & TUREK, supra note 39, at 239–40 (arguing that
it is “an unjust demand” that Indians not adapt to modern culture without risking the forfeiture of their
rights).
213 For a brief history of the environmental justice movement, see GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 4–8.
Additionally, EPA’s environmental justice history webpage provides a brief, agency-specific history of
the implementation of environmental justice efforts. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Environmental Justice:
Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/basics/ejbackground.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
214 See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983);
COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES (1987).
215 Jeffrey R. Cluett, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Hazardous Waste Siting on Indian Reservations
and in Minority Communities, 5 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 191, 192 (1999) (reciting
findings of COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 214).
216 GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 5.
217 Id.
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12,898, which required federal agencies to “make achieving environmental justice”
part of their mission.218
The primary focus of the environmental justice movement has been to ensure
that disadvantaged populations, whether defined along racial or socioeconomic
lines, are not “shouldering an unequal share of the burdens of hazardous waste” and
other harmful activities.219 The term “environmental racism” conjures up images of
whites deliberately targeting minority communities, but siting decisions can have a
disparate impact even where overt racism is hard to identify or prove.220 Though
one may not find a Bull Connor equivalent in the site decisions of environmentally
harmful activities, “[w]ell-meaning environmentalists and worried citizens of
affluent communities” opposed to facilities in their communities may have a
similar effect: the concentration of harmful activities in minority communities.221
Lack of political power and limited ability to effectively participate in decision
making may explain in part disadvantaged populations’ excess exposure to nearby
hazardous facilities.222 Cheap land can play a role, as can the hope among members
of the affected community that any new facility would also mean new job
opportunities.223 Ultimately, as Professor Alice Kaswan argues, “unequal
distributions are of concern regardless of whether they were determined by
discriminatory processes or ostensibly neutral market factors.”224
Wholesale application of the environmental justice paradigm when
considering Indian experiences, even if capturing tribal distributional burdens, fails
to take sovereignty into account. Scholars often describe the history, including
recent history, of Indian-white relations as one characterized by “exploitation of
Indian people and their lands.”225 Such a history would seem to lend itself to an
environmental justice approach. Indeed, the New York Times ad against Black Mesa
coal mining discussed earlier and critiques of the targeting of Indian reservations
by the hazardous waste industry both seem in line with this justice-centered
approach.226 But Indian environmental issues often receive only passing asides in
218

Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006).
Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394, 396 (1991).
How much is being shouldered is contextual. A sewage treatment plant in a poor neighborhood that
serves an entire city is a localized form of environmental injustice; a community bearing “the burden of
an environmental problem that belongs to the entire nation” is a more national form. See Collins & Hall,
supra note 130, at 269 (discussing the storing of nuclear waste on Indian reservations).
220 After discussing the challenges of finding deliberate environmental racism, Rachel Godsil ends
her section on the definition by simply concluding, “[B]ecause hazardous waste sites must go
somewhere, they are frequently placed in poor, minority communities.” Godsil, supra note 219, at 400.
221 Id. at 396.
222 Joshua Glasgow, Not in Anybody’s Backyard?: The Non-Distributive Problem with
Environmental Justice, 13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 69, 89–97 (2005) (arguing that political, educational, and
informational limits among poor communities prevent them from imposing not-in-my-backyard-type
costs upon developers pursuing environmentally harmful activities, making such communities more
attractive to those developers). Media indifference to environmental problems in minority communities
is arguably another contributing factor. Cluett, supra note 215, at 196.
223 See Collins & Hall, supra note 130, at 304.
224 Alice Kaswan, Distributive Justice and the Environment, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1031, 1044 (2003)
(describing the distributive environmental justice claim). Professor Kaswan’s thesis is that
“distributional injustice is a matter of concern regardless of its cause.” Id. at 1050.
225 FIXICO, supra note 142, at xvi.
226 See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text; Cluett, supra note 215, at 197–98.
219
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articles on environmental justice227 and, by treating Indians as equivalent to any
other minority group when looking at environmental racism, their unique sovereign
rights are largely ignored.228 The marginal place of Indians in the environmental
movement generally229 thus far has largely carried over to the environmental justice
approach.230 As Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr. explains, “Indian values and
belief systems are not reflected in or accepted by our environmental law. . . . [I]n
Indian visions of environmental justice, all land is sacred, but that does not mean
that tribal lands should never be used by the people.”231
Environmental paternalism might be appropriate—and has been called for—
when distributional justice is taken to be the sum total of environmental justice.
Accepting the need for environmental paternalism requires that the group being
“protected” be seen as unable to protect themselves.232 Only when it is accepted
that tribes are doing something “wrong” when they decide to prioritize economic
growth, or that tribes are powerless to resist the interest of harmful industries, can a
case for paternalism be made.233 Consider for example the following quotes from
two leading scholars:
Examples of outsiders to be opposed might be the corporate disposers of nuclear and
other toxic waste who want to dump in South Dakota and Indian country . . . .234
Unfortunately, the cultural meaning of Mother Earth to many tribes becomes less
important as their people seek sufficient education, well-paying jobs, modern health
services, updated housing, and adequate food supplies.235

The first quote assumes that Indian tribes should never agree to accept nuclear
or toxic waste in return for payments that would alleviate reservation poverty.
There is nothing wrong with that position, but its paternalism is self-evident.236 The
227 Most articles focus on environmental justice theory and not on providing examples—so they
should not necessarily be faulted for not discussing Indian environmental justice issues—yet the absence
of Indian examples is striking. See, e.g., Kaswan, supra note 224 (containing a 118-page article without
any discussion of Indian environmental justice issues).
228 See Cluett, supra note 215, at 197 (“American Indians are rarely treated as a separate group for
the purposes of examining environmental racism.”).
229 Wiggins, supra note 186, at 349.
230 A notable counter-example is Professor James Grijalva’s 2008 book, Closing the Circle:
Environmental Justice in Indian Country. GRIJALVA, supra note 15.
231 Robert A. Williams, Jr., Large Binocular Telescopes, Red Squirrel Piñatas, and Apache Sacred
Mountains: Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multicultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 1133, 1153
(1994).
232 See Cluett, supra note 215, at 201–02 (describing the paternalistic position of Eleanor Metzger).
233 Members of Congress share the idea that industry might need to be controlled because of the
possibility “that tribal communities are being exploited by an unprincipled industry that takes advantage
of poor communities.” Jana L. Walker & Kevin Gover, Commercial Solid and Hazardous Waste
Disposal Projects on Indian Lands, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 229, 260 (1993). Tribes that decide to pursue
harm-causing projects “face economic paternalism from those who believe . . . that Tribes are simply
incapable of making proper and intelligent decisions.” Walker et al., supra note 205, at 390.
234 Pommersheim, supra note 9, at 364.
235 FIXICO, supra note 142, at 190.
236 The paternalism of the original quote comes across when seen alongside the practice of tribes to
“seek . . . out” hazardous waste sites, even though such siting “generally seem[s] forced upon
communities.” Cluett, supra note 215, at 201.

GAL.ROSSER.DOC

2010]

6/23/2010 2:50 PM

AHISTORICAL INDIANS AND RESOURCES

471

same is true of the second quote: The word “unfortunately” only makes sense if
well-paying jobs and adequate food supplies are not thought of as rightly being
significant enough to alter the cultural meaning of Mother Earth.
Avoiding environmental paternalism requires expanding the understanding of
environmental justice to include respect for sovereignty when it comes to
Indians.237 And, according to Professor Williams, environmentalists find it
“difficult” to deal with tribal governments who are willing to entertain
environmentally harmful siting proposals.238 Yet there is some agreement among
scholars and government officials that “addressing environmental justice in Indian
country require[s] creative solutions utilizing tribes’ governmental status.”239 Once
tribal sovereignty is acknowledged to play a role in environmental justice, things
get a lot more complicated: Indians must be distinguished from all other
disadvantaged groups facing environmental injustice,240 Indian rights to self(re)definition must be respected,241 and arguably Indian environmental perspectives
should be incorporated to a greater extent into general environmental law.242 This is

237 “Indians” here refers to the collective rights of Indians as peoples, not Indians as individuals. The
United States and other countries oppose the term “peoples” in relation to indigenous peoples and have
sought “to delete the letter ‘s’ from the term ‘indigenous peoples.’” Dean B. Suagee, Recent
Development, Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Will the United States Rise to the Occasion?, 21
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 365, 376 (1997). Oren Lyons, a traditional chief of the Onondaga Nation, Iroquois
Confederacy, explains, “When you say peoples, then we have to be recognized as separate nations and
sovereigns. Consequently, they still refuse to add s to people.” Oren Lyons, Law, Principle, and Reality,
20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 210 (1993). The issue took center stage at the 1993 United
Nations World Conference on Human Rights and was dubbed “the battle of the ‘s’” by the Canadian
press. Russel Lawrence Barsh, Indigenous Peoples in the 1990s: From Object to Subject of International
Law, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 33, 51 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Canadian Press,
Battle of the ‘s,’ MONTREAL GAZETTE, June 23, 1993, at A12). For more on collective group rights of
indigenous peoples and how these rights relate to U.S. history and political structure, see generally
Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group Rights, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 739
(1990).
238 See Williams, supra note 231, at 1154.
239 GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 9 (describing the EPA position); see also Collins & Hall, supra note
130, at 313 (“In order to understand the position of Native Americans in environmental law, the twin
issues of racism and sovereignty must be understood.”); Walker et al., supra note 205, at 395 (“If Tribes
are to achieve environmental justice within Indian country . . . it is absolutely imperative that
environmental justice issues affecting Tribes be viewed against the backdrop of tribal sovereignty
. . . .”).
240 GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 4 (making this claim based on tribal sovereignty and the close
connections of Indians with the natural environment); Catherine A. O’Neill, Environmental Justice in
the Tribal Context: A Madness to EPA’s Method, 38 ENVTL. L. 495, 508 (2008) (arguing that Indians
cannot be treated as any other “subpopulation” for environmental justice purposes because of tribal
sovereignty and their government-to-government relationship with the United States (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
241 See, e.g., Oren Lyons et al., Traditionalism and the Reassertion of Indianness, in INDIAN SELFRULE, supra note 1, at 243, 244 (“We will determine what our culture is. It has been pointed out that
culture constantly changes. It is not the same today as it was a hundred years ago. We are still a vital,
active Indian society. We are not going to be put in a museum or accept your interpretations of our
culture.”).
242 For more on what environmental law stands to gain from Indian perspectives, see GRIJALVA,
supra note 15, at x–xi (“Tribes . . . bring a measure of human humility and respect for the natural world
modern American environmental law seemingly lacks but, I think, desperately needs.”); id. at 11
(“[W]estern environmental law as implemented by federal and state agencies is generally unable to
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not to suggest that the tensions between environmental justice as distributional
justice and a broader understanding of environmental justice simply disappear. In
the preface to his book on environmental justice in Indian country, Professor James
Grijalva writes that “[o]ne of the main premises of this book is that tribes’ absence
from the national dialogue and implementation of federal environmental programs
is largely responsible for creating environmental injustice in Indian country, the
concept that some minority communities suffer disproportionately higher
environmental risks than many white communities.”243 Professor Grijalva’s
premise challenges tribal and environmental advocates because it asserts that tribes
should play an expanded role while seeming to accept that results should be
judged based on whether Indians bear a disproportionate burden. It is the
potential conflict between distributional justice and sovereignty-informed
environmental justice that animates tribally embraced projects or harms.
B. Contracts of Adhesion and Tribal Lands
Should tribal contracts or lease agreements with environmentally harmful
industries be considered contracts of adhesion, as is true of Indian treaties? Or
when a tribe decides to accept a payment, whether in the form of royalties, taxes, or
jobs, in return for suffering environmental harm, does it do so “freely” and out of
its own powers of self-determination? On the one hand, without having an adequate
amount of freedom to walk away from environmentally harmful projects, the
“choice” to accept such projects is arguably merely the illusion of choice, and the
formal acceptance through contract hides the true tribal position. On the other hand,
the presence of constraints or tribal needs alone preceding contract approval should
not automatically taint all such agreements as adhesional.
Treaties between Indians and the United States have been likened to contracts
of adhesion and have been interpreted in that way by the Supreme Court.244
Recognizing the “power disparity” between Indians and the U.S. government in
drafting treaties, the Court, starting with Chief Justice John Marshall, has
consistently viewed treaties as “agreement[s] in which the negotiation process had
not been one of arm’s-length bargaining between equal adversaries.”245 In order to
partially offset the adhesional aspects of the treaty negotiation process, the Court
created a set of rules, or “canons of construction,” liberally favoring Indians, to be

account for Indian visions of environmental justice that include the physical, social and spiritual
relations affected by various land development uses.”).
243 Id. at xi.
244 Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: “As
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth”—How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV.
601, 617–18 (1975).
245 Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and
Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381, 401 (1993). Professor Frickey goes on to
highlight the limitations of a contract of adhesion approach as compared to a sovereignty approach when
interpreting Marshall’s opinion in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Frickey, supra, at
406–07 (focusing on timing of the Worcester decision, which predates the development of the adhesion
contract approach in contract law).
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used when interpreting treaty ambiguities.246 Importantly, the canons of
construction inform treaty interpretation, but they do not invalidate treaty terms—
whatever the failings or imbalances in the negotiations, the treaties are still valid
instruments.247 The United States stopped making treaties with Indians in 1871, and
since then what used to be accomplished through treaty has been in part
accomplished by agreement and contract between Indian tribes and
non-Indian governments.248
Power disparities between Indians and non-Indian interests did not go away
with the end of treaty making; what changed was the form of the relationship and,
to some degree, the contracting parties. The contracts of adhesion interpretative
lens used for treaties fits imperfectly with contracts for environmentally hazardous
or destructive activities—whether for the storage of nuclear waste or the mining of
coal—between tribes and companies or between tribes and non-Indian
governments. Dramatic proof that formal contracts are little more than adhesion
contracts can be seen in a 1948 Associated Press photograph.249 The “photograph
captured Fort Berthold Chairman George Gillette weeping as Interior Secretary
J.A. Krug signed the contract to acquire land that was home to 80% of the
reservation’s population to build a reservoir.”250 The resulting dam had
“devastating effects” on the tribes affected and “almost totally destroyed” their way
of life.251 This was accomplished by a government-to-government contract and not
by a treaty; yet, unequal bargaining positions make this supposed agreement akin to
an adhesion contract.
Some of the commentary on reservation mineral leases blurs the line between
non-Indian governments and non-Indian corporate interests, between power and
economics, treating them alike as powers that disadvantaged tribes are forced to

246 For more on the development of the Indian canons of construction, see Kristen A. Carpenter,
Interpretive Sovereignty: A Research Agenda, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 111, 117–20 (2008).
247 See id. at 120. Courts have resolved treaties between Indians and non-Indian governments “‘as
the Indians would have understood them.’” See id. at 117 (quoting United States v. Shoshone Tribe of
Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938)).
248 Congress, in 1871, passed legislation providing “[t]hat hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the
territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.” Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544,
566 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)). The Act reflected anger in the House of
Representatives about not being involved in the treaty process; therefore, “abandonment of treatymaking
was a matter of internal congressional politics.” Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in
Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 441 (2005). Negotiated agreements approved by Congress
and signed by the President replaced treaties. Id.
249 The photograph was taken by William Chaplis on May 20, 1948, and can be
seen at http://www.newberry.org/lewisandclark/newnation/ranchers/flooding.asp.
See
also
PAUL
VANDEVELDER, SAVAGES AND SCOUNDRELS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S ROAD TO EMPIRE
THROUGH INDIAN TERRITORY 113 (2009) (reprinting, on the preceding, unnumbered page, the
photograph, and describing tribal chairman George Gillette as being “[o]vercome by grief” as “the
formal takings act that allowed Congress to ‘condemn’ 156,000 acres of the tribes’ ancestral homelands”
was signed).
250 Bethany R. Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate over Indian Equality 12 (2010) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (emphasis added). Thanks to Professor Berger for locating the photo
and for providing the history of the photo.
251 Mandan, Hidatsa & Arikara Nation, History: Other History, http://www.mhanation.com/
main/history/history_garrison_dam.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
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accept. Professor Donald Fixico’s thesis in The Invasion of Indian Country in the
Twentieth Century is that the continued exploitation of tribal natural resources by
American capitalism has forced Indian leaders “to adopt modern corporate
strategies to ensure the survival of their nations and people.”252 Similarly, Nancy
Collins and Andrea Hall write, “[T]he federal government may force tribes, by the
power of law or economics, to accept nuclear waste.”253 According to this
perspective, the subordinate position of tribes forces acceptance of environmental
costs in return for compensation. Compensation, while it may “ameliorat[e] the
unfair consequences of siting,” also “can be seen as deliberately exploiting the
special status of these land-rich, economically poor, and isolated sovereigns in
order to secure a dumping ground where the community is in a poor position to
object to the infusion of economic incentives.”254 Viewed this way, businesses with
undesirable characteristics have the incentive to seek out “vulnerable”
communities—whether Indian or with other disadvantaged groups—that have little
choice but to accept payments for environmental harms.255
The problem with this perspective is that it denies the agency of affected
communities and tribes by falsely equating economic need with deterministic
outcomes. Considering the probusiness orientation of the U.S. government and its
failures to live up to its trust duty to tribes, it may be fair to blur the line between
government and corporate contracts with Indian nations.256 But simply because a
community is hurting economically does not mean that when it agrees to allow
harmful projects it does so “unwillingly,” as one commentator has suggested.257
Why is this important? Large multinational corporations bring to negotiations not
only their own resources but knowledge of the tribal position. Tribal governments
are heavily dependent upon both royalty receipts and U.S. government

252

FIXICO, supra note 142, at ix–x.
Collins & Hall, supra note 130, at 314 (emphasis added).
254 Id. at 320.
255 ROBERT D. BULLARD ET AL., UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE AT
TWENTY: 1987–2007: GRASSROOTS STRUGGLES TO DISMANTLE ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM IN THE
UNITED STATES 155 (2007), available at http://www.ucc.org/assets/pdfs/toxic20.pdf. A series of
influential environmental justice articles by Professor Vicki Been uses the term “locally undesirable land
uses” (LULUs for short); much of the thinking about environmental justice is framed in terms of
LULUs. See Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate
Siting or Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L.J. 1383, 1384 (1994) (discussing studies that demonstrate
links between LULUs and socioeconomic characteristics); Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got to Do With
It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001,
1001–03 (1993) (discussing the siting of LULUs in poor or minority neighborhoods). However, here the
choice to describe this in terms of “undesirable characteristics” instead of LULUs is deliberate; some
harmful activities may have little local effects while still being undesirable, and will only be accepted
with compensation. See, e.g., Howard A. Latin, Environmental Deregulation and Consumer
Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 197–98 (1982) (discussing
environmental consequences that “occur at times and places far removed from the locus of consumer
choice” (footnotes omitted)).
256 The success of the ex parte communications between a Peabody lobbyist and Secretary Hodel
attests to both the private-public linkages and the failure of the government to live up to the trust
relationship. See supra notes 158–63 and accompanying text.
257 Cluett, supra note 215, at 203 (“[R]esidents of minority and economically crippled
communities, presented with promises of money and jobs, unwillingly receive hazardous waste
facilities.”).
253
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assistance.258 For the Navajo Nation, “[c]hronic unemployment and an extremely
low per capita income level . . . would seem to make the people of this area
receptive to any form of industrialization, including mining.”259 Companies
engaged in harm-causing activities thus enter into negotiations from a position of
strength, but acknowledging that economic conditions may favor accepting
compensation for environmental harms does not mean that tribes are powerless to
resist corporate interests or that they will never reject harm-causing proposals.260
As Navajo Nation President Joe Shirley, Jr. explains, “The Navajo Nation is part of
the modern economy. We do not oppose creating jobs, but there are lines we will not
cross in order to make money.”261
Elsewhere I have argued that the United States bears some responsibility for
establishing the conditions in which tribes operate and which contribute to tribal
acceptance of harm-causing contracts such as those with extractive industrial
interests.262 The bureaucratic management of tribal land that I highlighted there is
just one aspect of a larger program of separating Indians from their land and
resources.263 The conflict between Indians and non-Indians has been seen by some

258 See Morton, supra note 56, at 104 (citing Lorraine Turner Ruffing, The Navajo Nation: A History
of Dependence and Underdevelopment, REV. RADICAL POL. ECON., Summer 1979, at 25, 31–32, for the
proposition that the Navajo Nation’s dependence upon royalty payments is one reason for the “relatively
low . . . bargaining power” of the tribe); see also Barsh, supra note 50, at 217 (“Even if Indian tribes
were guaranteed absolute freedom of choice in land development, their dependence on government aid
and capital would continue to influence planning.”).
It is beyond the scope of this Article to define or defend an accounting of what counts as
U.S. government aid to tribes. For the purposes of this Article, it is enough to say that if the United
States ceased providing tribes with funding, government services would suffer markedly for many
tribes. Some U.S. government funding goes directly to tribal administrative agencies that have taken
over work previously performed by BIA (similar to federal block grants to states), some funding is used
to meet obligations that the United States agreed to through treaty, and some funding flows directly to
individual tribal members as part of the government’s welfare obligations to all citizens, regardless of
Indian or non-Indian status. See generally Deloria, supra note 1, at 194–200 (discussing reservation
welfare programs); Virginia Davis, A Discovery of Sorts: Reexamining the Origins of the Federal
Indian
Housing
Obligation,
18 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 211, 211–12 (2002) (arguing that the U.S. government has
treaty-based obligations to provide reservation housing).
259 Radford, supra note 177, at 12.
260 See Williams, supra note 231, at 1153–54 (arguing that given high unemployment rates Indians
will consider siting a hazardous waste dump on an unused area, but would not even think about such a
dump if it were placed “where important spiritual, social, or physical values of the tribe are implicated”).
261 Declaration of Joe Shirley, President of the Navajo Nation, at 3, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) (Nos. CV 05-1824-PCT-PCR, CV 05-1914-PCT-EHC, CV 051949-PCT-NVW, CV 05-1966-PCT-JAT).
262 Ezra Rosser, This Land Is My Land, This Land Is Your Land: Markets and Institutions for
Economic Development on Native American Land, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 245, 265–66 (2005) (looking at the
causes and solutions to reservation poverty from the perspectives of neoclassical economics and new
institutional economics).
263 The dual—United States and tribal—control over trust land protects the integrity of the tribal land
base, a goal that almost everyone working on behalf of tribes supports and that reflects the failure of
allotment. See id. at 262–65. The problem comes when U.S. and tribal governments, together or
independently, manage the trust land poorly and in ways that reduce the value of the land. Even those
less supportive of tribal trust land who have done studies indicating that the trust status of reservation
land reduces land output acknowledge that such cost “does not necessarily imply that trust constraints
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scholars as fundamentally about control over resources and land, not about cultural
conflict.264 While land is no longer simply taken, there has developed “a system of
routine economic supervision, purportedly protective, that favors certain patterns of
resource exploitation.”265 Managing reservation land as if it were public land, the
United States discouraged some forms of investment and encouraged others.266 As
Professor Robert L. Bee argues, “[p]olicy ad-hoccery” may itself lead to
“exploitation of Indian resources,” even if the intent of U.S. government agencies
was entirely for the good of tribes rather than responding to corporate interests.267
But regardless of motivation, the United States “encouraged industry to exploit
Indian country’s wealth of natural resources,” even where not supported by tribes
or tribal members.268
To illustrate the tremendous impact of federal resource management, it is
worth exploring both the tribal effort to block further development of the San
Francisco Peaks and the imposition of mandatory livestock reduction by
Washington in the 1930s. Though somewhat removed from the U.S. government’s
encouragement of leasing for natural resource extraction, the two controversies
illustrate the importance of tribal control over tribal resources. They also have had
and will continue to have an impact on the forms of economic opportunities
available to the Navajo Nation and to tribal members.
1. San Francisco Peaks
The tension between Indian interests and industrial interests is currently
playing out dramatically in the courts in a case involving the San Francisco Peaks,
one of the traditional four sacred mountains of the Diné.269 The Peaks have spiritual
significance for many tribes, not just the Diné, but the land itself is off-reservation
federal forest land.270 The United States Forest Service granted a special use permit
to a ski resort, and in 2002 Snowbowl Ski Area sought permission to expand the
should be lifted.” Terry L. Anderson & Dean Lueck, Land Tenure and Agricultural Productivity on
Indian Reservations, 35 J.L. & ECON. 427, 449 (1992).
264 Joe De La Cruz et al., What Indians Should Want: Advice to the President, in INDIAN SELF-RULE,
supra note 1, at 311, 319 (including, according to Philip S. Deloria, “the relationship of Indians to the
economy” as part of the true conflict).
265 Barsh, supra note 50, at 195.
266 Id. at 195–98, 217.
267 Robert L. Bee, Riding the Paper Tiger, in STATE AND RESERVATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 139, 140 (George Pierre Castile & Robert L. Bee eds., 1992).
268 GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 175; see MCCABE & LEWIS, supra note 67, at 22–24 (comparing the
status of the Navajo reservation to an underdeveloped nation in the grip of a colonial system). The
Canadian government shares in this, promoting “industry and enterprises center[ed] on natural resource
extraction” as the means of generating jobs and government revenue on indigenous land. Taiaiake
Alfred, Sovereignty, in SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS: LOCATIONS OF CONTESTATION AND POSSIBILITY IN
INDIGENOUS STRUGGLES FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 33, 45 (Joanne Barker ed., 2005).
269 For up-to-date information on the dispute as well as a collection of the documents related to the
case, see Save the Peaks Coal., Protect and Respect the Mountain and Our Children!,
http://www.savethepeaks.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
270 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3–6, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2763
(2009) (No. 08-846); see also Jonathan Knapp, Note, Making Snow in the Desert: Defining a Substantial
Burden under RFRA, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 259, 295–96 (2009) (describing the importance of the Peaks in
the beliefs of Navajos and Hopis).
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resort and to spray the ski areas with artificial snow.271 Even before the Forest
Service approved the project, tribes for whom the Peaks are sacred objected,
claiming that their religious rights were being violated.272 To produce the artificial
snow, the resort was going to spray up to 1.5 million gallons of treated sewage
water a day onto the mountain as snow.273 The Ninth Circuit highlighted the lower
court’s findings that “highly variable snowfall” had resulted in operating losses for
the owners of the ski resort274 and that artificial snow was “needed to maintain the
viability of the Snowbowl.”275 For the tribes, this would be a form of desecration
because it is quite literally the spraying of feces and dead bodies onto the sacred
Peaks—feces because of the use of toilet wastewater, and dead bodies because of
run-off from funeral parlors.276 Such treatment of a place of religious significance
is, according to the plaintiffs, a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion
and a violation of the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).277
The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the Forest Service and Snowbowl,
characterizing the claim as being based upon “diminishment of spiritual
fulfillment,” which it held did not amount to a substantial burden.278 The appeals
court majority focused on the relatively small amount of land impacted—one
percent of the Peaks—by the ski area and applied a restrictive reading of RFRA’s
requirements.279 Additionally, the majority seemed to find comfort in Arizona’s
classification of the treated sewage water that would be used as being of an A+
grade, the highest mark possible under state law, signaling that it is suitable for
irrigation of school grounds and crops.280 Not discussed by the majority is that
Arizona’s approval of similar treated waste for school grounds places students
playing sports in the unenviable position of having to choose whether or not to dive

271

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 270, at 3.
Id.
273 Id.
274 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008).
275 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 208 F. Supp.
2d 866, 907 (D. Ariz. 2006)).
276 Id. Though the toilet wastewater complaint is straightforward, it might appear to require a little
creativity to connect sewage with dead bodies; but according to the Navajo Nation President, the
connection is a significant one:
272

Practitioners of the Navajo religion are not concerned with what the scientists say about the
quality of reclaimed wastewater. Some of this water has come into contact with death and
sickness at, for example, hospitals and mortuaries. It does not matter what kind of treatment is
provided, this water will compromise and contaminate the sacred Mountain that was established
by the Holy People.
Declaration of Joe Shirley, President of the Navajo Nation, supra note 261, at 2. The dissent seemed to
agree, quoting Larry Foster, a Diné training to be a medicine man, at length for a description of the harm
associated with sewage water, with Foster twice referring to “mortuaries or hospitals.” Navajo Nation,
535 F.3d at 1103 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
277 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to -4 (2006); Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1067.
278 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1070.
279 Id. (discussing amount of land impacted); id. at 1089 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority’s “restrictive definition of ‘substantial burden’”); Brief of Amici Curiae Religious Liberty Law
Scholars in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4–7, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S.
Ct. 2763 (2009) (No. 08-846).
280 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1065.
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for the ball or to let it get away so as to avoid excessive contact with grass that
when wet smells of human waste.281 In dissent, Judge William Fletcher noted that
the Forest Service’s environmental impact assessment failed “to discuss either the
health risks resulting from ingestion of the treated sewage effluent or the likelihood
that humans—either adults or children—will in fact ingest the artificial snow.”282
Moreover, the current owner of the ski resort purchased it in 1992 “with full
knowledge of weather conditions in northern Arizona.”283 After an extended
critique of the majority’s treatment of RFRA, Judge Fletcher ends the dissent by
highlighting the irony of the court protecting everyone’s recreational interest in
“‘public park land’” to justify “spraying treated sewage effluent on the holiest of
the Indians’ holy mountains,” when that land was originally taken by force from
Indians.284 Despite the strength of the dissent285and the importance of the case to
the tribes involved, the Supreme Court decided against hearing arguments on the
matter.286 Sewage effluent, after all, was not being sprayed on the National
Cathedral or a Judeo-Christian sacred site.287
2. Livestock Reduction
Diné who were alive in the 1930s still remember with anger the forced stock
reductions of that period.288 Sheep play a defining role in Navajo life: Herd size and
social position are correlated, extended family life revolves around sheep, and the
inheritance of grazing rights from generation to generation is often hotly
281 Based on a personal experience of the author playing seventh-grade soccer on fields irrigated
with such water in Kayenta, Arizona.
282 Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1111 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
283 Id. at 1082.
284 Id. at 1113 (quoting id. at 1063 (majority opinion)). Professor Kristen A. Carpenter, who has
done a series of articles on the religious rights of non-Indian owners, tellingly begins one article on
sacred site jurisprudence by calling attention to the fact that “through varied means of acquisition, nonIndian governments, entities, and individuals have come to own Indian sacred sites.” Kristen A.
Carpenter, Old Ground and New Directions at Sacred Sites on the Western Landscape, 83 DENV. U. L.
REV. 981, 983 (2006); see also Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites
Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1063 (2005) (discussing
the special problem American Indians face in practicing religious and cultural activities on land owned
by the federal government); Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katval & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of
Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1024–25 (2009) (focusing on protecting indigenous cultural rights
through property interests).
285 But see Knapp, supra note 270, at 306–11 (offering a critique of Justice Fletcher’s approach to
the case).
286 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009); see also GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at
172 (“[T]he Court’s modern role is not to seek justice delayed for Indian people, but rather to ensure
those who benefit from a nation built on land and natural resources acquired from Tribes by force,
threats, artifice and fraud continue to do so.”).
287 The amicus certiorari petition brief submitted by the National Congress of American Indians
draws parallels between how Indians view the San Francisco Peaks and the importance for non-Indians
of sacred sites around the world, and asks, “If Mount Calvary, the Holy Mosque in Mecca, or the
Wailing Wall were located on public lands in the United States, would they be denied protection under
RFRA in the same manner as the San Francisco Peaks?” Brief of Amici Curiae National Congress of
American Indians et al. in Support of Petitioners at 17, Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 129 S. Ct.
2763 (No. 08-846).
288 See MARSHA WEISIGER, DREAMING OF SHEEP IN NAVAJO COUNTRY 18 (2009).
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contested.289 Miss Navajo Nation contestants butcher a sheep as part of the pageant,
held during the Navajo Nation Fair.290 Mutton stands operating out of small trailers
or in fairgrounds are found in most towns, and the butchering of a sheep is a part of
how many celebrate major events such as weddings or large gatherings.291 If
anything, Navajo sheep culture was even stronger in the 1930s. In The Navajo
Indians, published in 1930, the authors write, “Men, women, and sheep—the three
are inseparable in Navajo life.”292 The majority of Diné owned sheep and, together
with goats, they were the source of cash.293 Social status was primarily determined
by herd size, with the wealthy raising sheep for sale on the market and the poor
having subsistence-level holdings.294 Sheep simultaneously provided Diné their food
and their livelihoods, and after returning from Fort Sumner in 1868, sheep numbers
rose such that before the turn of the century Navajos were described as wealthy and
self-supporting.295
Navajo livestock reduction was instituted in 1933 in an effort to deal with
severe overgrazing.296 Spearheaded by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs John
Collier, the program found support in the Roosevelt administration’s embrace of a
scientific approach to problems.297 The Navajo Nation Council, recognizing that
even if it objected “the government would carry out stock reduction anyway,”
approved the program in the hope that after doing so the tribe would be granted

289 Gary Witherspoon, Sheep in Navajo Culture and Social Organization, 75 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
1441, 1443 (1973).
290 Filmmaker Billy Luther, himself the son of the 1966 winner, followed Crystal Frazier as she
prepared for and competed in the pageant; the butchering scene in the resulting documentary vividly
captures the importance of sheep for the Diné. The author strongly recommends readers interested in the
Navajo Nation see, literally see, MISS NAVAJO (World of Wonder Productions 2007). More information is
available at World of Wonder Prods., Miss Navajo: A Documentary by Billy Luther,
http://www.missnavajomovie.com (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
291 See World of Wonder Prods., supra note 290.
292 COOLIDGE & COOLIDGE, supra note 37, at 63.
293 Morton, supra note 56, at 265.
294 Eric Henderson, Navajo Livestock Wealth and the Effects of the Stock Reduction Program of the
1930s, 45 J. ANTHROPOLOGICAL RES. 379, 380–81 (1989).
295 Id. at 380 (citing an 1892 account of a Gallup school superintendent).
296 Although containing some statements that are offensive by today’s standards—Navajos are
described as “superior physically and in other respects” and “[the] sex morals are on a higher plane than
with most tribes”—an article entitled Navajo Land Problems published in 1937 provides a great window
into the thinking at the time as to the origins of, and solutions for, Navajo overgrazing. See J.W. Hoover,
Navajo Land Problems, 13 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 281, 283, 297–98 (1937).
297 Professor Colleen O’Neill explains,

[T]he advent of a new, reformist administration offered a unique opportunity . . . . The soil
experts, climatologists, agricultural economists, and sociologists who descended onto the
reservation in the 1930s to preserve Navajo rangelands enjoyed unprecedented political support
in Washington and unwavering faith that science would offer an acceptable solution.
These scientists examined all aspects of the Navajos’ problem. They tested the soils, studied
the climate, and inspected the livestock. They assessed the carrying capacity of reservation land
and divided it into eighteen land management districts and calculated how many sheep, goats,
and horses each could support.
O’NEILL, supra note 57, at 23 (citation omitted).
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additional reservation land.298 The forced culling of Navajo herds affected all
livestock, with the reservation’s carrying capacity calculated in sheep units;
according to the Department of the Interior, the Diné had double the number of
sheep units that the land would support (one million compared to 500,000).299
Navajos were paid for the animals killed, but at below market rates.300 As a
consequence, force rather than consent was used: “Agents went to herds and often
shot the animals before the eyes of astonished, grieving families.”301 Some of the
animals “were merely shot and left to rot,” a level of waste that Navajos “were
incapable of understanding.”302 Removal and incarceration awaited those Diné who
resisted stock reduction.303 The supposed scientific necessity of reducing
overgrazing—a 1931 Department of the Interior study concluded that every
jurisdiction of the Navajo reservation “had more animals than it could conceivably
support”304—does not compensate for the colonialist nature of the program
imposed upon the tribe by the federal government.305 The Executive Committee of
the Navajo Nation Council was even told of the possibility that troops would be
called in by Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier.306
In part by design—the stock reductions were especially targeted to hit those
with the largest herds in order to reduce reservation inequality—the stock
reductions had dramatic effects on the Navajo economy and on the welfare of Diné
families.307 With their herds halved, for many families government welfare took the

298 David Wilkins, Governance Within the Navajo Nation: Have Democratic Traditions Taken
Hold?, WICAZO SA REV., Spring 2002, at 91, 105 (2002). The same basic promise—that if the Navajos
cooperated they would get more land—had been made to induce the tribal council to approve oil leases
in the 1920s. See supra note 95.
299 Gary D. Libecap & Ronald N. Johnson, The Navajo and Too Many Sheep: Overgrazing on the
Reservation, in BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC
GOVERNANCE 87, 89 (John Baden & Richard L. Stroup eds., 1981). For an overview of the development
of the Navajo sheep economy as well as the range conditions related to Navajo livestock, see RENO,
supra note 58, at 15–16, 26–45.
300 The government paid families $1 per goat and $2 per sheep; between 1933 and 1934, according
to one study, the market price for sheep rose from $2.30 to $3.35. Libecap & Johnson, supra note 299, at
89–90.
301 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 73 (discussing the goat reductions of 1934).
302 KELLY, supra note 71, at 162.
303 Robert S. McPherson, Navajo Livestock Reduction in Southeastern Utah, 1933–46: History
Repeats Itself, 22 AM. INDIAN Q. 1, 7 (1998). Moreover, “[a]s stock reduction became increasingly
forced, more violence and longer jail sentences resulted.” Id. at 12.
304 KELLY, supra note 71, at 114.
305 FRANCISCONI, supra note 85, at 50. In a 1934 article written by the Department of the Interior’s
Director of the Soil Erosion Service that uses reservation erosion as an example of a generalized
problem, readers are walked through the scientific process of dealing with erosion across the country on
a farm-by-farm basis and told that “work is carried out on a strictly cooperative basis with the farmers.”
H.H. Bennett, Soil Erosion—A National Menace, 39 SCI. MONTHLY 385, 400 (1934). Such consideration
was not extended on the Navajo reservation, where Navajos were “caught in a catastrophe, largely
because they were a colonial appendage of American society.” WHITE, supra note 38, at 248.
306 YOUNG, supra note 71, at 88.
307 For more on the equity goals of stock reduction and how the program changed over time, see
WHITE, supra note 38, at 265–68 (noting that the goat reduction portion of the program
disproportionately affected the poor, and highlighting opposition to early inequities); Henderson, supra
note 294, at 393–400 (discussing the leveling of wealth); Libecap & Johnson, supra note 299, at 89–95
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place of prior self-sufficiency and wealth.308 Although arguably undertaken with
good intentions—preventing the negative long-term effects of overgrazing—the
program also owed its existence to the construction of the Hoover Dam, which
experts feared would get clogged with silt and quickly become “useless” unless
erosion from Navajo lands was stopped.309 The Roosevelt Administration’s
program of “stock reduction rivaled the Long Walk in its devastating
consequences” on the Diné people and on the tribal economy.310 Professor Robert
McPherson explains,
The livestock reduction of the 1930s was one of two major tragedies in the
Navajos’ tribal memory. The trauma of the first tragedy, the round up and
incarceration of the people at Fort Sumner between 1864–68, has been passed down
by word of mouth for generations, as a time of defeat, degradation, and removal at the
hands of the white man. The destruction of livestock in the 1930s was, to the Navajo,
an economic form of the same thing—defeat, degradation, and removal.311

For the Navajo Nation, livestock reduction increased poverty, demonstrated U.S.
control over reservation life, and necessitated a move towards other forms of
economic growth.312
Livestock reduction and the San Francisco Peaks dispute are but examples of
the pervasive control that the United States has over Diné life. The Navajo Nation’s
current inability to protect off-reservation sites that are sacred to the tribe reflects
the same power dynamic as the forced livestock reductions of the 1930s. Legal
scholars describe the power of the United States over tribes in terms of
congressional “plenary power”—Congress’s (near) absolute authority over Indian
sovereignty—and as these two Navajo experiences show, the power dynamic takes
on different forms.313 Livestock reduction and the Peaks dispute share in the

(highlighting Collier’s role in pushing an equity as part of the program and the consequent limits on herd
size).
308 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 73 (“Many Navajos lost their livelihood altogether and were
forced to accept government subsidies for the first time.”); FRANCISCONI, supra note 85, at 58 (noting
that stock reduction made supplemental wages and welfare income a necessity for many families);
McPherson, supra note 303, at 2 (including the “crippling of the relatively self-sufficient Navajo
economy” among the effects of stock reduction).
309 Wilkins, supra note 298, at 104.
310 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 83.
311 McPherson, supra note 303, at 1.
312 Stock reduction’s “economic hardships” were supposed to be offset in part through wage work on
New Deal conservation projects, in line with Collier’s pledge “to triple Navajo income.” WEISIGER,
supra note 288, at 165. The end result, however, was “the expropriation and absolute impoverishment of
many Navajo families.” LAWRENCE DAVID WEISS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN THE NAVAJO
NATION: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY 98 (1984). For an excellent way to better understand the
effects and experience of the livestock reduction policy, see NAVAJO LIVESTOCK REDUCTION: A
NATIONAL DISGRACE (1974), a collection of first-hand accounts of Diné herders and politicians looking
back on livestock reduction published by the Navajo Community Press.
313 For more on the plenary power over Indians, see Nell Jessup Newton’s leading article on the
topic. Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 195 (1984). The summary of plenary power is captured by Professor Phil Frickey: “By virtue of
its plenary power, Congress has run rough-shod over tribal interests.” Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating
Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 45 (1996).
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shaping of Diné life and experiences by the federal government. Non-Indians
perhaps cannot fully appreciate the cultural significance of the Peaks to tribal
members, but the government’s taking of half of the livelihood of most families
obviously would have a long-term impact on Diné economic opportunities and
wealth.
The outcome of these episodes would have been quite different if the tribe had
had meaningful control. Looking just at the Peaks controversy might lead one to
focus on the off-reservation status of the sacred site. But, as livestock reduction
shows, the on-reservation line is not always sufficient to ensure tribal control over
natural resources, whether involving artificial snow, grazing rights, or mineral
leases. Another historical moment is illustrative: At one point early in the
development of oil leasing on the reservation, the council wanted to go into
partnership with an oil company rather than simply sell their oil.314 The tribe was to
put up the land and share in the expenses and profits: “It was a gamble the Tribe
was willing to take in the hope of generating more income with which to meet the
demands of the Navajo people for a better life in their homeland.”315 The Secretary
of the Interior, however, thought it was too big a risk, and as trustee for the tribe he
rejected the proposal.316 Maybe it was too big a risk and maybe the reservation was
suffering from overgrazing, but by dictating such matters, the federal government
was also defining the terms of economic possibility for the tribe.
Returning now to coal leasing and the question of tribal acceptance, one might
conclude that Navajo coal leases were not coerced. Morton writes, “[G]iven the
state of the reservation economies and intra- and intertribal factionalism, the tribal
councils had good reasons (from their points of view) to approve standard
leases.”317 Once the “state of the reservation economies” is seen not as a given, but
as a result of governmental policy (such as livestock reduction), the rejection of
coercion stands on less solid ground. Without “viable economic alternatives,” tribes
will be more receptive to environmentally destructive activities,318 and therefore,
U.S. government policies that in the past prevented or presently prevent the
development of alternatives should not be separated from the question of coercion
or whether the contracts are adhesionary. It is impossible to identify the exact
moment when the Navajo Nation escaped from being told what it had to do and
from having little choice in what contracts it accepted. As the San Francisco Peaks
dispute makes clear, the United States–Navajo Nation power differential has not
disappeared. Despite this, it is my position that the Navajo Nation is now entering a
period where decisions regarding natural resource exploitation should be treated as
“belonging” to the tribe.

314

YOUNG, supra note 71, at 152.
Id.
316 Id.
317 Morton, supra note 56, at 297.
318 Collins & Hall, supra note 130, at 270 (arguing that such alternatives are required if tribes are to
properly engage in cost-benefit analysis regarding nuclear waste storage).
315
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IV. ACCEPTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
The city of San Diego had a problem, too much trash, and a solution, the
Campo Band of Indians was willing to accept the trash. The Band, in partnership
with Mid-American Waste Systems, Inc., wanted to open a large solid waste
landfill on the remote reservation.319 The tribe’s revenue from the twenty-eight
million ton capacity landfill was estimated to be $1.6 million a year.320 The United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved the landfill in 1995, but a
year later the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed,
holding that EPA did not have authority to issue the approval.321
The attorney for the tribe at the time was Kevin Gover, who would go on to
become the Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs from 1997 to
2000, a law professor, and now the director of the Smithsonian’s National Museum
of the American Indian.322 A law review article by Jana Walker and Kevin Gover
on the proposed landfill unapologetically supports the Campo Band.323 They argue,
Under certain circumstances, a solid or hazardous waste disposal project is a
viable and appropriate form of industrial development for some Indian tribes. Waste
disposal projects are not only extremely profitable, but also require little up-front cash.
Moreover, waste disposal projects can provide job opportunities to reduce significant
involuntary tribal unemployment. The drawback is, of course, the potential
environmental problems.324

Potential environmental problems are treated in both the above quote and in
the article as being of secondary importance and as something with which only the
Campo Band should concern itself.325 Walker and Gover assert that reservation
wealth and job creation should be important elements to consider regarding the
viability of disposal projects.326 Stuttering economic development provided the
impetus for this form of growth,327 and, according to Walker and Gover, writing in
1993, the proposal “instilled a sense of pride and purpose in the Indian
319

Cluett, supra note 215, at 199–200.
Backcountry Against Dumps v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 100 F.3d 147, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
321 Id. at 149–50.
322 Id. at 147; Smithsonian Institution, Senior Staff Biography: Kevin Gover, Director, National
Museum of the American Indian, http://newsdesk.si.edu/admin/bios/gover.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
2010).
323 The authors’ footnote acknowledges that the authors were the attorneys for the Campo Band.
Walker & Gover, supra note 233, at 229.
324 Id. at 231–32.
325 This despite the fact that waste companies are attracted to Indian communities in part because of
“the prospect of relaxed regulation in Indian Country.” Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the
Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1994).
Walker and Gover’s position rejecting a non-Indian role with regard to tribal environmental matters
is shared by others. After identifying sources of law, including some available to non-Indians, Dean
B. Saugee’s and John P. Lowndes’s article on public participation in tribal environmental programs
concludes by arguing that tribal courts and tribal officials bear the responsibility for establishing the
right procedures and protections, thus implicitly favoring the resolution of all concerns through the
tribal system. Dean B. Saugee & John P. Lowndes, Due Process and Public Participation in Tribal
Environmental Programs, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 43 (1999).
326 Walker & Gover, supra note 233, at 231.
327 See Cluett, supra note 215, at 200.
320
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community. . . . [T]he Band has changed from a pocket of poverty and
hopelessness to a community of Indian people united by a determination to
succeed.”328 But the court decision in 1996 blocked the tribe from reaping the
expected improvements in education, housing, economic self-sufficiency, and
government facilities planned in connection with the landfill.329
Campo Band’s decision to convert part of the tribe’s reservation into a
receptacle for San Diego’s trash powerfully illustrates the challenge of such a path
towards economic development. It goes beyond the scope of this Article to go into
the full details of the Campo Band’s proposed landfill controversy,330 but at least
according to Walker and Gover’s account, the Campo Band “[chose] this form of
development” freely and knowingly.331 As a choice it is not entirely novel: Indian–
non-Indian relations have historically been defined by exchanges of land for money
or promises.332 Given the poverty and economic development challenges of many
tribes, the basic decision of the Campo Band—acceptance of environmental harm
in return for financial reward—is likely to be repeated, with local variation, by
other tribes.
Popular stereotypes of gaming tribes aside, most tribes are still struggling
economically. “Despite abundant natural resources of land, timber, wildlife, and
energy, Indian reservations remain among the most impoverished areas in the
United States.”333 The success of Foxwoods and Mohegan Sun, along with media
coverage of the large per capita payments made by some tribes, obscure “the
overall depressed state of Native American economic development.”334 Reservation
unemployment and underemployment has long been common.335 For many reasons,
some of which affect all tribes and some which differ across tribes, poverty is a fact

328

Walker & Gover, supra note 233, at 258.
Fortunately for the Campo Band, they were able to resolve disputes with the state of California in
1997, and the Golden Acorn Casino opened in 2001. Campo Kumeyaay Nation, Campo Kumeyaay
Nation History, http://www.campo-nsn.gov/modernera.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
330 For more on the controversy, see DAN MCGOVERN, THE CAMPO INDIAN LANDFILL WAR: THE
FIGHT FOR GOLD IN CALIFORNIA’S GARBAGE (1995).
331 Walker & Gover, supra note 233, at 262.
332 Collins & Hall, supra note 130, at 270 (focusing on tribal-U.S. relations and nuclear waste
siting).
333 ANDERSON, supra note 203, at 1; see also Walker et al., supra note 205, at 384 (“The economic
condition and public health status of [American Indians and Alaska Natives] are among the lowest of
any ethnic or minority group in the United States.”).
334 Joseph P. Kalt & Stephen Cornell, The Redefinition of Property Rights in American
Indian Reservations: A Comparative Analysis of Native American Economic Development,
in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 72, at 121, 126. Backlash against gaming tribes impacts the
cultural perception non-Indians have of Indian tribes seeking federal recognition. Renee Ann Cramer,
The Common Sense of Anti-Indian Racism: Reactions to Mashantucket Pequot Success in Gaming and
Acknowledgment, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 313, 314 (2006). Professor Bethany Berger argues that
protests arise when tribes violate the “racially fixed image” of Indians as “poor, traditional, and close to
the earth.” Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 651
(2009). For a detailed account of the anti-Indian, anti-casino backlash focused on Connecticut, home of
Foxwoods and the Mohegan Sun, see JEFFREY R. DUDAS, THE CULTIVATION OF RESENTMENT: TREATY
RIGHTS AND THE NEW RIGHT 95–136 (2008).
335 Aberle, supra note 122, at 414.
329
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of reservation life.336 It is now unfair to say, as one author has, that “[t]he
reservation economy is the welfare state,” but some reservations can seem that way,
especially to outsiders.337 And importantly, “Indians do not want to be poor
anymore.”338
The economic and social payoff for tribes whose environmentally destructive
projects go forward can be significant. Successful projects allow tribes to invest in
things such as education and government services.339 Additionally, tribes may need
“a viable economic base” in order to defend their sovereignty before the U.S.
government.340 Recognizing that poverty can threaten tribal survival, tribal
governments do not merely react to outside economic interests.341 While Professor
Fixico writes that growing natural resource demands “have forced tribal leaders
into two arenas—economics and law,” such language fails to appreciate the
motivating power of poverty.342 Just like non-Indians, Indian tribes feel the conflict
between protecting the environment and economic growth, but when they decide to
pursue growth with some sacrifice, that choice should not be dismissed as
“capitalistic greed.”343 As Sam Deloria argues, “[W]e cannot help but create
confusion in American society if we blame the system for Indian poverty and then
denounce opportunities for Indians to get themselves out of poverty.”344 Despite
Professor Fixico’s concern about “economics and law,” most scholars talk about
Indian poverty with little focus on economics.345 Tribes have begun improving

336 For more on the causes of reservation poverty, see Walker et al., supra note 205, at 387. Walker
et al. explain,

These reasons include, but are not limited to, lack of money for new projects on Indian lands, as
tribal and Indian trust land cannot generally be mortgaged or put up for collateral; the
remoteness of most reservations which makes many projects not economically feasible; lack of
infrastructure—electricity, communication systems, water, roads, and buildings—conducive to
business; lack of skilled laborers and professionals; and the applicability of many federal, as well
as tribal, laws to activities in Indian country that may make businesses reluctant to locate there.
Id. Vine Deloria, Jr., writing about allotment, argued, “Indian poverty was deliberately planned and as
predictable as the seasons.” Vine Deloria, Jr., Reserving to Themselves: Treaties and the Powers of
Indian Tribes, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 963, 978 (1996).
337 Buffalohead, supra note 179, at 273.
338 Joe De La Cruz et al., What Indians Should Want: Advice to the President, in INDIAN SELF-RULE,
supra note 1, at 311, 321.
339 See Cluett, supra note 215, at 201 (“As host to a uranium mine, Laguna Pueblo has become one of the
best-educated tribes, having produced poets, doctors, writers, lawyers and academics.”).
340 R. David Edmunds et al., Tribal Sovereignty: Roots, Expectations, and Limits, in INDIAN SELFRULE, supra note 1, at 289, 290.
341 Collins & Hall, supra note 130, at 275.
342 FIXICO, supra note 142, at 189.
343 Professor Fixico’s treatment of this issue illustrates the difficulties of recognizing agency when
tribes are also part of a larger system: “[C]apitalistic greed” is described as inconsistent with Indian
values regarding the environment at one point. Id. at 189. On the other hand, when describing Indian
motivations in more detail, Professor Fixico notes, “The Indians’ reaction to the demand for their energy
resources is twofold: reluctance to allow the mining operations to continue, on one hand, and a
progressive attitude toward increased mining to help develop tribal programs on the other.” Id. at 144.
344 Deloria, supra note 1, at 200.
345 Professor Hertzberg calls economics a “neglected subject,” and notes, “We talk about Indian
poverty, but there has not been enough analysis of the economic conditions on reservations.” Suzan
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their economic situation by pursuing opportunities created by “the resource
problems of the industrialized, affluent societies” that surround them.346 Partly this
pursuit reflects limited options,347 but success also reflects advantages that tribes
have when pursuing such opportunities.348
The Navajo Nation is no different. In Red Capitalism: An Analysis of the
Navajo Economy, written in 1973, Kent Gilbreath argued that Navajos do not want
“to isolate themselves from the surrounding society,” but rather “Navajos hope that
self-determination will free them to pursue in an individualistic manner their own
economic improvement while maintaining their cultural values.”349 The problem is
that hope has not turned into reality. In a 1981 introduction focused on Navajo
economic development, Al Henderson highlighted the role energy resource
development could play in eliminating reservation poverty.350 But the goal he
articulated, “achieving substantial reductions in the social and economic disparities
between the Navajo and the rest of the United States,” has not been achieved.351 In
2004, the U.S. per capita income was $30,547 and the unemployment rate was
5.7%; the Navajo Nation’s per capita income was $7734, one-fourth that of the
United States, and the Navajo Nation unemployment rate of 48% was more than
eight times that of the United States.352 Today the Navajo Nation is hoping that the
Desert Rock power plant will help combat unemployment and reservation poverty.

Shown Harjo, Russell Jim, Hazel W. Hertzberg, Joe De La Cruz & Oren Lyons, Federal Indian Policy
Yesterday and Tomorrow, in INDIAN SELF-RULE, supra note 1, at 278, 283.
346 RENO, supra note 58, at 2 (arguing that because of proximity, Indian tribes share the resource
problems, though not the affluence). Though it sounds good to speak in terms of the “need to preserve
our ecosystems from contamination so indigenous people can utilize those natural resources,” the irony
is that surrounding community contamination is what provides the market for on-reservation waste
siting. Harjo et al., supra note 345, at 281.
347 See supra notes 252–60 and accompanying text; see also Walker et al., supra note 205,
at 390 (“Tribes seeking to free themselves from federal dependence and poverty often must consider less
desirable forms of economic development that may include potentially polluting industries and locally
unwanted land uses (‘LULUs’).”).
348 Professors Joseph Kalt and Stephen Cornell of the Harvard Project on Indian Economic
Development explain,
[S]ome American Indian tribes have enjoyed more extensive, complete, and secure property
titles than private companies. That is, in a number of important respects, reservations are more
“deregulated”—at least with respect to nontribal governments—than the vast bulk of the rest of
the economy. This creates niches in the market that present American Indian tribes with classic
opportunities for the exercise of comparative advantage. The question, of course, is how, and
how well, tribes can respond to these opportunities.
Kalt & Cornell, supra note 334, at 126.
349 GILBREATH, supra note 48, at 55.
350 Al Henderson, Introduction: What Economic Development Means to the Navajo, in RENO, supra
note 58, at xii, xv.
351 Id. at xii.
352 TRIB CHOUDHARY, DIV. OF ECON. DEV., NAVAJO NATION, COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF THE NAVAJO NATION 2005–2006, at T 49 tbl.21 (2006).
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A. Desert Rock
Navajo Nation President Joe Shirley, Jr. would like to see the Desert Rock
power plant operational. Desert Rock would create 400 permanent jobs and
“provide more than $50 million annually to the Navajo Nation.”353 Additionally,
during the first four year period of the $3.4 billion power plant,354 more than 2800
workers are expected to put in the more than ten million hours of expected
construction work.355 According to Desert Rock Energy Company, the plant “will
support local prosperity” through the relatively high salaries to be paid its
employees.356 Though described in terms of benefits from a power plant, the
agreement between the Navajo Nation’s Diné Power Authority and finance partner
Sithe Global is largely about coal.357 The power plant would be built next to a coal
mine, thus avoiding the transportation issues of the mines on Black Mesa.358 Two

353 Press Release, Office of the President & Vice President, Navajo Nation, Fluor Corp. Signs
Agreement to Build Desert Rock Energy Project, Navajo President Joe Shirley, Jr., Calls It Step to
Independence (Sept. 7, 2007), available at http://www.navajo.org/News%20Releases/George%20
Hardeen/Sept07/Fluor%20Corporation%20selected%20to%20build%20Desert%20Rock%20plant%20for
%20Sept.pdf. Fifty-two million dollars annually is the project’s revenue benefit to the tribe
according to Desert Rock Energy Co., Our Commitment: Environment, http://www.desertrock
energyproject.com/commitment.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
The power plant may employ some non-Indians with special training or qualifications, but, given
the plant’s location on a remote part of the reservation and the Navajo Preference in Employment Act
(NPEA), NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 601–619 (West 2005), a sizable percentage of
employees are likely to be Navajo. Sithe Global acknowledges the NPEA would apply and assumes
“that 65 to 80 percent of the workforce, or 130 to 160 workers, would be American Indian. Most of them
would be Navajo.” SITHE GLOBAL POWER LLC, APPLICATION FOR PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT
DETERIORATION PERMIT FOR THE DESERT ROCK ENERGY FACILITY ADDITIONAL IMPACTS:
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ANALYSIS 30 (2006). Though the NPEA might be vulnerable to legal
challenge, a suit by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against Peabody Coal for
the company’s practice of Navajo hiring and promotion preferences on Black Mesa was dismissed by
the United States District Court of Arizona in 2006. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v.
Peabody W. Coal Co., No. CV 01-01050-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL 2816603, at *17–18 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30,
2006); see also Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy,
and United States v. Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal
Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 687–88 (2009) (noting the “perceived vulnerability” of the
NPEA); Brendan O’Dell, Special Feature, Judicial Rewriting of Indian Employment Preferences—A
Case Comment: E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Company, 400 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2005), 31 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 187, 204–05 (2006) (discussing the treatment by the Ninth Circuit of EEOC’s suit prior
to final remand).
The Navajo Nation is not the only tribe with laws affording preference for tribal members; for
more on Indian preference, see Jerry D. Stubben, Indian Preference: Racial Discrimination or a
Political Right?, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 72, at 103.
354 Indian Energy Development: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 21
(May 1, 2008) (statement of Steven C. Begay, General Manager, Diné Power Authority, Navajo Nation)
[hereinafter Indian Energy Development Hearing ].
355 Press Release, Office of the President & Vice President, Navajo Nation, supra note 353.
356 Desert Rock Energy Co., Jobs and Taxes: Construction Jobs, http://www.desertrock
energyproject.com/jobs_and_taxes.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (stating that the average salary is
projected to be $60,000).
357 For more on Sithe Global, see supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
358 Off-road mining trucks will bring the coal from an open pit mine to the Desert Rock power plant.
STEAG POWER, LLC, APPLICATION FOR PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION PERMIT FOR THE
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hundred of the four hundred jobs would be at the mine,359 not the plant, and over
half the projected revenues “are a direct result of the use of Navajo coal.”360
The agreement with Sithe Global includes an option for the Navajo Nation to
buy into the plant itself, though doing so would require either a high capital outlay
or the dedication of a significant portion of the coal revenue.361 Though the mine
and associated mine-mouth coal-fired power plant are being developed
simultaneously362—unless the Navajo Nation decides to purchase equity in the
power plant itself—the partnership form merely obscures the fundamental
similarity to earlier coal leases. The arrangement is in line with a 1955
recommendation of geologists favoring partnerships rather than leases.363 In 1974,
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights recorded the belief “that 50-50 partnership
arrangements with major firms . . . might help avoid some of the abuses of outside
exploitation.”364 More recently, Richard Burnette, former Director of the National
Congress of American Indians, urged tribes to “joint venture” their natural resource
development.365
The tremendous capital requirements of constructing a power plant work
against the tribe being able to open a Desert Rock–equivalent power plant without
outside backing, in this case from a New York hedge fund.366 A 1994 survey of
tribal leaders reported that ninety-six percent of respondents said their tribe lacked
capital, the most commonly agreed upon obstacle to economic development.367 The
Navajo Nation is partnering with Sithe Global—in fact, the Navajo Nation sought
DESERT ROCK ENERGY FACILITY 6-35 (2004); see also supra note 115 and accompanying text
(discussing Black Mesa’s coal slurry and dedicated train that connect power plants with Black Mesa).
359 Indian Energy Development Hearing, supra note 354, at 23 (prepared statement of Steven C.
Begay, General Manager, Diné Power Authority, Navajo Nation).
360 Desert Rock Energy Co., supra note 356.
361 The plant will be primarily debt financed, allowing the tribe an option to purchase a 25% equity
stake for $250 million. Christopher Helman, Beyond Casinos, FORBES, Mar. 16, 2009, at 88, 89. A 49%
equity stake costs $400 million. Kathy Helms, DPA Request Denied: Power Authority Sought $2M for
Desert Rock, Transmissions Projects, GALLUP INDEP. (Gallup, N.M.), Oct. 3, 2005,
http://www.gallupindependent.com/2005/oct/100305dpa.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). Had the
Navajo Nation won its $600 million breach of trust case, United States v. Navajo Nation, 129 S. Ct.
1547 (2009), against the United States, President Shirley’s plan was “to use some of the money to buy
an equity stake in Desert Rock.” Helman, supra, at 89. Tellingly, in a press release, the Office of Navajo
Nation President & Vice President highlighted the “opportunity for the Navajo Nation to acquire an
ownership stake in the project.” Press Release, Office of the President & Vice President, Navajo Nation,
supra note 353.
362 See STEAG POWER LLC, supra note 358, at 6-35.
363 CHAMBERLAIN, supra note 69, at 92.
364 MCCABE & LEWIS, supra note 67, at 122–23 (focusing on oil and gas development).
365 See Edmunds et al., supra note 340, at 292.
366 Helman, supra note 361, at 88.
367 Theresa Julnes, Economic Development as the Foundation for Self-Determination, in AMERICAN
INDIAN POLICY, supra note 72, at 151, 155. Professor Gavin Clarkson’s articles focusing on improving
tribal access to capital highlight both the legal barriers to, and possibilities of, improving tribal finance.
See Gavin Clarkson, Accredited Indians: Increasing the Flow of Private Equity into Indian Country as a
Domestic Emerging Market, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 285, 287–92, 325–26 (2009); Gavin Clarkson, Tribal
Bonds: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory Restraints on Tribal Economic Development, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1009,
1082–84
(2007);
Gavin
Clarkson,
Wall Street Indians: Information Asymmetry and Barriers to Tribal Capital Market Access,
12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 943, 952–58 (2008).
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out Sithe Global, rather than the other way around368—in part because the tribe is
not in a financial position to develop its coal resources on its own.369 For the
mining and energy companies, partnering rather than just leasing has the advantage
of protecting against the tribe imposing an excise tax after the royalty agreement is
finalized.370 By reducing the distance between a tribe’s regulatory and
entrepreneurial sides through the partnership, Sithe Global aligned its development
plans with the Navajo Nation’s economic goals.371
Local and global environmental harms accompany Desert Rock’s economic
promise. For that reason, many national environmental groups oppose the project:
Center for Biological Diversity, Environmental Defense Fund, National Parks
Conservation Association, Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Sierra
Club.372 They are joined by local groups such as Conservation Voters of New
Mexico, Grand Canyon Trust, New Mexico Conference of Churches, New Mexico
Citizens Alliance for Responsible Energy and Sustainability, San Juan Citizens
Alliance, and Western Resource Advocates.373 And on the reservation, Diné
Citizens Against Ruining our Environment (Diné CARE) and Doodá Desert Rock
368

Helman, supra note 361, at 88.
As Philip Reno argued in 1981, “Resources still in Navajo hands, primarily coal, should be
developed by the Tribe itself whenever possible.” RENO, supra note 58, at 151 (emphasis added).
370 See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). The ability of tribes to impose such severance or excise taxes
despite an earlier tribal-corporate agreement regarding the royalty rate was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Merrion. Id. at 133–44. The case involved an Indian Reorganization Act–constituted tribal
government whose decision was subject to review by the Secretary of the Interior. Three years later,
Kerr-McGee extended the Merrion decision when the Court affirmed a similar tax by the Navajo Nation,
a tribe without the secretarial approval requirement. Kerr-McGee Corp., 471 U.S. at 196–201.
371 According to Philip S. Deloria, the two hats that tribal governments have—that of the regulator
and that of the landowner or entrepreneur—make resource development “more complex” on-reservation
than off-reservation. Deloria, supra note 1, at 196.
372 See Letter from Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t et al. to Harrilene Yazzie,
NEPA Coordinator, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Navajo Regional Office (Aug. 17, 2007), available
at http://www.sanjuancitizens.org/air/FINAL%20DREF&20DEIS%20commentletter081707-1.pdf; Ctr.for
Biological
Diversity,
Group
Files
Appeal
on
Permit
for
Desert
Rock
Plant,
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/center/articles/2008/kold-09-02-2008.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2010). More on these groups can be found on their websites. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Center for
Biological Diversity, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2010); Envtl. Def. Fund,
Environmental Defense Fund—Finding the Ways That Work, http://www.edf.org/home.cfm (last visited
Apr. 18, 2010); Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n, National Parks Conservation Association: Protecting
Our National Parks for Future Generations, http://www.npca.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2010); Natural Res.
Def. Council, Natural Resources Defense Council: The Earth’s Best Defense, http://www.nrdc.org (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010); Sierra Club, Sierra Club Home Page: Explore, Enjoy and Protect the Planet,
http://www.sierraclub.org (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
373 More on the groups and their opposition to the project can be found on their websites. Grand
Canyon Trust, Plateau-Wide Issues: Air Quality: Our Work with the Western Clean Energy
Coalition
to
Oppose
the
Desert
Rock
and
Cemex
Facilities,
http://www.grandcanyontrust.org/plateau/air_actions.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2010); Conservation Voters
N.M., CVNM Accomplishments, http://www.cvnm.org/About/Accomplishments.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2010); N.M. Conference of Churches, The Environment, http://www.nmchurches.org/node/6 (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010); San Juan Citizens Alliance, San Juan Citizens Alliance, Air: Global Warming:
Desert Rock Power Plant, http://www.sanjuancitizens.org/air/desertrock.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2010);
W.
Res.
Advocates,
New
Mexico
Coal
Plants,
http://www.westernresourceadvocates.org/energy/coal/newmexico.php (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
369
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Power Plant Committee (Doodá Desert Rock) are united against Desert Rock.374
Doodá Desert Rock even has created a “cause page” with over 1700 members as
of April 2010 on Facebook.375
The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) supports plant
construction.376 Prepared for BIA by URS Corporation, the DEIS largely
downplays and hides Desert Rock’s harmful environmental effects while playing
up the economic benefits of the plant.377 Additionally, though there were public
comment periods preceding and following publication of the DEIS, the document
itself is written in such a way that it is a challenge to follow.378 For example, under
“Global Air Quality Impacts,” after discussing global warming, although the
amount of carbon dioxide (CO2 ) plant emissions is acknowledged, the report’s
coverage of this form of pollution is truncated.379 According to the San Juan
Citizens Alliance public comments regarding the DEIS, it “completely fails to
consider the impacts of 12.7 million [tons per year] of CO2” on world resources and
global warming.380 Instead of such information, in the section on “Global Air

374 More on these groups can be found on their websites. Diné CARE, Welcome to Diné CARE,
http://www.creativegeckos.com/dinecare/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2010); Doodá Desert Rock!, Stop the
Desert Rock Energy Project, http://www.doodadesertrock.com/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
For a detailed account of the struggles of grassroots efforts to protect the environment among Diné civil
society, focused on the foundation of Diné CARE and their work to protect against excessive logging on
the reservation, see SHERRY, supra note 124.
375 See Dooda (No) Desert Rock, Hall of Fame: Dooda (No) Desert Rock: Causes.com,
http://www.causes.com/causes/75652/hall_of_fame (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
376 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DESERT ROCK ENERGY
PROJECT: DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, at ES-20 to -21 (2007), available at
http://www.desertrockenergyeis.com/documents/presentations/Executive%20Summary.pdf.
377 BIA takes the lead role preparing environmental impact statements (EISs) for projects with a
significant impact on the environment, though other agencies and the governing tribe or tribes can
become “cooperating agencies” for the purposes of the EIS. Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obligations:
The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral
Resources, 71 N.D. L. REV. 327, 338–39 (1995).
378 Neither the DEIS nor an executive summary of the DEIS was available in Diné, the Navajo
language, limiting the participation of those without command of English. Letter from Diné Citizens
Against Ruining Our Env’t et al. to Harrilene Yazzie, supra note 372, at 28. The response to the DEIS
authored by Diné CARE and other environmental groups notes, “[T]he DEIS—at two-volumes and
1,600 page[s]—is very much inaccessible to most Navajo community members.” Id. For the list of the
meetings with the public and area officials that preceded publication of the DEIS, see BUREAU OF
INDIAN
AFFAIRS,
supra
note
376,
app.
L,
available
at
http://www.desertrockenergyeis.com/documents/presentations/Appendix%20L.pdf.
379 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 376, app.K, at K-37.
380 Letter from Mike Eisenfeld, N.M. Staff Organizer, San Juan Citizens Alliance, to Harrilene
Yazzie, NEPA Coordinator, Burea of Indian Affairs, Navajo Regional Office 12 (Oct. 4, 2007),
available at http://www.sanjuancitizens.org/air/DESERT%20ROCK%20DEIS%20Comments%20
SJCA%2010-8-2007%20FINAL.pdf; see also Letter from Vickie Patton, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Envtl.
Defense Fund, to Joseph Lapka, Air Permitting Program, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (July 31, 2008)
(on file with author) (arguing CO2 is subject to EPA regulation when considering Prevention of
Significant Deterioration permit applications). The figure given by the plant’s developers is 10.9 million
tons per year. Desert Rock Energy Co., Desert Rock Energy Project: Carbon Dioxide Facts,
http://www.desertrockenergyproject.com/carbon_facts.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). To give some
context to these amounts, consider that Yale University was responsible for more than 300,000 tons per
year of CO2 equivalent emissions from 2003 to 2008. YALE OFFICE OF SUSTAINABILITY, YALE
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Quality” the DEIS focuses on the plant’s “unique and innovative design” that
would make it “more efficient, in terms of power output versus fuel combusted,
than other coal-fired plants in the region.”381 As the DEIS acknowledges, such
efficiency gains merely reflect technological improvements that have occurred
since the prior plants were built, but the DEIS seems to suggest that the
improvements alone warrant construction of a new coal-fired power plant.382
Desert Rock’s local environmental impacts are more thoroughly—and
probably less controversially—detailed in the DEIS. The proposed location of the
power plant is on a remote piece of tribal trust land south of Shiprock and
Farmington, New Mexico.383 The plant itself would be on 592 acres of leased land,
with a footprint of 149 acres.384 Associated transmission lines, water wells, roads,
and a coal preparation area require far more land: 4630 acres.385 The power plant
would also require ten to twenty new water wells to supply a whopping 2795
gallons per minute (gpm), though the plans, per an agreement between the Navajo
Nation and plant developers, call for an additional water use of 275 gpm to provide
for Navajo municipal demand.386 Desert Rock also involves the development of a
new coal strip mine, the “Navajo Mine Extension Project,” on existing mineral
leased areas.387 North of the proposal extension lies Navajo Mine, an area leased
since the 1960s that provides 8.5 million tons of coal per year to the Four Corners
Power Plant.388 The Navajo Mine Extension Project would provide Desert Rock
with 6.25 million tons of coal per year every year for fifty years—the design life of

UNIVERSITY GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS INVENTORY: UPDATE 2003–2008, at 3 (2009), available at
http://sustainability.yale.edu/sites/default/ files/GHG2008.pdf.
Note: The Environmental Defense Fund Supplemental Comments were contained in an online
database, the Initial Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permit for the Desert Rock Energy Facility
Docket
folder
on
Regulations.gov,
Docket
ID:
EPA-R09-OAR-2007-1110,
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#docketDetail?R=EPA-R09-OAR-2007-1110
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2010). But given the challenges of subsequent researchers finding particular letters from
this database, citations are to copies of the letter on file with author.
381 BUREAU
OF
INDIAN
AFFAIRS,
supra
note
376,
at
5-12,
available
at
http://www.desertrockenergyeis.com/documents/presentations/Chapter%205%20-%20Cumulative%
20Impacts,%20Unavoidable%20Adverse%20Effects,%20and%20Irreversible%20and%20Irretrievable%20
Commitment%20of%20Resources.pdf.
382 Id. at 5-11.
383 See id. at 1-1, available at http://www.desertrockenergyeis.com/documents/presentations/
Chapter%201%20-%20Introduction.pdf.
384 Id.
at
2-2
tbl.2-1,
available
at
http://www.desertrockenergyeis.com/documents/
presentations/Chapter%202%20-%20Alternatives.pdf.
385 See id. (providing acreage requirements for transmission lines, water wells, the main plant access
road, and a coal preparation area); see also id. at 2-3 fig.2-1 (providing a planning map with anticipated
land use acreage and sites).
386 See id. at 2-7 to -8. The DEIS also includes water use figures in acre-feet per year (af/yr) rather
than gpm; 4950 af/yr is equivalent to the 3070 gpm planned amount. This does not include the additional
600 af/yr “associated with the expansion of the surface mining operations at the Navajo Mine required to
supply coal to the Desert Rock Energy Project.” Id. at 2-9.
387 Id. at 2-15.
388 Id.
app. D, at D-1, available at http://www.desertrockenergyeis.com/documents/
presentations/Appendix%20D.pdf.
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the plant.389 Strip mining, which entails first removing all vegetation, will create
localized dust clouds and will also leave a scar that the mining company would be
required to reclaim.390 But for the life of Desert Rock, and quite possibly longer,
the mine itself would add to the impact of the plant.391
While power plant opposition groups like to call attention to the few Diné
families who will be directly affected by the plant, the site selected is rural and
sparsely populated even by reservation standards.392 According to the DEIS, the
majority of the “area is characterized as occasional low intensity livestock grazing
and scattered dwellings, with primitive roads traversing the land.”393 At times the
description of the affected land in the DEIS, such as with “primitive roads” above,
reflects the cultural, ethnocentric bias in favor of development that has long been
used to dispose Indians of their land.394 When discussing the existing land uses near
a proposed water well, the authors of the DEIS seem unaware of the irony and
assumptions that underlie the following: “The vacant and undeveloped land within

389 Id. (giving the coal consumption figures); id. at 2-18, available at http://www.desertrock
energyeis.com/documents/presentations/Chapter%202%20-%20Alternatives.pdf (giving the plant’s design
life).
390 See id. app. D, at D-11 to -15, available at http://www.desertrockenergyeis.com/
documents/presentations/Appendix%20D.pdf.
391 The tribe’s experience with Black Mesa reclamation attests to the limits of reclamation.
According to Rebecca Reppert, the reclaimed area on Black Mesa had growing grass, “but not much else
could be done with that area.” Letter from Rebecca Reppert, English Teacher, Red Mesa High Sch., to
Robert T. Baker, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Oct. 24, 2006) (on file with author); see also Karyn I.
Wendelowski, Comment, A Matter of Trust: Federal Environmental Responsibilities to Native
Americans Under Customary International Law, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 423, 426 (1995) (arguing that
Black Mesa reclamation efforts have been unsuccessful and that Peabody Coal has not taken “its
reclamation obligations seriously”). For more on the challenges of reclamation and reclamation funding,
see A. Brooke Rubenstein & David Winkowski, Comment, A Mine Is a Terrible Thing to Waste: Past,
Present and Future Reclamation Efforts to Correct the Environmentally Damaging Effects of Coal Mines,
13 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 199–204 (2002).
392 See Leslie Linthicum, Proposed Coal-Fueled Plant on Navajo Land Worries Some Nearby
Residents, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 26, 2005, at A1, available at 2005 WLNR 10133288 (“The desert
floor fans out here like a dinner plate—flat, hot and empty. . . . Even by Navajo reservation standards,
this place is empty and remote. A perfect place, some might imagine, to tuck away a new power plant to
serve the energy-thirsty Southwest.”).
393 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 376, at 3-76, available at http://www.desertrock
energyeis.com/documents/presentations/Chapter%203%20-%20Affected%20Environment.pdf.
394 In City of Sherrill, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York (City of Sherrill), 544 U.S.
197 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the Oneida Indian Nation could not unify fee and Indian title
within their original reservation through open market purchases. Id. at 202–03. The decision was based
in part on a development bias: “[T]he properties here involved have greatly increased in value since the
Oneidas sold them 200 years ago. Notably, it was not until lately that the Oneidas sought to regain
ancient sovereignty over land converted from wilderness to become part of cities like Sherrill.” Id. at
215.
City of Sherrill is but the newest version of a Supreme Court bias that has been around since
Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). According
to Chief Justice Marshall, “[T]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages . . . . To
leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as a
distinct people, was impossible.” Id. at 590.
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the proposed water well field is permitted for livestock grazing with water tanks
and corrals dispersed throughout.”395

Figure 1

How does such development affect the plant’s immediate surroundings?
The physical structures, smoke emissions from the plant, and the 135 feet tall
transmission towers would be eyesores, a form of visual pollution on the high

395 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, supra note 376, at 3-85, available at http://www.desertrock
energyeis.com/documents/presentations/Chapter%203%20-%20Affected%20Environment.pdf.
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desert landscape (see Figure 1).396 Dislocation of some families and reduction of
some grazing areas is anticipated as well; the DEIS identifies one residence within
a half mile of the plant and 148 residences within a half mile of proposed
transmission lines, water wells, and access roads.397 Finally, although the initial
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit application submitted to EPA
suggests that any increase in regional haze will likely have other natural causes,
plant proponents had to acknowledge in their application that regional haze could
increase.398 For locals already familiar with haze from the area’s existing power
plants, this impact was known and a source of anger, inflamed by a Durango
Herald report that “Colleen McKaughan, an air-quality expert with the federal
Environmental Protection Agency’s Region 9, said the Four Corners region has air
so clean that it can absorb additional pollutants without harm.”399
Believing that the DEIS reflected bias and perhaps too close a relationship
between URS Corporation, which prepared the DEIS, and Sithe Global, Diné
396 Id.
at
2-7
fig.2-3, available
at
http://www.desertrockenergyeis.com/documents/
presentations/Chapter%202%20-%20Alternatives.pdf.
397 See id. at 3-79 to -85, available at http://www.desertrockenergyeis.com/documents/
presentations/Chapter%203%20-%20Affected%20Environment.pdf.
398 STEAG POWER LLC, supra note 358, at 6-25 to -32.
399 Chuck Slothower, Officials Tout N.M.’s Desert Rock: Environmental Impact Minimal from Plant,
They Say, DURANGO HERALD (Durango, Colo.), Sept. 15, 2006, http://archive.durango
herald.com/asp-bin/article_generation.asp?article_type=news&article_path=/news/06/news0609
15_2.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). The Four Corners Air Quality Task Force felt that the statement
“epitomizes our perception of the sensitivity of [EPA] Region 9 personnel to the issues in the Four
Corners region.” FOUR CORNERS AIR QUALITY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF MITIGATION OPTIONS 228
(2007),
available
at
http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/aqb/4C/Docs/
4CAQTF_Report_FINAL.pdf.
Public comments on Desert Rock highlighted the current pollution and haze problems associated
with the existing plants. See, e.g., Proposed Clean Air Act Permit for Prevention of Significant
Detioration of the Desert Rock Power Plant: Hearing Before the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 26 (Oct. 4,
2006, afternoon session) (statement of Anthony Lee) (on file with author) [hereinafter EPA Hearing I]
(“There’s too much smoke in the air, and it looks ugly.”); Letter from Rebecca Reppert to Robert T.
Baker, supra note 391 (“I have seen the band of haze that crosses the desert near the Four Corners. I am
against the construction of another coal-fired plant . . . .”); Letter from Dorothy Barber-Redhorse,
Resident, Little Water, to Robert T. Baker, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 9 (Nov. 13, 2006) (on file
with author). Dorothy Barber-Redhorse urged,

[T]he aesthetic value should be kept as a factor as we see yellow to brown haze across the
horizon every day. There are days when the haze is so bad that visibility is probably no more
than thirty miles. The day when Four Corners Power Plant went down, the visibility was great.
Id.; see also Desert Rock Energy Facility Public Comments: Hearing Before the U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency 17 (Oct. 3, 2006) (statement of Margie Connolly) (on file with author) [hereinafter EPA Hearing
II ] (“[O]n many days there’s this thick, ugly, yellow-brownish haze or smog that comes from the two
existing power plants in the San Juan River Valley. Any additional deterioration from a coal-fired power
plant is significant and should not be permitted.”); Letter from Loretta Annala to Robert Baker, U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 9 (Nov. 2, 2006) (on file with author) (“Since I moved to this area in 1966, I
have observed the thick yellow clouds of pollution from the existing plants cut visibility to a fraction of
what it should be.”); Letter from Jamie Stephens to Robert Baker, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 9
(Sept. 23, 2006) (on file with author) (“Over the last few years, the air quality here has worsened
dramatically. At times the mountains we used to see are almost obliterated by a yellow/brown haze . . . .
This haze (smog) is a result of the coal-fired power plants we already have in our area.”).
Tellingly, haze from Arizona plants burning Black Mesa coal “cut sunlight by 15 percent
downwind in Flagstaff, Arizona.” KRECH, supra note 185, at 215.
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CARE and the San Juan Citizens Alliance initiated a Freedom of Information
Act400 claim against BIA.401 Represented by attorneys from the Western
Environmental Law Center and the Energy Mineral Law Center in the Four
Corners region, the complaint calls attention to the limited role that BIA had in
preparing the DEIS and seeks records of contacts between URS and plant
proponents.402 San Juan Citizens Alliance’s position is that the use of URS to
prepare the DEIS for BIA “has resulted in a predetermined conclusion” supporting
Desert Rock.403 In their response to the DEIS, they seek a review of the “‘third
party preparation’” of the DEIS to “determine if URS Corporation and BIA were
unduly influenced by Sithe.”404 Certainly Diné Power Authority and Sithe Global
could not have hoped for a more supportive review of the plant’s environmental
impact.
In the waning days of the Bush Administration, EPA approved of Desert
Rock—more precisely, it issued Desert Rock a permit to pollute—but the Obama
Administration EPA quickly pulled the approval in order to allow itself to
“reconsider its actions on several issues” related to Desert Rock.405 Diné Power
Authority (DPA) and Sithe Global seemed to have reached their goal when EPA
issued a PSD permit on July 31, 2008.406 As Desert Rock Energy Project noted, the
PSD Permit “is the key permit among several regulatory approvals” needed for the
development of the power plant.407 Having been sued by Navajo Nation and Sithe
Global for failure to act on the PSD application, the permit was issued in
accordance with the consent decree that set July 31st as the deadline for EPA to
issue a final permit decision.408 The press release on the issuance of the PSD permit
400

5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
Complaint, Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Bradley, No. 08-CV-350 (D.N.M. Apr.
2,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sanjuancitizens.org/air/Filed%20Version%20FOIA
%20Complaint%20Doc%201.pdf.
402 Id. at 11, 12.
403 Letter from Mike Eisenfeld to Harrilene Yazzie, supra note 380, at 35.
404 Id. at 31.
405 EPA Region 9’s Motion for Voluntary Remand at 1, In re Desert Rock Energy Co., PSD Permit
No. AZP 04-01, (Envtl. Appeals Board, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 2009), 2009 WL 3126170, available
at
http://www.epa.gov/region09/air/permit/desert-rock/docs/Desert-Rock-EAB-EPA-Motion-forVoluntary-Remand.pdf [hereinafter EPA’s Motion for Remand]. This Motion for Voluntary Remand to
the Environmental Appeals Board is the current form of the Obama Administration’s course reversal,
though the Desert Rock litigation, appeals, and lobbying will no doubt continue, and therefore, the fate
of the proposal is not yet finalized. See, e.g., Desert Rock Energy’s Response to EPA Region 9’s Motion
for Voluntary Remand, In re Desert Rock Energy Co., PSD Permit No. AZP 04-01, (Envtl. Appeals
Board,
U.S.
Envtl.
Prot.
Agency
2009),
2009
WL
3126170,
available
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/EAB_WEB_Docket.nsf/Filings%20
By%20Appeal%20Number/915881434C6257B5852575D30059CEC0/$File/Motion%20for%20Remand%2
0...183.pdf.
406 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION PERMIT,
PSD PERMIT NO. AZP 04-01 (2008), available at http://www.desertrockenergyproject.com/
Final%20permit.pdf.
407 Long Awaited Final Air Permit from the US EPA Issued, DESERT ROCK ENERGY
PROJECT (Desert Rock Energy Co., Houston, Tex.), Sept. 2008, at 1, available at
http://www.desertrockenergyproject.com/Desert%20Rock%20Newsletter%200808%2015%20final.pdf.
408 See Original Complaint, Desert Rock Energy Co., LLC v. EPA, No. H-08-872, 2009 WL
3247312 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.sanjuancitizens.org/ air/complaint.pdf. Suit
was brought in the name of secondary institutions: Diné Power Authority, an organ of the Navajo
401
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quoted Wayne Nastri, EPA Regional Administrator for Region IX, which includes
the Navajo Nation, as saying, “The Desert Rock power plant will be one of the
cleanest pulverized coal-burning power plants in the country.”409 When the Obama
Administration reversed its PSD permitting approval with its motion for voluntary
remand, Desert Rock Energy company, of course, was not happy with the remand
decision.410 But for environmentalists, the voluntary remand signaled that EPA was
beginning to “address legal and scientific concerns they contend were overlooked
by the Bush [A]dministration.”411 Irony was lost on EPA, which effectively put a
roadblock in front of the Navajo Nation’s hoped-for power plant with the remand
filing on the same day as the Navajo Nation’s “Sovereignty Day,” created in
celebration of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the tribe’s right to tax energy
companies.412
The Navajo Nation leadership is “staunchly” supportive of Desert Rock.413 At
the beginning of the project in 2004, President Shirley wrote to EPA, expressing
the Navajo Nation’s excitement about the project’s progress.414 In 2005, President
Shirley again wrote the EPA: “I am writing you to confirm in the strongest possible
terms that the Navajo Nation supports the efforts of DPA and Sithe Global Power
LLC . . . and needs your dedicated assistance to conclude air permitting activities
for the Desert Rock power plant in the very near future.”415 Shirley, citing
reservation poverty and unemployment statistics, called on EPA to quickly issue
the PSD permit.416 The letter also called attention to the forced out-migration of
Navajos unable to find work on the reservation, a point that President Shirley
would return to in subsequent State of the Navajo Nation addresses.417 Two years
Nation government, and Desert Rock Energy Company, a Sithe Global subsidiary. EPA’s
Unopposed Motion to Lodge Consent Decree, Desert Rock Energy Co., LLC, 2009 WL 3247312
(S.D.
Tex.
Sept.
29,
2008),
available
at
http://www.sanjuancitizens.org/air/Desert%20Rock%20consent%20decree.pdf.
409 Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 9, EPA Issues Air Permit for Desert Rock Energy
Facility (July 31, 2008), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/2dd7f669225439b7852 5735
900400c31/8331e0972492f17c85257497005a37fb!OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
410 EPA Move Chagrins Desert Rock Developers, COAL TRADER, Apr. 29, 2009, at 4, available at
2009 WLNR 9095762.
411 Robin Bravender, EPA Wants to Review Permits for Navajo Nation Power Plant, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/04/28/28greenwire-epa-wants-to-review-permitsfor-navajo-nation-10707.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010)
412 See EPA’s Motion for Remand, supra note 405; Press Release, Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo
Nation, President’s Statement on Sovereignty Day (Apr. 27, 2009), available
at
http://www.navajo.org/News%20Releases/George%20Hardeen/Apr09/090427pres_President%20
Shirley’s%20statement%20on%20Sovereignty%20Day.pdf.
413 Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 9, supra note 409.
414 Letter from Joe Shirley to Gerardo C. Rios, supra note 30.
415 Letter from Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, to Wayne Nastri, Reg’l Adm’r, U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency Region 9, at 1 (May 28, 2005) (on file with author).
416 Id. at 2.
417 Id. (“According to the Navajo Division of Community Development, the stagnation of economic
development in Navajo country has forced Navajo families to move to far away cities to find their
livelihoods. . . . [W]ithout reducing outmigration, by 2012 more than half of the Navajo people may
leave the Navajo reservation.”). In his State of the Navajo Nation address, President Shirley has argued
that Desert Rock “will allow Navajos to remain in their homeland rather than seek economic opportunity
beyond their own borders.” Joe Shirley, State of the Navajo Nation Address, supra note 28, at 5; see
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later, when Shirley was still pushing EPA to issue a final PSD permit, he noted that
Desert Rock would provide a third of the Navajo Nation government’s annual
budget and would replace revenues lost with the closing of other plants and
mines.418 The letter concluded by quoting Senator John McCain:
Each of us shares a strong commitment to promote and defend tribal sovereignty,
tribal self-governance, and tribal self-sufficiency. But my friends, these things we hold
dear, will wither and die unless they are watered by a strong Reservation economy that
produces a decent standard of living for all of our people. Unfortunately, as you well
know, economic development success stories in Indian Country are still the exception
and not the rule.419

The working relationship between the Navajo Nation and EPA was obviously
strained by this point—President Shirley was no longer excited about the progress
that had been made—and the lost revenue was impacting the tribal budget.420
The strongest statement of the Navajo Nation’s support for Desert Rock is
President Shirley’s January 2008 explanation of why the Navajo Nation decided to
sue EPA for failure to act on the PSD permit application.421 The decision to bring
suit reflected Shirley’s frustration that EPA had not approved “the cleanest coalfired power plant in the United States” despite the “stringent emission standards
imposed” by EPA on the project.422 The statutory requirement was that EPA act
upon a complete application within one year, but the Desert Rock application had
been pending for almost three years by the time of President Shirley’s
explanation.423 In calculated language, President Shirley wrote:
EPA’s unlawful delay and its failure to issue the final PSD permit are inhibiting the
growth and independence of the Navajo Nation, the largest sovereign Indian Nation in
the United States. Today, we see prosperity, growth and development all around us,
but not within our own borders. Every highway leading off the Nation leads to a
flourishing economy, and every highway leading onto the Nation leads to economic

also Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, State of the Navajo Nation Address at the 21st Navajo
Nation
Council
2
(Apr.
20,
2009),
available
at
http://www.navajo.org/News%20Releases/George%20Hardeen/Apr09/090420pres_STATE%20OF
%20NAVAJO%20NATION%20ADDRESS,%20APRIL%2020%202009.pdf (“Desert Rock will bring
hundreds of Navajos home to work on the project, and keep hundreds more from leaving to seek
employment elsewhere.”).
The fear that half the population may have to leave the reservation by 2012 is not a new fear:
In the 1940s, with some Navajos reported starving, “it was thought that half of the people must find a
living elsewhere.” UNDERHILL, supra note 125, at 259. But the oil development of the 1960s helped
allow Navajos to stay on the reservation and led to a near doubling of the population. Id.
418 Letter from Joe Shirley to Stephen L. Johnson, supra note 27, at 2.
419 Id. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
420 As the general manager of Diné Power Authority noted in his prepared statement to the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs, “[D]elay costs the Navajo Nation approximately $5 million of desperately
needed dollars every month.” Indian Energy Development Hearing, supra note 354, at 23 (prepared
statement of Steven C. Begay, General Manager, Diné Power Authority, Navajo Nation).
421 Letter from Joe Shirley, Jr., President, Navajo Nation, et al. to Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency 1 (Jan. 17, 2008) (on file with author).
422 Id. at 1–2.
423 See id. at 1.
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silence. Once construction begins (which cannot start until EPA acts on the PSD
permit), Desert Rock will be the largest economic development project in Indian
Country in the United States.424

The letter continued by driving home the fact that the Navajo Nation
Council—which voted sixty-six to seven in favor of the project’s lease—stood with
President Shirley in supporting Desert Rock.425
Navajo government enthusiasm for Desert Rock is not shared by all. New
Mexico Governor and 2008 Presidential Candidate Bill Richardson issued a
statement in 2007 that said that he was “gravely concerned about the potential
environmental impacts” of Desert Rock, adding that he believed the plant “would
be a step in the wrong direction.”426 Richardson argued that the plant, which would
raise the state’s total CO2 emissions fifteen percent, would make his “aggressive
greenhouse gas reduction goals difficult—if not impossible—to meet.”427 And a
little over a month before EPA issued the PSD permit, Governor Richardson and
his attorney general wrote EPA with “serious concerns about the environmental
impacts of constructing Desert Rock in a region already impaired by other large
coal-fired power plants.”428 The concerns of the New Mexico Governor’s office
were also shared by county and city governments in New Mexico and in other
states.429
The Doodá Desert Rock Power Plant Committee spearheaded local
opposition.430 According to Doodá Desert Rock President Elouise Brown, “Doodá
424

Id. at 2.
Id. The margin in favor has remained fairly constant: In February 2009, “the council voted 71-to8 to approve right-of-way legislation for the Desert Rock Energy Project.” Press Release, Office of the
President & Vice President, Navajo Nation, Navajo President Joe Shirley, Jr., Pleased by Council Vote
to Approve Desert Rock Energy Project Right-of-Way Permit (Feb. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.navajo.org/News%20Releases/George%20Hardeen/Feb09/
090228presNavajo%20President%20pleased%20by%20approval%20of%20Desert%20Rock%20permit.pdf.
426 Press Release, Bill Richardson, Governor, N.M., Governor Richardson Issues Statement on
Proposed
Desert
Rock
Energy
Facility
1
(July
27,
2007),
available
at
http://www.sanjuancitizens.org/air/Richardson_pressrelease.pdf.
Richardson’s
public
statement
preceded—arguably something it should not have—his formal request regarding Desert Rock for
government-to-government consultation, a process the state and the tribe had previously agreed to in
order to resolve disputes. See Letter from Bill Richardson, Governor, New Mexico, to Joe Shirley, Jr.,
President, Navajo Nation 1 (Aug. 20, 2007) (on file with author).
427 Press Release, Bill Richardson, supra note 426, at 2.
428 Letter from Bill Richardson, Governor, N.M., & Gary K. King, Attorney Gen., N.M., to Stephen
L. Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, & Wayne Nastri, Reg’l Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency
Region 9, at 3 (June 19, 2008) (on file with author).
429 See, e.g., Letter from Helen Kalin Klanderud, Mayor, City of Aspen, Colo., to Robert Baker, U.S.
Envtl. Prot. Agency 1 (Mar. 20, 2007) (on file with author) (noting that the Aspen City Council was
unanimously concerned with the effects of the Desert Rock on Aspen); Letter from Joelle Riddle, Chair,
La Plata County Bd. of County Comm’rs, to Deborah Jordan, Dir., Air Div., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency
Region 9 (July 16, 2008) (on file with author).
430 Although describing resistance to Appalachian, and not Western, reservation strip-mining, an
account of the creative work of local opposition groups and lawyers can be found in Dean Hill Rivkin et
al., Strip Mining and Grassroot Resistance in Appalachia: Community Lawyering for Environmental
Justice, 1 L.A. J. PUB. INT. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 14–26), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478549 (follow the “One-Click Download”
hyperlink).
425

GAL.ROSSER.DOC

2010]

6/23/2010 2:50 PM

AHISTORICAL INDIANS AND RESOURCES

499

means ‘absolutely no!’ in Diné,” as in Absolutely No Desert Rock.431 One thousand
five hundred Four Corners residents signed a Doodá Desert Rock petition opposing
Desert Rock that was submitted to the BIA Navajo Regional Office.432 Doodá
Desert Rock’s focus was on the interests of “the most impacted people [who] still
reside within close proximity of the proposed power plant site.”433 Powerful images
of the faces and lives of those who would be displaced and those who would be
most affected by the plant were captured by photographer Carlin Tapp, invited to
take the photos by Doodá Desert Rock that were later exhibited in Santa Fe.434 In
December 2006, protestors prevented surveyors from accessing the proposed site
by blocking trucks and later occupying the site.435 Plant developers obtained a
temporary restraining order against the occupiers, but the parties agreed to coexist
so long as the site work was allowed to go forward.436 A permanent “resistance
camp” was built on January 20, 2007, on the land of Alice Gilmore,437 and “day
after day” the protestors—Diné and “a coalition of religious and environmental
organizations”—“‘[sat] vigil’” near the plant site.438 By July 2007, the vigil was
down to “[a] handful of people, mostly Navajo women.”439 But the outrage at the
issuance of the PSD permit became celebration when the permit was revoked.440 In
February 2009, following EPA’s decision to voluntarily remand the permit, Doodá
Desert Rock President Elouise Brown triumphantly asserted, “[T]he Desert Rock
power plant is dead!”441

431

Elouise Brown, Doodá Desert Rock!, EARTH FIRST! J., Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 14, 14.
DOODA (NO) DESERT ROCK POWER PLANT (2005) (on file with author) (petition signed by 1500
Four Corners residents).
433 Letter from Lucy Willie, Member, Doodá Desert Rock Power Plant Comm., et al. to Steven
Begay, Gen. Manager, Diné Power Auth., & Bill Skeet, BHP Billiton/BHP Navajo Coal Co. 1 (July 28,
2006) (on file with author). One member even signed the letter and a separate individualized response
with a thumbprint. Letter from Louise Benally to Robert Baker, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 9 (Oct.
24, 2006) (on file with author).
434 See Shannon Shaw, Documenting Desert Rock, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, July 19, 2006, at C4,
available at 2006 WLNR 12809289 (describing the origins of the photo exhibit). For the photos of those
impacted, a protest in Window Rock, and the resistance camp, see Carlan Tapp, Question of Power,
http://www.questionofpower.org/Pages/stories.html (follow the “click to view story” hyperlinks) (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010).
435 Lisa Meerts, Desert Rock Officials Get Court Order to Access Site, DAILY TIMES (Farmington,
N.M.), Dec. 21, 2006, available at LEXIS; Lisa Meerts, Protestors Stop Work on Power Plant, DAILY
TIMES (Farmington, N.M.), Dec. 13, 2006, available at LEXIS.
436 Lisa Meerts, Desert Rock Protesters Reach Agreement, DAILY TIMES (Farmington, N.M.), Jan. 3,
2007, available at LEXIS.
437 For resistance camp construction photographs, see Carlan Tapp, Desert Rock Resistance Camp,
http://www.questionofpower.org/qp3/index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
438 Moises Velasquez-Manoff, Before Regulation Hits, a Battle Over How to Build New Coal Plants,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 22, 2007, at 13.
439 Leslie Linthicum, A Question of Power: Coal-Fired Plant on Navajo Land Called a Cleaner
Energy Source, But Critics Say Land, People Will Pay the Price, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 15, 2007, at
B1, available at 2007 WLNR 13533062.
440 See Cornelia de Bruin, Breaking News: EPA Issues Desert Rock Air Permit, DAILY TIMES
(Farmington, N.M.), July 31, 2008, available at LEXIS (noting intent of both Doodá Desert Rock and
Diné CARE to challenge the permit in court).
441 Elouise Brown, Letter to the Editor, What’s Next for Desert Rock?, DAILY TIMES (Farmington,
N.M.), Feb. 11, 2009, available at LEXIS.
432
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The challenge of Desert Rock opposition was expressed during a Desert Rock
public hearing by a resident of Fort Wingate, New Mexico, who noted that the
Navajo are divided on Desert Rock.442 A less than sympathetic news article in the
Albuquerque Journal was dismissive of local opposition: “[E]ven on this desert
plot, where the nearest neighbors are cattle, sheep and raptors—and where the
power plant is a guest of the Navajo tribe—the not-in-my-backyard syndrome has
taken hold.”443 Locals directly impacted by a particular development—here, a
power plant—are more likely to object, whether the proposal is located on the
Navajo Nation or is in Delaware.444 Those in the immediate area would not like to
“see” the plant developed, but as Diné Power Authority argued, “Much of the
money can be expected to go toward existing social and health programs for the
Navajo people, not just in the chapters surrounding the plant, but across the Navajo
reservation.”445 Consequently, local positions may not align fully with the rest of
the tribe.
Focusing just on local opposition risks devaluing the challenges that
“competing demands of conservation and development” force upon tribal
governments.446 The Navajo Nation can decide to protect some areas more than
others without necessarily being blind to environmental concerns. Thus, the Navajo
Nation, which “became the first American Indian tribe to authorize their own park
system” in order “[t]o protect special places,”447 can also choose places not to
protect. In the San Francisco Peaks case, the Ninth Circuit wrote, “The Navajo
believe their role on earth is to take care of the land.”448 But taking care of the land
does not mean the power plant opponents are automatically in the right: “[E]ven
though all land is sacred, a specific area may be considered as having less sacred

442 Proposed Clean Air Act Permit for Prevention of Significant Deterioration of the Desert Rock
Power Plant: Hearing Before the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 8 (Oct. 4, 2006, evening session) (statement
of Albert Shirley, Office of the Majority Leader, New Mexico House of Representatives) (on file with
author) [hereinafter EPA Hearing III ] (“[Y]ou can’t really believe Desert Rock when it tells you that
there is no opposition to this project. You can’t believe the media when they tell you that all the Navajo
people are in opposition to this proposal.”).
443 Leslie Linthicum, Power Struggle, ALBUQUERQUE J., June 26, 2005, at A1, available at
2005 WLNR 10133288.
444 Impacts on grazing rights or hogans might be more likely to raise the objections of educated
Navajos “willing to participate in development, but [who] are not happy about an outcome in which the
traditional way of life for their parents is sacrificed.” Schoepfle et al., supra note 54, at 901.
Locals who benefit from the project may strongly support Desert Rock. Clayton Benally, a union
engineer from Shiprock, New Mexico, told a Desert Rock panel, “This project would mean that these
people would come back home to work here at home, to be part of their families, to watch their children
grow, to enjoy all that a family unit has to enjoy. Like I said, I support this project.” EPA Hearing III,
supra note 442, at 26 (statement of Clayton Benally); see also Facsimile from Lyla Ransdell, Field
Representative, Mountain W. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, to Robert Baker, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency
(Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author) (letter from a local carpenter’s union expressing support for Desert
Rock).
445 Letter from Steven C. Begay, Gen. Manager, Diné Power Auth., to Robert Baker, U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency Region 9, at 2 (Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with author).
446 Linda Kruger & Graciela Etchart, Forest-Based Economic Development in Native American
Lands: Two Case Studies, in AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, supra note 72, at 191, 193.
447 KELLER & TUREK, supra note 39, at 186.
448 Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008).
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value and development may be pursued on it.”449 It may be that like Black Mesa, the
proposed Desert Rock site is far enough from tribal power centers that Navajo
Nation leaders believe it appropriate for such harmful development.450
Ultimately, Desert Rock detractors, both Navajos and non-Indians, must
confront the Navajo Nation’s democratically elected leaders who seem to think that
the project is in the best interests of the tribe as a whole. President Shirley’s
reelection occurred in November 2006, well after public hearings and debate about
Desert Rock began.451 Navajos had not reelected an incumbent President in twentyeight years, something of which President Shirley is very proud.452 Similarly, an
equally supportive council was not voted out of office, though Desert Rock
opponents accuse them of “not listening to the people.”453 These results would not
be predicted by those myopically paying attention only to the “overwhelming
opposition to the project by tribal members in the area,” but might if the entire tribe
is considered.454
The subordinate relationship of the Navajo Nation relative to the U.S.
government, operational here in the requirement that the plant is subject to EPA
review,455 puts Desert Rock opponents into an awkward position. With the tribal
government firmly behind the plant, opposition groups, both local and national, end
up hoping that EPA will act against the interests of the Navajo Nation’s
government.456 National environmental organizations seeking to derail Desert Rock
largely avoided the issue of sovereignty in their responses, confining the discussion
to technical critiques of the proposal and EPA actions.457 Doing so obscures the
choice made by such organizations to accept the appropriateness of the subordinate
449

Kruger & Etchart, supra note 446, at 193.
Public comments on Desert Rock make a similar point about the Washington, D.C.–Four Corners
separation, an accusation rejected by EPA: “We disagree that EPA’s PSD permit treats the Four Corners
area as a ‘sacrifice’ zone.” U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION 9, EPA RESPONSES TO PUBLIC
COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION PERMIT FOR THE DESERT
ROCK ENERGY FACILITY 152 (2008); see also KULETZ, supra note 198, at 13 (describing the southwest
areas used for nuclear weapon development as “a landscape of national sacrifice, an expendable
landscape”).
451 Natasha Kaye Johnson, Shirley, Shelly Prevail: Incumbent First to Win Back-Back Elections
Since
1982,
GALLUP INDEP. (Gallup,
N.M.),
Nov.
8,
2006,
http://www.gallup
independent.com/2006/nov/110806nkj_shrlyshlly.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
452 Joe Shirley, Jr., Native America and the Rule of Law, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 59, 60 (2007).
453 EPA Hearing I, supra note 399, at 89 (statement of Arnold Clifford).
454 EPA Hearing II, supra note 399, at 72–73 (statement of Steve Cone) (continuing by calling
Desert Rock “a classic land grab”).
455 See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 562 F.3d 1116, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining EPA oversight
of facilities on tribal lands under the Clean Air Act).
456 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the President & Vice President, Navajo Nation, Navajo Nation
President Joe Shirley, Jr., Stands with Hopi Tribe in Opposition to Environmental Groups’ Interference
in
Sovereignty
2
(Sept.
30,
2009),
available
at
http://www.navajo.org/News
%20Releases/George%20Hardeen/Sept09/090930presvajo%20president%20stands%20with%20Hopi%20Tri
be%20in%20opposition%20to%20environmental%20groups%20interference%20in%20sovereignty.pdf
(opining that, despite “overwhelming support” for the Desert Rock project, the Navajo Nation Council’s
“greatest opposition comes from environmentalists . . . . [M]any of these people don’t know about
Navajos, sovereignty or self-determination”).
457 See, e.g., Letter from Sanjay Narayan, Staff Attorney, Sierra Club Envtl. Law Program, to Robert
Baker, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Region 9 (Nov. 10, 2006) (on file with author) (discussing the permit’s
failure to meet the best available control technology standard and enforceability issues).
450
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tribal position and to disregard the tribe’s democratic decision-making process
when the results are not in line with the priorities of these organizations.458
Perhaps more tragically, Diné opposed to Desert Rock end up turning to an
arm of the U.S. government when they do not accept the path of their own tribal
government. After criticizing Desert Rock, an e-mailed public comment to EPA
pleaded, “Our leaders in the Navajo Nation government do not seem to listen to our
cry for help. Please help our people!”459 EPA, however, is an imperfect place to
turn to, for its role is inherently limited:
EPA acknowledges that there are supporters and opponents of this proposed project.
EPA does not have a position on whether the [Desert Rock Energy Facility] is an
appropriate land-use or public policy choice for the Navajo Nation, as the scope of our
PSD permitting process is limited to evaluating compliance with PSD permitting
requirements.460

Rather than focusing, as one participant whose comments at a public hearing were
entirely in the Diné language, on “how we, as Navajo people, . . . allow our tribal
government to exercise its sovereignty,” limited tribal sovereignty externalizes the
debate.461 After criticizing the tribal government, Navajos end up in the ironic, and
arguably tragic, position of calling the U.S. government their “last hope.”462
B. Possible Limits on Tribes
Escaping this form of subordination requires rethinking the processes and
limitations that currently define tribal rights to engage in environmentally
destructive development. Desert Rock is emblematic of the current state of things; a
project, even one fully supported by a tribe’s government, must go through EPA’s
permitting process, during which environmental groups actively lobby against the
project.463 Although by law the U.S. government has a government-to-government
relationship with Indian tribes, Indian governments lack the power to set their own
terms for reservation environmental protection.464 The history of the United States
is replete with periods of environmental destruction in the name of economic
development,465 yet the Navajo Nation is not allowed to determine its own balance
458

This idea is more fully developed in Part V.A, supra.
E-mail from Julie Lee to U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Jan. 5, 2007) (on file with author).
460 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION 9, supra note 450, at 193.
461 EPA Hearing III, supra note 442, at 20 (statement of Gloria Emerson) (on file with author).
462 EPA Hearing I, supra note 399, at 40 (statement of Nelson Lee Simms) (focusing on the EPA in
particular).
463 See, e.g., Joe Hanel, EPA to Reconsider Power Plant Permit, DURANGO HERALD
(Durango, Colo.), Sept. 26, 2009, http://durangoherald.com/sections/News/2009/09/26/EPA_to_
reconsider_ power_plant_permit/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (discussing EPA’s reconsideration of the
permit for the Desert Rock facility, and the responses to EPA’s decision to reconsider by both coal
power opponents and Navajo leaders).
464 See Walker et al., supra note 205, at 382, 392–93.
465 See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use”
Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 406 (1994) (stating that early public land laws that gave “private
property rights in water and mineral resources . . . are a major cause of the enormous amount of
environmental destruction in the West”).
459
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between these competing goods. Instead, the U.S. government and environmental
organizations—even on-reservation groups—“respond to Indian proposals for
development initiatives or alternative conservation practices that conflict with their
own proposals” by relying on a U.S.-centric decision-making process.466
Before turning to the approach favored by this Article—that environmental
organizations relate to Indian tribes as if the limits on Indian sovereignty regarding
development and the environment approximated international human rights limits
on nation-states—it is worth considering four alternative answers to the question of
appropriate limits. The four alternative approaches for setting the limits of tribal
environmental destruction considered are 1) federal primacy, 2) Indian trust
doctrine, 3) cooperative regulation, and 4) tribal determination and international
sovereignty. For reasons explained in Part IV, an international human rights
approach does a better job than any of these alternatives at recognizing tribal
sovereignty while not giving tribes a carte blanche. But even though this Article
concludes by supporting a human rights approach, each of these alternatives is
supported by valuable insights that ought to be incorporated into an environmental
regime based on a tribal international human rights order.
1. Federal (Administrative) Primacy
As the Desert Rock controversy shows, federal administrative primacy largely
defines the current environmental regulation of reservations. This is not to say that
tribes and states play no role, but the regulatory framework is decidedly federal.
Thus, Professors Judith Royster and Michael C. Blumm introduce “Environmental
Protection” in their textbook, Native American Natural Resources Law, by writing,
“This section explores the interplay of federal, tribal, and state authority for
environmental protection in Indian country. In particular, these materials focus on
which of the governments is authorized to carry out the federal environmental
programs in Indian country.”467 Within this framework, limiting state regulation of
the reservations and granting tribes “treat[ment] as states” by EPA is sovereignty
enhancing.468 Tribes and Indian advocates have fought hard to gain this level of
tribal control over the environment, which, generally speaking, reflects where tribes
are today.469 Though celebrating these advances with regards to federal recognition
of sovereignty, it is important to remember that the overarching structure is
federally defined.470 Tellingly, the environmental provisions of the 2005 Indian

466 Wiggins, supra note 186, at 345 (beginning the article by asking how environmentalists should
respond to such proposals).
467 JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 217 (2002) (emphasis added).
468 Professor Richard Monette explains that for “tribes, being treated as states meant at least being
treated fairly.” Richard A. Monette, Treating Tribes as States Under Federal Statutes in the
Environmental Arena: Where Laws of Nature and Natural Law Collide, 21 VT. L. REV. 111, 114
(1996).
469 Id. (“[B]eing treated as states meant at least being treated fairly.”).
470 Or, as Professor Royster argues, “Tribal control of federal programs is thus better than federal
control, but a clear second-best to tribal choices of what programs and development opportunities to
pursue.” Royster, supra note 96, at 1070.
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Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act,471 while placing “greater
practical decision-making in the hands of energy tribes,” also mirror the existing
federal environmental requirements.472
Federal primacy, in environmental law and generally, can protect tribes from
the states. As the Supreme Court observed in 1886, historically states have been the
“deadliest enemies” of Indians, and the federal government has consequently had to
play a protective role.473 Substituting state or local authority for federal oversight
undermines the government-to-government relationship that has defined United
States–Indian relations since the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790.474 The
Supreme Court enshrined a uniquely federal-tribal relationship into the common
law in Worcester v. Georgia,475 a case dealing with an attempt by Georgia to
impose state law upon the Cherokees in the 1830s.476 Chief Justice John Marshall
wrote, “The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the Indian territory
as completely separated from that of the states; and provide that all intercourse with
them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union.”477 The idea,
Judge William Canby, Jr. explains, was that “[w]hen tribal interests, broadly
viewed, were affected, the state was excluded.”478 Professor Robert Clinton’s work
on the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution shows that the framers’
original understanding was that states would have no powers over tribes and that
federal “power is broad vis-à-vis the states.”479 Not contemplated by the framers,
according to Professor Clinton, was the Supreme Court’s transformation, beginning at
the end of the nineteenth century, of the exclusive federal-tribal relationship of
international sovereigns into plenary power over tribes.480 Though there is no “true

471 Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58,
§§ 501–06, 119 Stat. 594, 763–79 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
472 Royster, supra note 96, at 1082, 1090.
473 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
474 Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 177
(2006)); see also Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528 (repealed 1815). The risks of a
diminished federal role are further explored in Forced Federalism: Contemporary Challenges to
Indigenous Nationhood by Professor Jeff Corntassel and Richard C. Witmer, which focuses on how,
“given the devolution of federal powers to states, indigenous nations have become more vulnerable to
the jurisdictional claims of local governing bodies, such as state and municipal policymakers.” JEFF
CORNTASSEL & RICHARD C. WITMER, FORCED FEDERALISM: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO
INDIGENOUS NATIONHOOD 5 (2008).
475 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
476 Id.
477 Id. at 519.
478 William C. Canby, Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1,
6 (1987).
479 Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
113, 133 (2002).
480 Id. at 162–235 (detailing the history of the Supreme Court’s approval of congressional,
colonialist-driven plenary power and creation of judicial plenary power); see also Robert N. Clinton,
The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1058 (1995) (“The thesis of this article
is that the Supreme Court’s rejection in Cotton Petroleum of any viable Indian Commerce Clause
limitations on state authority represents an historically untenable interpretation of the clause, and
therefore, constitutes an exercise of contra-constitutional interpretation.”).
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constitutional benchmark to orient the federal-tribal discourse on sovereignty,” tribes
seem to be stuck, at least for now, with the plenary power doctrine.481
The heavy hand of the federal government extends to environmental matters
and arguably should serve as a check on the role of states. While environmental laws
that affirm tribal sovereignty are a factor in preempting state authority, plenary
power also plays a role.482 State assertions of jurisdiction over reservation land and
resources arguably undercut tribal sovereignty even when states act seemingly with
the best of intentions. The state of New York in 2001 decided to sue General Motors
(GM) because of the chemical pollution being discharged by a GM plant located
near the St. Regis Mohawk reservation.483 After noting the history of an exclusive
federal-tribal relationship, a law review article on New York’s proposal argues that
the offer to help “should be viewed with skepticism.”484 The problem with this
seemingly supportive stance of the state, according to the article, is that it “extends
the reach of states, generally chipping-away at the seemingly ever-dwindling
sovereignty of tribal peoples in the United States.”485 According to this perspective,
the federal government acts as “a shield against the states’ gentleman’s sword, such
as New York’s encroachment upon the federal-tribal relationship,” preventing the
erosion of tribal sovereignty and authority over the environment.486 The same
perspective can be seen in the decision of the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council and the
Yukon River Inter-Tribal Council to oppose transfer of National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System primacy, which would transfer permitting authority from EPA
to the State of Alaska, because such a transfer would “subvert Tribes legally
recognized right to government-to-government consultation.”487 Such a strong
481 FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
TRIBAL LIFE 39 (1995). Given the diminishment of sovereignty at the hands of Congress and the
judiciary, Professor Pommersheim has suggested that it is time “to more fully consider the necessity for
an amendment to the United States Constitution that expressly recognizes tribal sovereignty.” Frank
Pommersheim, Is There a (Little or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?: A
Brief Essay, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 271, 285 (2003); see also FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN
LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE CONSTITUTION 295–312 (2009) [hereinafter
POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE] (discussing the political feasibility of such an amendment).
Likewise, Professor Robert Laurence would like “to ratchet the sovereignty doctrine higher now, and
then lock it in place by declaring it to be a constitutional doctrine.” Laurence, supra note 192, at 6.
482 It has been argued that “[m]any federal environmental statutes . . . grant Indian tribes a great deal
of sovereignty and in so doing preempt states from applying their laws to Indian tribes.” Cluett, supra
note 215, at 198. But what this description misses—besides the characterization as a “grant” rather than
a “recognition” of sovereignty—is that it is sovereignty “coupled with the federal plenary power over
Indian affairs [that] explains why state regulatory laws generally never apply to tribes and tribal lands.”
Walker et al., supra note 205, at 383.
483 Peter D. Lepsch, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Is New York State’s Move to Cleanup the
Akewsasne Reservation an Endeavor to Assert Authority over Indian Tribes?, 8 ALB. L. ENVTL.
OUTLOOK J. 65, 69 (2002).
484 Id. at 70.
485 Id. at 107.
486 Id.
487 E-mail from Alaska Inter-Tribal Council to Ezra Rosser (July 31, 2009, 20:53) (on file with
author); Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of Enlightened
Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 21–23 (1999) (exploring the
requirement that the federal government consult with tribes on matters affecting them); see also Letter
from Clarence Alexander, Executive Bd. Chair, Yukon River Inter-Tribal Watershed Council, to Nina
Kocourek, Office of Water & Watersheds, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 2 (Aug. 18, 2008) (on file with
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enforcement of a state-tribal line may seem out-of-place when states and tribes are in
agreement, but it protects tribes when states and tribes disagree and tribes face the
insistence that they yield to conflicting state interests.488
Federal environmental law also provides space for tribal environmental
enforcement and—so long as tribes remain within federally determined
parameters—for tribes to make some decisions regarding their level of
environmental protection versus development.489 A classic example is that tribes
can reclassify reservation air quality under EPA’s PSD regulations, as the Tribal
Council of the Northern Cheyenne chose to do in 1976, over the protests of stripmining coal companies.490 The Ninth Circuit upheld the reclassification with
language indicative of a move towards treating tribes as states by EPA: “[S]tates
and Indian tribes occupying federal reservations stand on substantially equal
footing,” the court stated, adding that it could not find “Congressional intent [in the
Clean Air Act] to subordinate the tribes to state decisionmaking.”491 The tribe’s PSD
air quality reclassification required EPA’s approval and the decision had as much to
do with the role of EPA as the tribe’s actions, but despite such a caveat, the decision
“set an enduring legal and political precedent for Indian country environmental
law.”492
Treating tribes as states was the EPA’s solution to two related problems:
filling the gaps of federalism and determining the extent of tribal powers. The
United States is popularly conceived of as having only two levels of government—
federal and state—with tribes “effectively neglected, if not completely omitted”
from consideration.493 EPA moved away from the “basic strategy of not mentioning
Indian tribes”494 with its 1984 Policy for the Administration of Environmental

author) (“The state of Alaska has taken a ‘hands off’ approach to government consultation with the
Tribes of Alaska.”). One of the fears tribes might have is that a state empowered to implement federal
environmental regulatory authority that contained protribal elements—such as a consultation
requirement—might deliberately undermine federal objectives the state was tasked with putting into
effect. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118
YALE L.J. 1256 (2009) (exploring state use of federally delegated authority in ways opposed to federal
goals).
488 As Professor Grijalva notes, “Opponents of tribal sovereignty sometimes . . . perceive the only
appropriate resolution of state objections is forcing differing tribal values to yield.” GRIJALVA, supra
note 15, at 115.
489 The tension between space and control explains one author stating that “[t]he decision to build
waste disposal facilities should be left entirely to the tribes themselves,” and then continuing in the same
paragraph by writing, “Still, the decision to enter the waste management business requires assurance that
compliance with environmental laws will be stringent.” Sehgal, supra note 211, at 433–34.
490 Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 704–05 (9th Cir. 1981).
491 Id. at 714.
492 James M. Grijalva, The Origins of EPA’s Indian Program, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 191, 214
(2006).
493 Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based upon the Constitutional Status of Indian
Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 318 (2003). Professor Tebben’s thesis is that tribes are part of the
constitutional structure of the United States, id., something this Article moves away from in Part III. But
regardless of how tribes are classified, they should not be simply ignored.
494 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Treatment as Tribe, Treatment as State: The Penobscot Indians and the
Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 815, 816 (2004).
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Programs on Indian Reservations.495 Three years after Nance v. EPA, EPA
committed to Indian tribes playing a “lead role for matters affecting reservation
environments” and taking on responsibilities “under terms similar to those
governing delegations to States.”496 While treating tribes as states (TAS) arguably
fails to accord tribes their proper due as sovereign nations, under such a policy
tribes can establish reservation environmental protection levels. TAS operates
under federal guidelines and tribes are not free from EPA involvement, but tribes
can do some things under TAS—like set water quality standards that are higher
than federal or state standards—that might be surprising.497
TAS, even though it is part of federal primacy over reservation environmental
regulation, is arguably an attractive option. Professor Lincoln Davies concludes his
in-depth study of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians’ proposal to store
nuclear waste on their reservation by advocating a “mechanism by which tribes can
have guaranteed sovereignty equivalent to what we afford states today.”498 Facing
an uncertain future and a shrinking tribe, the Goshutes hoped that storing nuclear
waste would “revitalize their nation” through project-related jobs and payments.499
The willingness by some tribes to accept nuclear waste, according to Professor
Saleem H. Ali, should not be discounted as merely a sign of desperation; rather, the
choice “should be seen as a self-conscious (and, perhaps, misplaced) attempt to
invigorate self-determination, absent other avenues to do so.”500
Initial environmental impact statements supported the Goshute proposal.501 Just as
Bill Richardson actively opposed Desert Rock, the governor of Utah played a
similar role—going so far as to attempt to create a land moat around the reservation
to block transportation routes to the proposed storage facility—in trying to derail to
Goshute project.502 In 2006, Senator Orrin Hatch declared the nuclear storage plan

495 WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA POLICY FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 1 (1984), available at
http://www.epa.gov/tribalportal/pdf/indian-policy-84.pdf.
496 Id. at 2. The Policy provided for encouraging tribal assumption of regulatory and program
management, but with EPA retaining responsibility until tribes were interested in and capable of
taking on such a role. Id.; see also President’s Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs,
1970 PUB. PAPERS 564, 568 (July 8, 1970) (arguing that, under the self-determination initiatives
Nixon introduced with the speech, “Indian control of Indian programs would always be a wholly
voluntary matter”). For more on the 1984 EPA Policy, see Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court’s
“Whack-A-Mole” Game Theory in Federal Indian Law, a Theory That Has No Place in the Realm of
Environmental Law, GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J., Fall 2002, at 90, 124–25.
497 City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 423 (10th Cir. 1996). For more on the case and the
issue of tribal water quality standards, see Janet K. Baker, Tribal Water Quality Standards: Are There
Any Limits?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 367 (1997).
498 Lincoln L. Davies, Skull Valley Crossroads: Reconciling Native Sovereignty and the Federal
Trust, 68 MD. L. REV. 290, 365 (2009).
499 Id. at 334.
500 ALI, supra note 11, at 36.
501 Davies, supra note 498, at 339–40.
502 Id. at 343; see also David Rich Lewis, Skull Valley Goshutes and the Politics of Nuclear Waste:
Environment, Identity, and Sovereignty, in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PERSPECTIVES
ON THE ECOLOGICAL INDIAN 304, 304 (Michael E. Harkin & David Rich Lewis eds., 2007)
(highlighting Utah governor Michael Leavitt’s vocal opposition to the Goshute plan).
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“stone cold dead.”503 In many ways Desert Rock and the Goshute nuclear proposal
are analogous examples of tribes considering environmentally harmful forms of
economic development. After presenting the Goshute proposal controversies,
Professor Davies argues that tribes should have the right to opt into a state-like type
of sovereignty.504
The attractiveness of federalizing tribal sovereignty is that sovereignty is
recognized but is also subject to a natural limit. Professor Davies’s solution and
EPA’s TAS both require that tribes “submit to” aspects of federal law.505 The
thinking behind such a requirement is simple: “because the actions of every
sovereign entity in this country can affect the others, there is a need to moderate
such [transboundary environmental] harms in an evenhanded and fair way.”506
Certainly the Goshute proposal has externalities affecting those off-reservation (to
give just one example, one would predict that land values of parcels near the
nuclear storage facility would fall), just as Desert Rock would impose local and
global externalities. Under Professor Davies’s proposal—which for power plant
development is close to the current state of the law under EPA’s permitting
scheme—the allowed form and degree of tribal environmental destruction for
economic gain would be moderated by the federal government, just as the federal
government has the same role for states.507 As Professor Davies acknowledges, this
externality solution is above all else a “practical” one, but is it appropriate for the
Navajo Nation?508
The trouble with federal primacy is found in the moderation’s unidirectional
nature. Dealing with the externalities of sovereigns is a crucial part of any regime,
but leaving the “evenhanded and fair” setting of limits entirely in the federal
government’s hands is an imperfect solution at best.509 Besides undermining tribes’

503 Davies, supra note 498, at 346 (quoting Press Release, Office of U.S. Senator Orrin G. Hatch,
Utahns Deliver Killing Blow to Skull Valley Nuke Waste Plan (Sept. 7, 2006),
http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.View&PressRelease_id=6bf6bbeb834-4ebb-a950-19e629e35706 (quoting Senator Hatch)).
504 Id. at 374–76. Under this proposal, tribes would decide whether or not to switch to such a
position, just as they had decided whether to opt into IRA during the New Deal. A key difference is that
under Professor Davies’s model, opting in would also protect tribes from Congressional and judicial
diminishment of tribal sovereignty. Id. at 367.
505 Id. at 371.
506 Id. at 370.
507 Professor Richard Monette explains that Republican Party objections to federal bureaucracy and
preference for local regulation led to the current form of federal primacy with state administration: “The
federal government assumed primacy over environmental regulation, but its programs ‘devolved’ to the
states to administer. It is a mistake to believe, however, that the EPA has delegated such programs to the
states.” Richard Monette, Environmental Justice and Indian Tribes: The Double-Edged Tomahawk of
Applying Civil Rights Laws in Indian Country, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 721, 735 (1999).
508 Davies, supra note 498, at 371–72 (“[S]ome tribes might see that kind of moderation as a dilution
of their historical sovereignty—particularly when that sovereignty is couched in terms of the full nationlike sovereignty tribes theoretically enjoy, or even in terms of sovereignty exercised in a way that seeks
to minimize federal contact—and therefore might choose not to partake in the tradeoff. Others, of
course, may adopt a more practical view . . . .”).
509 Professor Judith Royster argues that when it comes to mineral leasing, the Secretary of the
Interior cannot “subordinate the best interests of the tribes to public values or the national interest,”
including environmental interests, because federal statutes governing such leasing impose a fiduciary
duty on the Secretary to tribal mineral owners. Royster, supra note 377, at 364. This trust obligation
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claims to be independent nations with separate sovereign authority,510 federal
primacy in environmental regulation and enforcement fails to take into account
other differences between tribes and states. For example, should the Navajo Nation
have more rights to pollute the environment than, say, Delaware in order to help
bridge the income gap between the reservation and the rest of the United States?
Or, to take another example, should EPA public participation practices be required,
or should a tribe be able to set different standards for public involvement and forms
of acceptable dissent? Federal primacy answers these and all other questions by
insisting that standard federal guidelines applicable to states should also apply to
Indian nations.
2. Indian Trust Doctrine
The core idea of federal (administrative) primacy, that the United States
should determine the extent of permitted environmentally harmful forms of
reservation development, also is supported by the Indian trust doctrine.
An enhanced version of the Indian trust doctrine when it comes to the environment
is presented most fully by Professor Mary Christina Wood over the span of three
law review articles.511 Professor Wood argues that when it comes to development
that directly or indirectly impacts the reservation environment or land base, at times
the trust doctrine requires federal judges to block tribal council approved
projects.512 By operating independently of statutes or administrative agency
practices, the Indian trust doctrine arguably limits reservation development more
than does federal administrative primacy.513 In order to appreciate the potential
applicability of the trust doctrine on tribally supported development such as Desert
Rock, it is worth exploring Professor Wood’s arguments in depth.

may not reach all other agencies when it comes to environmentally harmful mineral development and, as
the Navajo Nation II case shows, the U.S. government does not always live up to its trust obligations.
510 As Professor Imre Sutton, the scholar who perhaps has done the most work on Indian geography
and the nature of reservation land, explains, “[A] reservation provides the base and the locus for the
functioning of the tribe as a political or jural entity within its own bounds, but this should not be
construed to mean that the reservation is a distinct and separate political unit equivalent to a state, a
county, or even a municipality.” Imre Sutton, Sovereign States and the Changing Definition of the
Indian Reservation, 66 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 281, 287 (1976); see also Marren Sanders, Clean Water in
Indian Country: The Risks (and Rewards) of Being Treated in the Same Manner as a State, 36 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 533, 551 (2010) (describing imposition of EPA standards as an “affront to the
sovereignty” of some tribes).
511 Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive’s Trust Responsibility Toward the Native Nations
on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration’s Promises and Performance,
25 ENVTL. L. 733 (1995) [hereinafter Wood, Partial Critique]; see Wood, supra note 325; Mary
Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust Paradigm for Federal
Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109 [hereinafter Wood, New Trust
Paradigm].
512 See Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 143 (“Otherwise, the federal trust obligation
essentially collapses into a rule of absolute deference to a tribal council’s decision . . . .”).
513 See id. at 141 (“[T]he government should achieve a degree of protection that is appropriate to
protect the tribe’s way of life on the reservation, even if this level of protection exceeds what is
otherwise mandated by statutory law.”); id. at 227 (“[C]ourts should enforce the procedural mandate of
the trust obligation independent of the statutory procedures called for by NEPA.”).
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According to the Indian trust doctrine, the United States has a trust
relationship with Indian tribes that should guide policy and judicial review.514 The
Supreme Court’s rejection of the breach of trust claim in Navajo Nation I, upheld
in Navajo Nation II, suggests that the trust doctrine approach may get only limited
support from the courts. In Navajo Nation I, the Court acknowledged “the
undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and
the Indian people.”515 But in Navajo Nation I and II, the Court ultimately twice
forgave the Secretary of the Interior’s clear breach of the trust obligation that is
supposed to run to Indian tribes.516 What amounts to judicial skepticism regarding
trust doctrine enforceability does not, however, mean that the trust doctrine
necessarily has no teeth nor that federal policy should not reflect the doctrine. Were
it to be taken more seriously by all branches of the U.S. government than it was in
the Navajo Nation decisions,517 the trust doctrine arguably would involve the
imposition of an outer limit on tribal development decisions impacting reservation
land.
According to Professor Wood, underlying the trust doctrine is protection of
the possibility of tribal separatism and the tribal land base.518 Since development
decisions can imperil the land base and consequently tribal separatism, Professor
Wood argues that the trust doctrine requires the rejection of certain
environmentally harmful forms of development.519 The conflict between the trust
doctrine and self-determination when it comes to development can be seen in
Professor Wood’s formulation of the doctrine itself. Professor Wood writes, “[T]he
core principle of the trust doctrine remains a duty to protect a viable native
separatism and tribal sovereignty,”520 but these are really two principles—
separatism and sovereignty—which at times align but at times conflict. Professor
Wood resolves these conflicts in favor of the environment, preservation of
traditional ways of life, and dissidents, asserting that maintaining viable separatism

514

See id. at 111.
Navajo Nation I, 537 U.S. 488, 506 (2003) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225
(1983)). The Indian trust doctrine is firmly established as a principle of federal Indian law that has been
acknowledged repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S.
286, 296 (1942) (“[T]his Court has recognized the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the
Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people.”).
516 See supra notes 158–74 and accompanying text.
517 The judiciary is not alone in its skepticism regarding the trust doctrine:
515

[T]he Department of [the] Interior has begun to distance itself from any notion of a general trust
responsibility. In decision-making documents, the Department of the Interior once embraced the
trust responsibility, often using it as an alternative basis for a decision in many areas of Indian
affairs. In more recent years, Interior has been much more guarded, rarely mentioning the trust
responsibility.
Kevin K. Washburn, Remarks at Harvard Law School Panel Discussion (Mar. 20, 2008), in Kevin K.
Washburn et al., Paternalism or Protection? Federal Review of Tribal Economic Decisions in Indian
Gaming 2, 3 (Ariz. Legal Studies Working Paper Group, Discussion Paper No. 08-25, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1226542 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink).
518 Wood, supra note 325, at 1496.
519 See Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 235–36.
520 Id. at 113.
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can justify overturning development decisions of tribal councils.521 The trust
doctrine, she argues, requires that when the tribal council makes a shortsighted or
wrong decision regarding the tradeoff between development and the environment,
secretarial approval should be withheld and federal courts should step in to block
such development.522
In writing that the trust doctrine requires federal review of tribal council
decisions,523 Professor Wood accepts a narrowing of tribal sovereignty as a
necessary consequence of the United States’ trust obligation to Indians. Though
administrative approval regarding tribal land use is vested in the U.S. Department
of the Interior for many tribes and land-use decisions, in practice tribal council
decisions are treated deferentially and Professor Wood does not view the federal
approval process as providing a meaningful check on tribal council decisions.524
Institutional review of tribal council lease and development decisions would
therefore be with the federal judiciary. Federal courts have hesitated to be actively
involved in tribal matters, dismissing claims because tribal sovereign immunity
prevents an “indispensible party,” the tribal government, from being subject to
suit.525 The involvement of a less hesitant judiciary would be driven by the
challenges of dissident tribal members opposed to the actions of their own tribal
council.526 For Professor Wood, the trust doctrine requires that non-Indian judges
and courts review tribal council decisions and administrative approvals to “ensure
the perpetuation of the land base as an attribute of native sovereignty.”527
521 See Wood, supra note 325, at 1558–64 (arguing federal government review of tribal council
decisions may be the only way to review environmental impacts that prevent preservation of the
traditional way of life).
522 Professor Wood’s faith in the trust doctrine and federal oversight is surprising given the Navajo
Nation facts and record of BIA, which “in balancing its trust responsibilities with Indian selfdetermination, has both squandered tribal resources and saved tribes from short-sighted expediency and
greed.” David Rich Lewis, Still Native: The Significance of Native Americans in the History of the
Twentieth-Century American West, 24 W. HIST. Q. 203, 216 (1993).
523 Wood, supra note 325, at 1564.
524 Id. at 1480. (“As a practical matter, however, the BIA simply approves transactions that tribal
governments support.”).
525 See id. at 1537–40 (explaining and critiquing the dismissal along “indispensible party” grounds of
two such cases). For more on tribal sovereign immunity, see Note, In Defense of Tribal Sovereign
Immunity, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1058 (1982).
In some respects, Professor Woods seems to agree with judicial hesitation. Although the first law
review article advocates “aggressive judicial enforcement,” Wood, supra note 325, at 1569, the
subsequent article offers a clarification: “A prudent judicial approach to such conflicts might be to
reserve decisions that depart from tribal council prerogatives for those cases presenting extreme
circumstances.” Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 145.
526 Wood, supra note 325, at 1480 (“[C]hallenges typically originate from dissenting individuals
within the tribe.”); id. at 1536 (“Given this deference to the tribal council, the only parties who would
likely challenge the federal approval decision on trust grounds are individual Indian plaintiffs or
groups of tribal members who are opposed to the decision made by the tribal council.”); see also
Louis G. Leonard, III, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environmental Justice in the Mescalero
Apache’s Decision to Store Nuclear Waste, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 651, 674 (1997) (“The Trust
Doctrine may be used in this way by tribal members to challenge practices such as the BIA’s approval
power over land uses . . . .”).
527 Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 149 (“[A] court should consider the permanency
of the land use, its relation to existing and future spacial needs of the tribe, and collateral effects which
may further detract from the usable land base.”).
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Professor Wood argues that there is no inherent contradiction in tribal
sovereignty and the simultaneous probability that if federal courts follow her
aspirational version of the Indian trust doctrine they will overturn tribal council
decisions.528 The counterargument is acknowledged: “Any judicial invalidation of a
transaction initially approved by a tribal government naturally strikes many as an
invasion into tribal prerogative. Indeed, some advocate complete control by tribal
councils over all tribal lands and resources, without any federal approval role.”529
The question of whether federal courts are the appropriate forum to decide what is
beneficial for Indian country is also acknowledged: “Judicial intervention in this
context may intrude on the sovereignty of tribes by substituting a court’s notion of
what is in the best interests of the tribe for a determination made in the first
instance by the tribal government itself.”530 But the thrust of Professor Wood’s
argument is that when it comes to long-term leasing or environmentally harmful
development, such decisions cannot be left to tribal governments. Professor Wood
argues that tribal councils may not provide dissenters—what under her framework
are federal court plaintiffs—”adequate remedy,” essentially a challenge aimed at
what should be assumed regarding tribal government processes.531 They also may
fail to adequately take into account the position of traditionalists or future
generations.532 Finally, tribal councils, Professor Wood cautions, may be unable to
resist powerful non-Indian interests seeking access to tribal resources.533
The Indian trust doctrine can prevent non-Indian interests from acquiring
access to reservation resources otherwise available with permission of the tribal
council. Sovereignty and federal review are not in conflict, Professor Wood argues,
because sovereignty absent federal review is impossible: “Self-Determination will
prove a hollow concept if industry and the government exploit it to serve the
interests of the majority society at the expense of the native nations. Indeed, it will
become nothing more than continued colonialism under the banner of native
sovereignty.”534 Or put differently, “[w]hat often amounts to an automatic
deference to tribal councils effectively eliminates any restraint against transfer of
528

Wood, supra note 325, at 1562–64.
Id. at 1551; see also Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 156–57 (“Second guessing
tribal council decisions, even in a broad policy context, may affront contemporary notions of tribal
sovereignty.”).
530 Wood, supra note 325, at 1550; see also Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 128.
531 Wood, supra note 325, at 1540–41 (“[T]he presumption that the tribal government always
provides an adequate forum of redress for tribal members may be unwarranted.”). Government
processes go beyond providing redress, and it similarly has been asserted that the trust responsibility is
important based on the argument that “some tribes do not have the institutional and enforcement
mechanisms needed to guarantee that tribal resources will be developed responsibly.” Andrea S. Miles,
Note, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: Tools for Achieving Energy Development and Tribal SelfSufficiency or an Abdication of Federal Environmental and Trust Responsibilities?, 30 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 461, 472 (2006).
532 Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 143, 167.
533 Id. at 143. Tribal councils are not alone in having a limited ability to resist; the same can be true
of the federal agencies. See Wood, Partial Critique, supra note 511, at 746 (“These private stakeholders often exert overwhelming pressure on agencies to render decisions favorable to them, and often
public or environmental values fall sway to more immediate and quantifiable economic interests.”).
534 Wood, supra note 325, at 1568–69 (emphasis added); see also Leonard, supra note 526, at 689
(making a similar argument—that “the federal government is now using the concept of tribal
sovereignty as an excuse”—regarding the siting of nuclear waste on Indian reservations).
529
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Indian lands and resources. Taken to its extreme, this policy may resurrect the
specter of Termination under the more palatable banner of Self-Determination.”535
This is strong language is supported by Professor Wood’s position that “tribal
councils frequently capitulate to development proposals even when individual tribal
members strongly oppose the development for religious and spiritual reasons.”536
Capitulation language echoes the concern tribes are entering into contracts of
adhesion, the difference being that while the concern in Part III.B was with unfair
contracts, Professor Wood favors a heightened standard of environmental
protection for reservation, relative to off-reservation, development.537 This
aspirational version of the trust doctrine requires that the U.S. government “insulate
tribal lands from the priorities of the non-Indian market,”538 based on a “federal
fiduciary duty to protect a tribe’s territory against market encroachments of the
majority society.”539 The argument ultimately is that Indians are different and
traditional ways of life must be protected from “the development and pollution that
now plagues nearly every sector of the majority society.”540
By elevating the tribal member objections to tribal council actions from
internal tribal matters to the level of the trust doctrine enforceable by federal courts,
Professor Wood ends up prioritizing the environment and the idea of static
reservation ways of life over tribal sovereignty. The argument is made that federal
administrative and judicial oversight “does not amount to a per se intrusion into the
internal affairs of the tribes as long as the federal government directs its authority
primarily against the non-Indian entity seeking to do business with the tribe.”541
But this argument does little to address situations, as in the Desert Rock proposal,
where a tribe initiates the proposal or where a tribe is working in partnership with a
non-Indian entity. Additionally, Professor Wood advocates “a role for the trust
doctrine in protecting the more traditional elements of native separatism.”542 But I
find the romantic assertion that traditionalists enjoy special priority vis-à-vis
(generally speaking, democratically elected) tribal councils that should be protected

535

Wood, supra note 325, at 1564 (emphasis added).
Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 221.
537 Professor Wood writes, “[T]he trust obligation to protect tribal resources should often translate
into a higher level of ecological protection than that which might result when solely non-Indian interests
are affected.” Wood, Partial Critique, supra note 511, at 745. A heightened reservation standard reflects
Professor Wood’s disdain for the relationship non-Indian society has with the environment. Professor
Wood notes the “ominous horizon of ecological damage that haunts the majority’s industrial society,”
Wood, supra note 325, at 1569, and later describes the indigenous model as “the very antithesis of the
industrial model,” Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 153.
Professor Wood is not alone in her disdain for the relationship of non-Indian society to the
environment; Professor Rebecca Tsosie begins her article on self-determination and the environment by
writing of the United States as “a nation faced with the dismal legacy of overdevelopment.” Tsosie,
supra note 71, at 225.
538 Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 163.
539 Wood, supra note 325, at 1568.
540 Wood, Partial Critique, supra note 511, at 740.
541 Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 181; see also Wood, supra note 325,
at 1561 (“A negative approval, whether emanating from the BIA or a court reviewing the BIA’s
decision, represents less of a directive on how the tribe should use its land and more of a restraint on the
particular private firm seeking to access the reservation’s resources.”).
542 Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 235.
536
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by the United States government similarly unconvincing.543 It is true that “tribal
council decisions often prompt fierce protests by other tribal members who wish to
maintain a more traditional, land-based way of life on their reservation and who
may consider such industrial development both a desecration of their lands and a
harbinger of cultural extinction.”544 However, that does not mean that Indian trust
doctrine enforcement is the best way to deal with such protests.
Though conceptually the trust doctrine could be considered federal primacy’s
cousin, because of the strength of Professor Wood’s arguments, it is worth fully
considering her Indian-trust-doctrine-based approach to environmentally harmful
activities on reservations. Ultimately, I have no better counterargument than
Professor Wood’s own summary of the argument against federal enforcement:
[C]onflict over development is not uncommon in other governments, and the existence
of conflict alone may not justify judicial interference. Self-determination can flourish
on reservations only if the federal government leaves tribes to set their own priorities.
The tribal governments carry the mantle of authority, and while their actions may meet
with dissension within the tribe, part of the price of sovereignty may be improper or
unwelcome management by tribal governments. Federal intrusion of any kind may be
fundamentally incompatible with tribal sovereignty.545

The difference is that while Professor Wood finds these reasons not
compelling, I do, and as a consequence I do not think the federal government—
particularly federal courts—should be in the position of passing judgment on tribal
development decisions.
3. Cooperative Regulation
The third alternative approach for setting the limits of tribal environmental
destruction is cooperative arrangements between Indian nations and local
governments. Pollution is not bound by lines in the map—environmental issues offreservation impact nearby Indian tribes and vice versa. Projects, whether a power
plant or a waste facility, often serve Indian and non-Indian communities,546 and for
tribes the economic gains may be based primarily on off-reservation demand.547
Overlapping concerns and impacts, such as where there is “mutual interest” in “the
same natural resources,” seem to call for a cooperative approach to environmental

543

For more on the stereotyping of Indians as environmentalists, see supra Part III.
Wood, New Trust Paradigm, supra note 511, at 143; see also Wood, supra note 325, at 1562
(“[I]nternal dissension over such offers [as waste facilities] is often muted in the outside policy realm by
an overall appearance of tribal willingness created by the tribal government’ own sponsorship of the
waste proposal.”); id. at 1567 (“[T]he deep aversion of a significant portion of the native population to
industrial development of their lands is largely overlooked in the face of tribal council approvals . . . .”).
545 Wood, supra note 325, at 1558.
546 See, e.g., Helman, supra note 361, at 88 (discussing the Desert Rock power plant).
547 See id. (explaining that the initial Desert Rock proposal came at a time of “rampant power plant
construction . . . spurred by rolling blackouts across California”).
544
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regulation.548 Scholars have taken note: Cooperative agreements have become a
preferred solution for tribal-state conflicts, including environmental ones.549
There are practical reasons to support cooperative agreements, and scholarship
or case studies on environmentally destructive activities proposed by tribes
frequently end with a call for cooperation. An article on indigenous commercial
fishing, after a section introducing all the problems, concludes that “[a] plausible
approach for addressing these conflicts is the creation of joint agreements between
indigenous peoples and state or federal governments, explicitly establishing the
parameters of indigenous fishing rights.”550 Jana Walker and Kevin Gover make
cooperative agreements the final suggestion for how tribes could improve the “legal
infrastructure” to encourage economic development, and their description presents
the many positives of such agreements:
Cooperative agreements can be essential for environmental control because
pollution does not respect political boundaries. Neither tribes nor states can effectively
regulate regional environmental quality without the cooperation of the other. Joint
regulatory programs avoid jurisdictional disputes by allowing the parties to agree on
who will regulate a particular activity for a particular period of time. Moreover,
cooperative agreements lower intergovernmental tensions that can damage the overall
quality of state/tribal relations and also provide greater flexibility for both tribal and
state policy-makers in the future. Finally, environmental agreements stretch limited
tribal and state funds by reducing administrative and service costs. Given the limited
resources of most tribes and the twenty-year head-start on environmental regulation
enjoyed by states, cooperative agreements may give tribes the ability to call upon state
resources and expertise in creating tribal programs.551

These benefits underlie a similar ending to another article: “Given the high
mobility of air pollutants and the interdependence of state and tribal jurisdiction, it
is imperative for Tribes and States to come together and work cooperatively for
environmental protection.”552 Yet another author believes “negotiation may
produce a more useful means to build relationships between Indian tribes and
federal officials.”553 But will “tribes and states [working] together to achieve
compromises acceptable to both sovereigns” really work for nuclear waste?554 Or
for a new coal-fired power plant in the four corners?
548 Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Sovereignty and Intergovernmental Cooperation, in TRIBAL
WATER RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN CONTEMPORARY LAW, POLICY, AND ECONOMICS 13, 30 (John E. Thorson et
al. eds., 2006).
549 The “development of intergovernmental agreements” is identified as a “trend” by a Harvard Law
Review
note
exploring
the
advantages
and
risks
of
cooperative
agreements.
Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: Models for Expanded Usage,
112 HARV. L. REV. 922, 922 (1999).
550 Michael A. Burnett, The Dilemma of Commercial Fishing Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
A Comparative Study of the Common Law Nations, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 389, 421 (1996).
551 Walker & Gover, supra note 233, at 250 (calling such agreements a way to avoid litigation and
political battles around nuclear waste in Indian country).
552 Kristina M. Reader, Case Note, Empowering Tribes: The District of Columbia Circuit Upholds
Tribal Authority to Regulate Air Quality Throughout the Reservation Lands in Arizona Public Service
Company v. Environmental Protection Agency, 12 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 329 (2001).
553 Johnson, supra note 196, at 528.
554 Collins & Hall, supra note 130, at 343.
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Cooperative regulation in theory avoids the pitfalls of federal primacy—tribal
sovereignty is not diminished when tribes agree to share regulatory authority with
states or localities—while also directly dealing with cross-border externalities.
Cross-deputization agreements have helped tribes police reservations, and these
practical agreements to work around Supreme Court limitations on jurisdiction over
non-Indians show the potential of cooperative agreements generally.555 Professor
Alex Tallchief Skibine has “advocated a return to a relationship based on consent,”
with tribal, state, and federal jurisdictional responsibilities established by
negotiation.556 But importantly, Professor Skibine’s hope is that the new “treaties,
compacts, covenants, or agreements which would outline the elements of the new
relationship” would be negotiated between tribes and the United States—period.557
Cooperative regulation in contrast involves negotiation with all levels of nonIndian government which, given an emphasis on practical local solutions to local
problems, means there is “room—abundant room—for tribal negotiations with the
states in areas where local concerns control.”558 The “increased cooperation”
between tribes and all levels of non-Indian government is described as “a major
positive development” by Professor Charles Wilkinson and the American Indian
Resources Institute.559 Similarly, Professor Rebecca Tsosie concludes that with a
“foundation of mutual respect and appreciation for the complex issues at stake,
Indian nations and states can likely make better decisions about the future than any
single judge or court system.”560 After presenting the rise in cooperative agreements
and in state laws authorizing negotiation with tribes, Professor Matthew Fletcher
writes, “Tribal-state agreements are exercises of sovereignty.”561 But Professor
Fletcher’s far more interesting claim is that cooperative agreements actually are “a
means of earning governmental legitimacy” for tribes, because the signing of such
agreements is itself a form of recognizing tribal government legitimacy.562 But, in
my opinion, much depends on the content of the agreements; after all, as Professor
Robert Laurence reminds us, “one of the ways for a tribe to lose sovereignty is by
voluntary surrender of it.”563
555 Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts’ Frustration of Tribal-Federal
Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 20 (2004); Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Comment, Toward Consent
and Cooperation: Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507,
584–85 (1987) (using cross-deputization agreements as an example of a pragmatic solution to a local
problem that does not deny Indians their sovereignty).
556 Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State Power Inside Indian Reservations with the
Right of Tribal Self-Government and the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1156.
557 Id. at 1108.
558 P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The
Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365, 382 (1994).
559 CHARLES WILKINSON & THE AM. INDIAN RES. INST., INDIAN TRIBES AS SOVEREIGN
GOVERNMENTS 48 (2d ed. 2004).
560 Tsosie, supra note 548, at 34. But, as Judge Canby notes, even if the importance of
tribal-state negotiations increases, court decisions help establish “the legal armament that each side
brings to the negotiating table.” Canby, supra note 478, at 22.
561 Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations 24
(Mich. State Univ. Coll. of Law Working Paper Group, Research Paper No. 05-03, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007756 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink).
562 Id. at 26.
563 Laurence, supra note 192, at 19 (emphasis added) (discussing the desirability of a new treatymaking era).
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Having written about the dangers of uncritical support of cooperative
agreements elsewhere, I focus here on the limits of such agreements when facing a
particular controversy.564 Even if cooperative agreements worked ex ante, without
endangering tribal sovereignty, cooperative agreements would not likely be a
successful mechanism for setting the limits of tribal environmental destruction in
the context of a controversial proposal. Ex post—once a viable project is proposed
and supported by a tribe—states or localities opposed to the project are not likely to
enter into cooperative agreements that would permit the project to go forward.565
Once the Navajo Nation decided to pursue Desert Rock, a cooperative agreement
was not going to resolve the dispute, nor would either the tribe or local non-Indian
governments concede regulatory authority to the other side. Cooperative
agreements are not the deus ex machina of environmental regulatory conflicts and,
while they would be “a mainstay of Indian law utopia”566 and can help set the
advance terms of some proposals with cross-border impacts, it is important not to
overstate the potential of cooperative agreements.
4. Tribal Determination and International Sovereignty
Unqualified tribal determination of the trade-offs between development and
the environment is the fourth alternative approach for setting the limits of tribal
environmental destruction. The key feature of this alternative is that tribes truly
control their environmental protection.567 This means more than allowing tribes
some administrative authority over a range of possibilities set by federal guidelines
and historically provided by federal agencies.568 Under this approach, Indian
nations set their own priorities, regulatory methods, and pollution tolerance levels
independently, without reliance upon federal enabling statutes or EPA oversight.569
The long history of federal control of reservation life, continuing in a perhaps
muted form through the present self-determination period, makes such a state of

564 See Ezra Rosser, Caution, Cooperative Agreements, and the Actual State of Things: A Reply to
Professor Fletcher, 42 TULSA L. REV. 57 (2006).
565 Moreover, the back and forth between tribes and non-Indian governments over tribally proposed
projects may reduce the possibility of future agreements, even on unrelated issues. Professor Philip
Frickey gives an example of a negotiation that succeeded because, rather than being about a single
controversy, the parties approached the negotiations “with an eye towards accommodating . . . the longterm relationship as well.” Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and
Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 1780–81 (1997). But importantly, the
negotiations were between the tribe and the federal government and did not involve state or local
governments. Id.
566 Laurence, supra note 192, at 22.
567 This approach borrows from Professor Robert Porter’s definition of indigenous sovereignty as
“freedom of a people to choose what their future will be.” Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous
Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 75, 75 (2002).
568 While laws allowing tribes to take over traditionally federal roles and service provisions are a
start, their coverage as far as governance is limited, and more “importantly, they frame the services
being carried out first and foremost as federal obligations—not the tribe’s.” Davies, supra note 498, at
367.
569 This is true notwithstanding the conclusion of a 1992 EPA study that “[t]ribal programs could
translate traditional cultural and spiritual values into . . . the substantive requirements of pollution
permits issued under the modern federal environmental programs.” GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 11–12.
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“full sovereignty” hard to imagine.570 Moreover, focus on “the terms of sovereignty”
alone risks undermining or diverting attention from claims important to Indian
communities, but that do not fit neatly into struggles over jurisdiction.571 Most articles
on Indian issues focus on working within the existing constraints or making minor
tweaks to the federally designed system, and consequently some scholars will reject
this alternative as unduly utopian.572
Tribal determination at its fullest involves removing federal oversight of
development on Indian land. In the environmental context, tribal determination
would involve movement from federal to tribal primacy:
[F]ederal policy must recognize that tribal communities are fully capable of evaluating
waste project proposals and making good decisions for themselves. . . . Congress must
avoid environmental paternalism and instead show its confidence in tribal decisionmaking. If and when a tribal community decides that it wishes to pursue such a
project, Congress should not only accept, but also respect that decision.573

As shown in the above quote, project decisions under this alternative are in tribal
hands.574 The law should assume that Indian nations will make good decisions
regarding project developments, either because advocates truly believe tribes
always will or because tribal sovereignty means tribes should have the space to
make decisions non-Indian governments would not support. “Tribes are fully
capable of deciding for themselves when projects will or will not serve their best
570

Sam Deloria highlights the complications associated with “sovereignty”:

[W]e should take the word sovereignty and put it on the shelf for about ten years because it is a
very confusing concept to a lot of people. It makes me feel bad to go to a meeting and see some
unfortunate person’s soul so transfixed by the word sovereignty that they can’t think their way
through the simplest problems.
Sam Deloria, Commentary on Nation-Building: The Future of Indian Nations, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 55, 55
(2002).
571 See THOMAS BIOLSI, DEADLIEST ENEMIES: LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE RELATIONS ON AND
OFF ROSEBUD RESERVATION 190 (2001).
572 There are a number of scholarly approaches to federal Indian law, but not surprisingly, most of
the approaches identified in a textbook epilogue (placing scholars into “Foundationalist,” “Critic,”
“Pragmatist,” or “Tribal Realism” camps) rely heavily upon Supreme Court opinions as an analytical
starting point. ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 895–99
(2008). “Critic” Professor Robert B. Porter observes,
Even those who write from what you might call a “pro-Indian perspective” seem resigned to
accept the reality that the United States really does have plenary power over the Indian nations,
that there exists a federal trust responsibility for Indigenous peoples, and that the Indian nations
really are “domestic dependent nations.”
Porter, supra note 567, at 97.
573 Walker & Gover, supra note 233, at 262. The Walker and Gover article at times seems to accept
federal primacy. See id. at 244 (“By assuming primary responsibility under the federal environmental
laws whenever tribal amendments so allow, tribes can establish environmental quality standards suited
to local and individual situations, rather than accept EPA’s generalized standards that may have little to
do with local conditions.”). At other points the authors focus on cooperative agreements as a good
approach. See id. at 250. However, overall the article supports unfettered tribal control. See id. at 244
574 See, e.g., Collins & Hall, supra note 130, at 317 (“The question for Indian nations is first, who
decides? Only after that query is answered in favor of Indian sovereignty can we turn our attention to the
second question, what shall be done?”).
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interests,” and therefore, according to this perspective, environmental paternalism,
even if motivated by concern for environmental justice, is not appropriate.575 Such
insistence on the ability of tribes to decide for themselves also reflects frustration at
non-Indian assumptions of tribal incompetence.576
For many readers, the full tribal control approach will evoke arguments that
Indian tribes should be considered sovereign nation-states under international law.
The approach this Article concludes with, developed in Part V, borrows from
international human rights law but should not be confused with full tribal control as
nation-states. Aspects of the U.S.-tribal relationship, such as the history of treaty
making, reflect recognition of tribes as international actors. But in Johnson v.
M’Intosh,577 Chief Justice Marshall accepted the doctrine of discovery, under which
the Christian nation that discovered new land not only gained title to that land, but
also Indian “rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
necessarily diminished.”578 Chief Justice Marshall later characterized Indian tribes
as “domestic dependent nations,”579 a description that stuck.580 Though the
Supreme Court continues to be comfortable with it, pro-Indian advocates have not
quietly accepted diminished tribal sovereignty. For some scholars, discontent is
expressed in largely doctrinal terms, often critiquing the Supreme Court’s
narrowing of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians or the Court’s inconsistency.581
For others, the way forward cannot be found in U.S. precedent but instead in
international law.582
An extensive body of scholarship rejecting the “domestic dependent” qualifier
asserts that Indian nations should be understood and treated as international
575 Walker et al., supra note 205, at 390; see also Walker & Gover, supra note 233, at 231 (arguing
that the fact that tribes reject most waste industry proposals is itself proof “that tribal governments are
fully capable of evaluating waste proposals”). Such insistence in the ability of tribes to decide for
themselves also might reflect frustration at non-Indian “ethnocentric if not racist” assumptions of tribal
incompetence. GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 155.
576 GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 155–56. Fear among environmentalists that tribal oversight would
mean lesser environmental protection than under federal oversight mirrors assumptions made by
policymakers that federal management of tribal resources is better than tribal control; yet, given the
record of U.S. management, tribes probably “would do no worse” than the United States has historically.
Peter C. Maxfield, Tribal Control of Indian Mineral Development, 62 OR. L. REV. 49, 71–72 (1983).
The Navajo uranium experience and even EPA’s seemingly political flip-flop on Desert Rock’s PSD
permit attest to shortcomings in federal oversight. Although writing about jurisdiction over
nonmembers, Professor Robert Clinton’s admonition that decolonization of Indian law involves getting rid
of the “underlying . . . distrust of tribal governance” applies with regard to environmental regulation as well.
Clinton, supra note 101, at 152.
577 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
578 Id. at 574. The doctrine of discovery “did not come from any principle of constitutional law . . .
but rather from a doctrine of international law.” POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE, supra note 481,
at 261.
579 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
580 See, e.g., Krakoff, supra note 124, at 1110.
581 When he was Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court, Robert Yazzie observed that
“[t]here are a lot of agonizing law review articles coming out these days about what a mess Indian law
happens to be,” and continued by suggesting that state and federal judges do not read the articles. Robert
Yazzie, “Watch Your Six”: An Indian Nation Judge’s View of 25 Years of Indian Law, Where We Are
and Where We Are Going, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497, 501 (1999).
582 See, e.g., Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st
Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 217, 300–01 (1993).

GAL.ROSSER.DOC

520

6/23/2010 2:50 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 40:437

sovereigns. Though a 1961 article declared that “[t]he possibility of the international
status of the Indian nations is of little more than academic interest” at the time of
the article, many of the debates in the Indian law field revolve around related
questions.583 For example, should plenary power be rejected because of its racist
origins and incompatibility with true sovereignty?584 How should Indian rights as
U.S. citizens be impacted by their simultaneous status as tribal members? And
should the U.S. government have the power to limit tribal choices regarding
on-reservation development or land use? Numerous scholars have answered these
questions by drawing upon the international law of states, either analogizing
between tribes and nation-states or insisting that Indian nations are equivalent to all
other nations and should be treated as such.585 While one could imagine recognizing
tribal determination over project approval without recognizing other aspects of
nation-state sovereignty, defining the powers of Indian nations according to
international sovereignty standards would involve an expansion of the scope of
independent tribal determination.586

583 Frank B. Higgins, International Law Consideration of the American Indian Nations by the United
States, 3 ARIZ. L. REV. 74, 84 (1961).
584 For a lively scholarly exchange on this question, see Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the
Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams’
Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1988); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric
Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence’s Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the
Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439 (1988); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian
Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man’s Indian Jurisprudence, 1986
WIS. L. REV. 219; see also Clinton, supra note 101, at 121 (“Any effort to decolonize federal Indian law,
therefore, must begin with a rejection of the plenary power doctrine . . . .”).
585 E.g., Barsh, supra note 237, at 86 (arguing for the reemergence of indigenous peoples “as
subjects of international law”); McSloy, supra note 582, at 280 (arguing that the United States should
“treat Native nations as nations”); Skibine, supra note 556, at 1109 (“International law should be applied
to the relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes.”). The Executive Director of the
Indian Law Resource Center, Robert “Tim” Coulter, explains the basis for thinking of Indians as nationstates: “Many Indian nations clearly have the required elements of nationhood. It has been noted that
several Indian nations have more territory, larger populations and probably better governments than
some of the nations now sitting in the United Nations.” Robert T. Coulter, Contemporary Indian
Sovereignty, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 109, 117 (Comm. on Native Am. Struggles, Nat’l Lawyers
Guild ed., 1982). Coulter continues, “Thus, viewing Indian sovereignty in terms of international law,
contemporary writers have concluded, as John Marshall did in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that at least
some Indian nations are, or indeed have the right to be, nation-states within the meaning of international
law.” Id. at 119.
586 The “international” approach is controversial and is not universally accepted by Indian law
scholars. Some believe it to be of little practical utility given the improbability that the U.S. government
will abandon plenary power and afford tribes nation-state status. In a candid essay on Indian law,
Professor Robert Laurence, for example, states, “I see little short-term help—that is to say within the
next couple of generations or so—from international law.” Laurence, supra note 192, at 4. These
scholars view such work as unhelpful and fear that such internationally focused scholarship is
dangerously utopian, in a way that might inspire a judicial or popular backlash against Indian
sovereignty. See, e.g., Suagee, supra note 210, at 5 (“[A] gung-ho believer in tribal sovereignty can be
just as dangerous as someone who just doesn’t understand the concept to begin with.”). But see S. James
Anaya, Keynote Address: Indigenous Peoples and Their Mark on the International Legal System (Mar.
16, 2006), in 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 257, 257 (2007) (“[W]e are in a time when international law
speaks concretely to the issues of Native Americans in this country . . . and it does so not just from the
standpoint of theory or proposal by a scholar writing some time ago. It not only speaks to these issues,
but it also establishes certain standards of obligation for our government . . . .”).
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V. ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND TRIBES
The center should not hold. The current federal permitting process requires
that Indian nations fend off indirect attacks on their sovereignty by environmental
organizations.587 It also seems to put environmental organizations in the position of
having to either give up on their larger environmental goals or participate in the
colonialism of federal environmental primacy. The alternative approaches explored
so far—federal primacy, Indian trust doctrine, cooperative regulation, and tribal
determination as international sovereigns—all contain valuable attributes, but all
fall short in some way or another. Federal primacy provides a way of dealing with
the externalities of environmentally destructive reservation projects, but only by
denying tribes the right to set their own path. Indian trust doctrine does much the
same, but instead of decisions being determined by federal agency guidelines, they
are made by federal courts. Cooperative regulation recognizes the importance of
cross-border relationships and impacts, but has few solutions for situations of
necessary conflict. Full tribal determination and international sovereignty allows
tribes the greatest freedom to decide for themselves how to balance economic
development and the environment, but besides being perhaps overly utopian, it fails
to take into account potential local and global externalities of tribal projects. Given
the shortcomings of the federal primacy, Indian trust doctrine, cooperative
solutions, and nation-state solutions, let me suggest a more radical alternative:
international human rights law. Established and emerging international human
rights law related to sovereignty, development, and the environment, I believe,
contains the promise of resolving the impasse between tribes and environmentalists
while avoiding the pitfalls of colonialism inherent in federal primacy.
There are two important limitations to the argument that follows. First, the
concern of this Part is the relationship between environmental organizations and
Indian nations, not the relationship between the U.S. government and tribes. Why
the distinction? The U.S. government’s Indian policy is well-established and
unlikely to change dramatically for the better.588 One can believe that the “severe

587 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 455–58 (discussing environmentalists’ opposition to
Desert Rock as an attack on the Navajo Nation’s sovereignty).
588 Some tribes are arguably enjoying an “Indian renaissance.” See Joseph Bruchac,
Indian Renaissance, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2004, at 76, 90 (“[The] situation is changing as Indians
across the U.S. exert new influence over their lives and their communities.”). And policy changes, such
as those exemplified in President Richard Nixon’s 1970 Special Message to Congress, have played a
role in tribal improvements. President’s Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 1970 PUB.
PAPERS 564, 565 (July 8, 1970). These changes came as a result of struggle: BIA, for example, went
from making “virtually all decisions for individual tribes,” to allowing for greater tribal autonomy as a
response “to pressure from younger and more aggressive tribal leaders.” Cohen & Mause, supra note 78,
at 1824. Robert Coulter’s description of the importance of struggle also explains the need for such
struggle: “The present status of Indian nations is the result of the constant erosion of Indian
governmental rights by the courts and by Congress and the steady, persistent efforts of Indian nations to
strengthen and maintain their existence and governments.” Robert T. Coulter, Present and Future Status
of American Indian Nations and Tribes, in INDIAN SELF-GOVERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
POLITICAL STATUS OF INDIAN NATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 37, 42–43 (Carol J.
Minugh et al. eds., 1989). For an enjoyable and eye-opening account of the struggles behind increased
tribal independence and the people involved, see generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE:
THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS (2005). But while the “Indian renaissance” is promising, it is not
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limitations” the United States places on Indian sovereignty “does not change the
fact that natives are still entitled to their full sovereign rights,”589 without
necessarily writing about the need for revolutionary change in federal Indian law.590
Second, this Part’s argument does not explore all the dangers of environmental
organizations adopting a human rights approach to tribal authority. Though I
believe a human rights approach is promising, this Article should not be the final
word on the subject. Hopefully, further scholarship in the area will explore the
implications of a relationship between tribes and civic society based on human
rights precepts rather than federal supremacy and shed light on possible adverse
unintended consequences of the proposal.
This Part’s focus is on how environmental organizations respond to Indian
nations that reach different conclusions regarding the trade-offs between economic
development and the environment. The Part leaves the work of asserting that the
U.S. government should take greater account of international human rights
regarding indigenous peoples to others and focuses how environmentalists relate to
Indian tribes regardless of federal primacy.591 Progressives who work on
environmental matters often instinctively support tribal sovereignty, yet when it
matters—when a tribe is proposing an environmentally harmful project—they end up
using U.S. government processes to try to block tribes. My argument is that
environmental organizations should base their relationships with Indian nations on
norms and laws of international human rights regarding indigenous peoples. Doing so
might lead environmental organizations not to oppose some projects and, when they
do object, to channel their concerns through tribal and perhaps international
institutions rather than U.S. processes.

shared by all tribes, nor, I believe, is it likely to be accompanied by dramatically better federal Indian
policies.
589 John Howard Clinebell & Jim Thomson, Sovereignty and Self Determination: The Rights of
Native Americans Under International Law, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 669, 714 (1978).
590 For example, Professor James Grijalva’s conclusion to his comprehensive study of environmental
justice in Indian country, which primarily looked at EPA policy and federal Indian law, explains his
book’s focus by noting, “We might hope the time comes when the preservation of American indigenous
culture needs no federal agency, court or legislative body. Until that day, tribal primacy for federal
environmental programs may well be the most effective means for addressing environmental injustice in
Indian country.” GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 200.
591 The development and significance of international indigenous rights is best understood through
the work of Professor S. James Anaya. E.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 2004) (the leading book in the field); S. James Anaya, International Human Rights and
Indigenous Peoples: The Move Toward the Multicultural State, 21 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 13 (2004)
(discussing a number of important rights indigenous communities have under international law).
Many other scholars have at different points in their writing also highlighted the significance of
international indigenous rights in how the rights of Indians are understood. See, e.g., G. William Rice,
Teaching Decolonization: Reacquisition of Indian Lands Within and Without the Box—An Essay, 82
N.D. L. REV. 811 (2006) (discussing tribal reacquisition of land under the United Nations Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples); Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and
Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625 (2007) (calling for
indigenous rights to environmental self-determination based on human rights norms); POMMERSHEIM,
BROKEN LANDSCAPE, supra note 481, at 259–93.
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A. Role of Environmental Organizations
The Hopi Tribal Council voted 12-0 on September 28, 2009, to ban
environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and the Natural Resources Defense
Council from the Hopi Reservation.592 Two days later, Navajo President Joe
Shirley, Jr. issued a press release saying he stood with the Hopi Tribal Council and
described environmental organizations as being “among the greatest threat[s] to
tribal sovereignty, tribal self-determination, and our quest for independence.”593
Tribal Counsel for the Hopi Tribe, Scott Canty, accused environmental
organizations of wanting to work with tribes “only on terms set by environmental
organizations,” adding that they “blindly pursue their agenda without any real
regard to the sovereignty or legitimate economic interests of the Hopi tribe.”594
Similarly, President Shirley argued that “[e]nvironmentalists are good at
identifying problems but poor at identifying feasible solutions,” continuing, “Most
often they don’t try to work with us but against us . . . . They support tribes only
when tribes are aligned with their agenda.”595 Coverage of the ban on
environmentalists countered the Hopi Tribal Council and Navajo President’s
position by pointing out that some of the active environmental opposition groups
were on-reservation, grassroots organizations.596 The ban, and the reaction against
the ban, reflects the heated nature of the current tribal-environmental debates and the
tensions created by the existing structure of reservation environmental regulation.
The insight that seems to be escaping environmental organizations, I argue, is
that by using the federal environmental regulatory scheme against tribal projects
they are complicit in the subversion of Indian sovereignty. Although non-Indian
groups and environmentalists can delay projects on tribal lands by “challenging
the adequacy of the EIS in federal court,” should they?597 Even though the federal
government and federal Indian law are unlikely to radically change,598 this does not

592 Hopi Tribal Council Bans Environmental Groups, NAVAJO-HOPI OBSERVER, Sept. 29, 2009,
http://www.navajohopiobserver.com/main.asp?SectionID=1&subsectionID=1&articleID=11876
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2010).
593 Press Release, Office of the President & Vice President, Navajo Nation, supra note 456, at 1
(quoting Navajo President Shirley).
594 Carol Berry, The Green Divide Meets Tribal Politics, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 2, 2009,
http://www.indiancountrytoday.com/national/63296187.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (quoting Scott
Canty, Hopi Tribal Counsel).
595 Press Release, Office of the President & Vice President, Navajo Nation, supra note 456, at 2
(quoting Navajo Nation President Shirley).
596 See, e.g., Felicia Fonseca, Hopi, Navajos Say Environmentalists Not Welcome, REZNET, Sept. 30,
2009, http://www.reznetnews.org/article/hopi-navajos-say-environmentalists-not-welcome-39650 (last
visited Apr. 18, 2010); Mary Annette Pember, Leaders Disguise a Deep Tribal Dispute, DAILY
YONDER,
Oct.
12,
2009,
http://www.dailyyonder.com/leaders-disguise-deep-tribaldispute/2009/10/12/2390 (last visited Apr 18, 2010); Jonathan Thompson, Op-Ed., Whose Sovereignty
Is It?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Paonia, Colo.), Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.hcn.org/wotr/whosesovereignty-is-it (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
597 Royster, supra note 377, at 340.
598 Reflecting the field of Indian law’s stability, Professor Philip Frickey, perhaps the leading
doctrinal scholar of federal Indian law, argues that “the field is structurally immunized against
substandard doctrinal reevaluation.” Frickey, supra note 565, at 1778.
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mean environmental organizations that know, or should know, better599 should not
change the nature of their relationship with Indian nations. In the context of Desert
Rock, by attempting to stall the project through the EPA permitting process,
environmentalists in practice accepted and relied upon federal primacy.600 By doing
so they accepted the colonizing myth that “the United States has the right to boss
Indian nations around without their consent. After all, America belongs to the
Americans,”601 or to American environmentalists in this case. Environmental
organizations need not conclude that the Navajo Nation is a nation-state under
international law—that it is “a sovereign as Bolivia is a sovereign”—to realize that
federal primacy does not adequately respect Indian sovereignty.602
Environmental organizations ironically recognize indigenous rights to selfdetermination in other countries to a greater extent than they seem to in the United
States. The environmental community has pushed foreign countries, international
institutions, and corporations to respect the rights of international indigenous
communities.603 Basing their indigenous environmental policies on the principles of
“free, prior, and informed consent” (FPIC) when it comes to indigenous peoples
globally, environmental groups recognize indigenous rights to make decisions about
development that will affect them and to benefit from development projects that go
forward.604 However, when it comes to Native Americans, environmental
organizations take a different tact. Support for Indian nations when they oppose
development or seek environmental redress turns into reliance upon
federal primacy to block tribes when there is not issue alignment.
This Part explores what it would mean for environmental organizations to
treat Indian tribes the way they treat indigenous groups globally. I make two
principle arguments in this Part. First, I argue against an international sovereignty
approach to indigenous peoples and in favor of international human rights as the
basis for the relationship between tribes and environmental organizations. I argue
that environmental organizations should replace domestic reliance upon federal
primacy over the reservation environment with a modified version of the
internationally-used principles of free, prior, and informed consent when it comes
to development in Indian country.605 Second, I discuss the heightened governance
599 Professor Grijalva notes that “environmentalists like most Americans know little of the nuances
of federal Indian law and the doctrine of retained tribal sovereignty.” GRIJALVA, supra note 15, at 198.
And Dean Suagee notes, “The Supreme Court doesn’t understand Federal Indian law, so why should we
expect non-Indian environmental lawyers to do that?” Suagee, supra note 210, at 5. But I believe such
understanding should be expected of environmentalists working on reservation issues.
600 See supra notes 455–58 and accompanying text.
601 Rice, supra note 591, at 814.
602 Laurence, supra note 192, at 7 (differentiating Santa Clara Pueblo’s sovereignty from Bolivia’s).
603 See S. James Anaya, Environmentalism, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples: A Tale of
Converging and Diverging Interests, 7 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 (2000) (discussing the important role that
international indigenous human rights issues have in the modern environmental movement).
604 See, e.g., Fergus MacKay, Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent and
the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 43,
43, 52 box 1 (2004) (discussing the acceptance of indigenous peoples’ rights to FPIC in the international
community and listing international environmental organizations that have accepted indigenous peoples’
rights to FPIC).
605 The author thanks Professor David Hunter for highlighting FPIC’s importance for understanding
how environmental organizations relate to indigenous peoples internationally.
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responsibilities that tribes might have under a human rights framework. To the
degree to which tribes have embraced, or decide to embrace, international human
rights when convenient, I argue they must also accept the limitations on
sovereignty that comes with such an embrace of the human rights framework. The
pressing problems of reservation poverty and global climate change may present a
competing goods problem today, but human thriving for Indian nations and all
peoples in the long run will require healthy economies and a healthy planet. That
environmental organizations should unilaterally lay down the power over
reservation development that they have by virtue of federal primacy’s colonializing
aspects is an important conclusion of this Part, but the focus on how environmental
organizations relate to Indian tribes should not be taken to mean that how Indian
tribes relate to the environment is of lesser importance.
1. A “Rights” Approach to Indigenous Sovereignty
The environmental problems associated with treating Indian tribes as nationstates under international law caution against internationalizing Indian sovereignty.
True, recognizing Indian nations as international equivalents to nation-states would
be a rejection of plenary power and federal primacy, but it would also involve
wholesale acceptance of the international legal order regarding states and their
environmental choices. Indian nation-states would have tremendous freedom to
engage in environmentally destructive development. Although institutions such as
the United Nations (U.N.) have provided some avenues for the participation of nongovernmental organizations in global governance,606 the continuing structural
weakness of international environmental law prevents environmental organizations
from being able to block Indian nation-state supported projects as effectively as
they can through the current EPA process.607 Consequently, were Indian tribes to
become nation-states under international law, environmental groups would have far
fewer outlets to provide meaningful objections. They could lobby the United States
to pressure tribes, but the U.S. government would not have the hammer of plenary
power or EPA permitting. The only available option might be a local one,
supporting tribal members or Indian organizations (such as Doodá Desert Rock) in
their efforts against on-reservation projects.
Arguably this is as it should be: The “imperial pretence” that indigenous
peoples have less right to sovereignty than European powers would be put aside
and Indian nations would be subject to the same limitations as other nationstates.608 Indians are not to blame if the international community has not succeeded

606 Indigenous people and indigenous non-governmental organizations have gained some right to
participate, but as Professor Jeff Corntassel cautions, “an illusion of inclusion” does not mean
“indigenous voices are truly being heard.” Jeff Corntassel, Toward Sustainable
Self-Determination: Rethinking the Contemporary Indigenous-Rights Discourse, 33 ALTERNATIVES 105,
111 (2008).
607 See, e.g., James Gustave Speth, International Environmental Law: Can It Deal with the Big
Issues?, 28 VT. L. REV. 779, 793 (2004) (arguing that international environmental law, as it stands
today, is unable to effectively address global environmental issues).
608 Alfred, supra note 268, at 44 (arguing that Indigenous leaders have the responsibility “to expose”
this pretence).
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in setting up an adequate scheme for limiting the potential nation-states.609 In the
case of coal, the same government that pulled the Navajo Nation’s PSD permit has
been unwilling to commit itself to reducing greenhouse gases and has severely
dampened the impact of various multinational environmental efforts.610
Environmentalists may object that these failures are the result of U.S. government
policy and not something they should be charged with, but the stalled international
order does reflect the environmental movement’s inability to garner the necessary
political capital, especially in the United States. Just because international
environmental law (IEL) would not be able to prevent harmful projects from going
forward if tribes are recognized as nation-states does not itself justify denying
international status to Indian nations.611
Indigenous peoples have struggled to be incorporated into the international
environmental legal regime. Reliance on state-centered approaches and treaties
between states as the means of developing IEL “did not leave any room” for
indigenous environmental concerns.612 It was not until 1992 and the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, coming out of the U.N.’s Rio Earth
Summit, that the “vital role” of indigenous people and their right to “effective
participation” in environmental management was recognized.613 The U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration), adopted by the
General Assembly in September 2007, though not environmentally focused, states
in Article 29, “Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection
of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and
resources.”614 The United States and three other countries did not sign onto the
Declaration, but the Declaration remains a “powerful statement” on indigenous

609 The ineffectiveness of international environmental law is closely linked to “the failure of green
governance at the international level,” according to Yale School of Forestry and Environmental
Studies’s Dean James Gustave Speth. Speth, supra note 607, at 793.
610 Though President George W. Bush’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, probably symbolizes U.S.
resistance to global environmental limits, the son was merely continuing in his father’s footsteps.
President George H.W. Bush was the “most visible opponent to a legally binding treaty” connected with
the 1992 Earth Summit and actively “resisted calls for action” on numerous environmental treaties,
ranging from global warming to forest protection. MIGUEL A. SANTOS, LIMITS AND SCOPE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 306 (1995).
611 Although written by my colleague in 1992, Professor David Hunter’s observations regarding the
limits of international law largely remain true today: “[T]he international legal system, reflecting as it
does an archaic acceptance of the nation-state as the root of all power, may be fundamentally incapable
of meeting [the] challenges” of global environmental problems. David B. Hunter, Toward Global
Citizenship in International Environmental Law, 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 547, 548 (1992).
612 Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Environmental Rights and Indigenous Wrongs, 9 ST. THOM. L. REV. 85,
88 (1996).
613 U.N. Conference on Env’t & Dev., Rio de Janeiro, June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, princ. 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (June 14, 1992), reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 874, 880 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration]; see also Arsanjani, supra note 612, at 90
(labeling Rio’s incorporation of indigenous peoples “sympathetic” but “rather superficial”).
614 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 29, ¶ 1,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/
documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. The Declaration goes on to say that states shall not store or dispose of
“hazardous materials” on the lands of indigenous peoples without their consent. Id. art. 1, ¶ 2.
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rights supported by most of the world.615 Yet, indigenous peoples remain on the
periphery of international environmental law and, perhaps because their claims to
international sovereignty are not taken seriously, they have made few inroads into
the IEL canon.616
The attraction of international law also comes with a choice between
sovereignty and human rights as the proper approach for indigenous advocacy.
Professor S. James Anaya’s explanation is worth quoting at length:
The appeal to international law is to its presumptive capacity to exert control
over or influence the exercise of power, most significantly the power welded directly
by independent states. Indigenous peoples and their advocates have advanced
arguments based on what international law is perceived to provide or what it should
provide to condition the behavior of states in their relations with indigenous peoples.
International law is looked upon as a way of compelling, or at least encouraging, states
to act consistently with a catalogue of rights deemed fundamental to the survival of
indigenous peoples, including rights over lands and natural resources. Among those
who advocate for indigenous rights within the discourse of international law, two,
usually complementary, strains of argument emerge.617

The argument strains that Professor Anaya identifies are a “state-centered
frame” and a “human rights frame.”618 The first strain involves positing
“indigenous peoples as states, or something like states, within a perceived postWestphalian world of separate, mutually exclusive political communities.”619 In
other words, the international nation-state approach discussed in Part IV.B.3 of this
Article, or a nation-state-like approach of partial recognition of sovereignty.620 The
second strain of argument asserts that indigenous peoples rights are “moral
imperatives” supported by “human rights principles that are already part, or
becoming part, of international law.”621 Professor Anaya ends up supporting the
second strain of international law approaches by indigenous advocates, arguing in

615 Carpenter et al., supra note 284, at 1036. As a nonbinding instrument, the Declaration does not
impose legal obligations on signatories. Connie K. Chan, Response, Lisa J. Laplante & Suzanne E.
Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector,
11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 117, 120 (2008).
616 Textbook coverage of indigenous peoples in the IEL field arguably reflects their peripheral status.
See, e.g., PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (3d ed. 2009)
(including discussion of indigenous peoples in four out of 810 pages); INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE (Nico Schrijver & Friedl Weiss eds., 2004)
(containing four brief mentions and one page with discussion in 698 pages).
617 S. James Anaya, Divergent Discourses About International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Rights
over Lands and Natural Resources: Toward a Realist Trend, 16 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 237,
240 (2005).
618 Id. at 241.
619 Id.
620 For a brief history of the gains indigenous peoples have made in having their sovereignty
recognized in different countries around the world and before international institutions, see U.N.
Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Indigenous
Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, ¶ 17–30, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30
(July 13, 2004) (prepared by Erica-Irene A. Daes) [hereinafter U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights,
Permanent Sovereignty].
621 Anaya, supra note 617, at 241.
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favor of the “pragmatic and ethical” realist use of human rights law in a way that
incorporates developing standards.622 What this argument offers is the possibility
that the problematic independence of sovereign states need to be fully incorporated
into the way environmental groups relate to Indian nations.
Instead of “historical sovereignty” stopping all discussion about the proper
balance between economic development and the environment, “the human rights
discourse” allows tribes and environmental organizations alike to escape from
formalistic ideas of statehood.623 Indian tribes have a realist’s appreciation for the
fact that the United States will play a significant role in their development. While it
is arguably reasonable that the Navajo Nation, given its population and size, might
have a greater claim to more attributes of international sovereignty than a small,
heavily allotted tribe, being surrounded by the United States and being dependent
on U.S. government funding does limit the Navajo Nation’s ability to remove the
U.S. role completely.624 Small, weak nation-states reveal “the myth of sovereign
equality” in the international sphere625 and an internationally-recognized Navajo
Nation would still be less powerful than the United States, and the relationship
would reflect the power differential. This realization suggests another reason,
besides improbability of it actually occurring, why internationalization of tribal
sovereignty would not end the need for some tribal accommodation of U.S. interests.
But should environmental organizations approach to tribally proposed projects be
based upon power alone? Put differently, what legal theory besides federal primacy
and plenary power should guide environmental organizations as they deal with
Indian nations?
The international legal origin of federal Indian law arguably provides the basis
for insisting that international human rights ought to inform domestic treatment of
Indians. This is Professor Phil Frickey’s argument in Domesticating Federal Indian
Law.626 U.S. power over Indian tribes was originally based upon international law,
but that power was never constitutionalized.627 Professor Frickey argues that the
“backdrop of international law provides the only satisfactory basis for sorting out
the existence of an inherent federal power over Indian affairs,” and consequently,
international human rights norms regarding indigenous peoples are a necessary
backdrop for consideration of U.S. power over Indians.628 Under this theory,
international human rights norms regarding indigenous peoples should be
considered by courts because federal Indian law links them “directly to the
622

Id. at 258.
Id. at 257 (focusing on Indian advocates and control over reservation resources, not the role of
environmental organizations).
624 Hurst Hannum, Sovereignty and Its Relevance to Native Americans in the Twenty-First Century,
23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 487, 494 (1999) (“[E]ven if sovereignty might be meaningful for the Navajo, it
is more difficult to comprehend the relevance of sovereignty to much smaller nations, some of which
number only in the hundreds.”).
625 Id. at 492.
626 Frickey, supra note 313.
627 See id. at 31 (“[T]ribal sovereignty is not ‘created by and springing from the Constitution,’ but
rather is an inherent sovereignty that ‘existed prior to the Constitution’ and is, therefore, not subject to
it.” (quoting Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382, 384 (1896)) (footnotes omitted)).
628 Id. at 79. International law, to the extent that “the evolving component of it concerning the rights
of indigenous peoples” is incorporated, can include international human rights norms regarding
indigenous peoples. Id. at 37.
623

GAL.ROSSER.DOC

2010]

6/23/2010 2:50 PM

AHISTORICAL INDIANS AND RESOURCES

529

Constitution,” not because of the independent value of human rights norms.629
Though Professor Frickey’s article centered on how courts should consider U.S.
power over Indians, if courts should take into account the backdrop of international
human rights under domestic law, arguably so should environmental
organizations.630
Although Professor Frickey does not go so far as to say that international
human rights norms should be applied regardless of the history of federal Indian
law, others do. Tim Coulter, Executive Director of the Indian Law Resource
Center, an indigenous rights organization with an international focus, supports the
development of “a permanent, irreversible and universal consensus about the rights
of Indian nations . . . [as] one of the best ways to assure the continued existence and
self-government” of Indian peoples.631 Professors Robert Williams and James
Anaya locate an obligation to apply human rights standards to Indians not in the
history of federal Indian law, but in international treaties that the United States has
signed and in emerging international law regarding indigenous peoples.632
The quintessential form of international human rights law involves the
protection of the individual from the state—the recognition of the individual’s
human rights even against the majority or the state. For human rights scholars, it
may therefore come as a surprise that the most important human right that
indigenous peoples have been recognized to enjoy is the right to collective selfdetermination. The self-determination norm “arise[s] within international law’s
modern human rights frame,” and derives from established human rights principles
and norms.633 Article 3 of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples reads, “Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.”634
Indigenous peoples’ collective right to self-determination does not fit neatly
into international human rights law’s predominant framework of protection of
individuals or discrete minorities. It is worth quoting at length a U.N. summary of
indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination:
[I]ndigenous peoples, as collectivities, have distinct and unique cultures and world
views, and their current needs and aspirations for the future may differ from those of the
mainstream population. Their equal worth and dignity can only be assured through the
recognition and protection of not only their individual rights, but also their collective

629

Id. at 78.
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous
Peoples, Professor S. James Anaya, makes a shortened version of Professor Frickey’s argument:
“[C]ontemporary domestic law concerning Native Americans remains frozen in the international law of
200 years ago. . . . So, it makes perfect sense to look to contemporary international norms, to come up
with interpretations of domestic federal law doctrine.” Anaya, supra note 586, at 271–72.
631 Coulter, supra note 588, at 48.
632 S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over
Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
33 (2001).
633 ANAYA, supra note 591, at 97.
634 G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 614, art. 3.
630
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rights as distinct groups. It is when these rights are asserted collectively that they can be
realized in a meaningful way.635

The summary explains,
The core international human rights instruments protect the rights of the individual
and establish obligations by States to guarantee, protect and respect such rights. The
rights related to indigenous peoples seek to protect, in addition to individual rights,
their collective rights, because recognition of such rights is necessary to ensure the
continuing existence, development and well-being of indigenous peoples as distinct
collectivities. Past experience has shown that unless the collective rights of
indigenous peoples are respected, there is a risk that such cultures may disappear
through forced assimilation into the dominant society.636

That self-determination is an important aspect of indigenous peoples’ human
rights means that not recognizing the collective rights of Indians is a denial of their
human rights, even though it would not be for other groups.637 As the U.S. Supreme
Court has acknowledged, the nature of Indian rights is sui generis,638 and this holds
true for how indigenous human rights are understood: Treating indigenous peoples
as equivalent to individuals with regard to human rights protection is falsely
reductive. Moreover, the collective nature of indigenous peoples’ human rights
includes not only self-determination rights but also land rights. Recognition of
indigenous peoples’ ownership, use, and control rights over land has been driven
by a human rights perspective.639 As a result of indigenous efforts,
“[t]he international legal order has come to recognize indigenous land rights as
human rights.”640 Self-determination and land rights are linked: “For many
635 U.N. Dev. Group, Inter-Agency Support Group on Indigenous Issues, Guidelines on Indigenous
Peoples’ Issues, at 4, U.N. Doc. HR/P/PT/16 (2009), available at http://www.un.org/
esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/UNDG_guidelines_EN.pdf.
636 Id. at 15 (endnote omitted).
637 See Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 675, 696 (2007) (“[I]ndividually-oriented human rights
protections run into serious legitimacy issues in the context of indigenous peoples.”).
638 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (referring to the uniqueness of BIA’s
relationship with Indians). A note of caution is in order. Late Professor Erik Bluemel observed of the sui
generis category of indigenous claims or rights that while it “can be a very important, analytically
distinct category,” the contents of the category is not yet “clearly defined.” Erik B. Bluemel, Separating
Instrumental from Intrinsic Rights: Toward an Understanding of Indigenous Participation in
International Rule-Making, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 55, 71 (2005). Professor Bluemel therefore chose to
deemphasize the sui generis nature of some indigenous claims in his own analysis. Id. Others in contrast
seem to fully support the idea of sui generis indigenous rights. See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 591, at 142;
Tsosie, supra note 591, at 1653 (“[I]ndigenous peoples are distinctive and . . . their rights cannot be
coextensive with those of any other group.”).
639 Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Hybrid State-Corporate Enterprise and Violations on Indigenous
Land Rights: Theorizing Corporate Responsibility and Accountability Under International Law, 11
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 135, 141–44 (2007).
640 Id. at 144; see also Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself? Indigenous
Peoples’ Human Rights and the World Bank’s Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, 17
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 527, 604 (2002) (“[H]uman rights standards, as set out in treaties, in jurisprudence
interpreting those treaties, and in emerging standards, all require that countries recognize and respect
indigenous ownership rights, at a minimum, over lands traditionally occupied.”).
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indigenous peoples, the central focus of the right to self-determination is the right
to control access to natural resources.”641
Environmental organizations’ reliance on federal primacy fails to respect the
collective human rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination and to control
of their land. But why should environmental groups abandon the processes and
laws that guide their work nationwide simply because projects are located in Indian
Country? Within the Indian law scholarly community there is considerable debate
about how much emphasis should be placed on international indigenous rights
practice.642 But the debate within the community is largely about the efficacy of
arguments tied to indigenous peoples’ rights before the branches of U.S.
government, not about the contents of the rights. Were Indian advocates successful
in rewriting the terms of the relationship between Indian nations and the United
States in a way that rejected the colonizing aspects of the law as it currently exists,
environmental organizations would have no choice but to relate to Indian nations in
line with the new rules. But as stated previously,643 I do not believe that a radical
change towards a more pro-Indian relationship with the United States is likely in
the foreseeable future. And because this Part invites a misreading, it bears repeating
that the topic being discussed here is how environmental organizations relate to
Indian nations; quite deliberately this Article is not advocating one way or another
on the direction or content of a radical change in U.S.-Indian relations.644
Given the status of the U.S.-Indian relationship, environmental organizations
must choose whether to accept the law—federal primacy—as dictated by the U.S.
government or relate to Indian nations as prescribed by the (collective) human
rights of indigenous peoples. Ultimately environmental organizations have to
decide between accepting processes regarding reservation development that derive
from the colonial relationship of federal primacy, or give up some authority in the
name of indigenous peoples’ human rights. So what decision has been reached? In
641 Anne Perrault et al., Partnerships for Success in Protected Areas: The Public Interest and Local
Community Rights to Prior Informed Consent (PIC), 19 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 475, 490 (2007).
For more on the legal basis for indigenous peoples’ rights to land, natural resources, and development,
see ANAYA, supra note 591, at 141–50.
642 Questions such as whether Indian advocates arguing before the United States should base their
arguments in part on international norms, such as the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, are divisive. Some believe that, like international human rights, international indigenous rights
offers a way to escape the ethnocentrism and limits of federal Indian law; others believe that because the
United States is unlikely to respond favorably to international developments, indigenous peoples
advocacy is ineffective or, worse, counterproductive. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian
Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TULSA L.J. 73, 123–25 (1999) (discussing
the potential of using international law norms to secure indigenous rights); Pamela Stephens, Applying
Human Rights Norms to Climate Change: The Elusive Remedy, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
49, 80–81 (2010) (describing potential difficulties in using international law in a federal law setting).
643 See supra note 586 and accompanying text.
644 Proposing a new direction in U.S.-Indian relations is beyond the scope of this Article. Given the
respect I have for scholars and the scholarship of those who would like to undo existing federal Indian
law, it was a compliment to be accused by one reader of seeming “to have joined the dark (really, other)
side” by urging use of international human rights. But rather than being a broad assertion of the need for
the United States to incorporate international human rights into its relationship with Indian nations, the
focus here is purposefully limited to how environmental organizations relate to Indian nations and,
therefore, the accusation or compliment is unearned. To put it another way, the Article does not pick a
side, except when it comes to environmental organizations.
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practice, domestically, environmental organizations make use of federal primacy,
but when it comes to projects in other parts of the world indigenous peoples’ rights
are embraced.645 Domestically, non-Indian environmental organizations channel
objections through federal permitting processes in the name of tribal dissenters or
the environment itself.646 In contrast with development proposals that implicate
indigenous peoples’ interests internationally, environmental organizations insist
that states respect the free, prior, and informed consent rights of indigenous
communities.
FPIC provides indigenous peoples the opportunity to have a say and play a
role in development that affects their communities.647 “[P]artially derived from the
right to self-determination,” FPIC is the accepted international standard for
indigenous involvement in reviewing project proposals.648 The first three elements
of FPIC are summarized below:
For consent to be “free,” it must be given without coercion, duress, fraud,
bribery, or any threat or external manipulation.
For consent to be “prior,” it must be given before any significant planning for the
proposed activity has been completed, and before each decision-making stage in the
proposed activity’s planning and implementation at which additional relevant
information is available or revised plans are proposed.
For consent to be “informed,” it must be given only after the affected indigenous
people is provided with all relevant information related to proposed activities in
appropriate languages and formats, including information regarding indigenous rights
under domestic and international law, the likely and possible consequences of the
proposed activities, and alternatives to the proposed activities. All information must be
provided free from external manipulation and with sufficient time for review and
decision-making in accordance with the laws and customs of the affected indigenous
people.649

645 See, e.g., Wiggins, supra note 186, at 350–51 (detailing environmentalist support for the
Yanomami in Brazil).
646 See supra Part IV.A.
647 Although FPIC arguably applies to all communities impacted by development proposals, support
for FPIC’s requirements is strongest with indigenous peoples because of their uniquely recognized
rights. Lisa J. LaPlante & Suzanne A. Spears, Out of the Conflict Zone: The Case for Community
Consent Processes in the Extractive Sector, 11 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 69, 93 (2008) (“The
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples . . . constitutes recognition of indigenous peoples’ right
to FPIC by most members of the international community.”); Perrault et al., supra note 641, at 478
(noting indigenous people’s longstanding relationship with the land). The article refers to prior informed
consent (PIC), but as explained later in the article, PIC and FPIC are equivalent. Id. at 521–22.
648 Brant McGee, The Community Referendum: Participatory Democracy and the Right to Free,
Prior and Informed Consent to Development, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 570, 576 (2009). For more on the
origins and legal basis for FPIC, see id. at 576–93.
649 U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. for Soc. Policy & Dev., Contribution of the Indian Law
Res. Ctr., Workshop on Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Jan. 17–19, 2005, Indigenous Peoples’ Right
of Free Prior and Informed Consent with Respect to Indigenous Lands, Territories and Resources, at 2,
U.N. Doc. PFII/2004/WS.2/6; see also International Conference on Engaging Communities, Brisbane,
Austl., Aug. 15, 2005, Engaging Indigenous Peoples in Governance Processes: International Legal and
Policy Frameworks for Engagement 10–12 (breaking FPIC into a description of its elements).
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FPIC’s fourth element, consent, requires greater elaboration. FPIC requires more
than “mere consultation.”650 The indeterminate nature of consultation contrasts with
the active community participation in decision making that consent entails.651
Although consent can be summarized as a community’s right to “approve,”
and implicitly disapprove,652 proposals, the question of “how to determine or
quantify consent” is important.653 The case can be made that consent should be
determined by community referenda, especially when the affected community is a
nonindigenous one.654 The problem with a referenda process when it comes to
Indian nations is that the imposition of such a process assumes the absence of an
existing governance structure. Although a referenda process may be appropriate for
some indigenous peoples, with perhaps a few exceptions “[t]he consent process
should allow communities, indigenous peoples in particular, to participate through
their freely chosen representatives and customary or other institutions.”655 The
exceptions might include situations where there is a known break between formally
chosen representatives and customary institutions, such as with the Hopi tribe.656
Otherwise, consent should be determined in a “way agreed upon by the
community,” with respect given to “the representative(s) chosen by the community
as the only legitimate provider(s) of consent.”657 Answering the question of
“whether consent is sought from a legitimate authority” is something for the
particular tribe to decide, and not the work of outsiders.658 Though FPIC
participation
can
be
associated
with
“interand
intra- community issues,” consent does not hinge on universal agreement.659 This
means that the presence of internal disagreement within a particular community
regarding the decision of tribal representatives or leaders to approve or disapprove
a project does not invalidate the decision.660
For all its strengths—FPIC certainly represents an improvement on the earlier
international norm of not taking indigenous peoples into account—FPIC’s
imagined community is largely passive. The assumption behind FPIC seems to be
650

McGee, supra note 648, at 578.
Laplante & Spears, supra note 647, at 87. The contrast should not be overstated: Weak versions
of what consent requires—“consent may be given through good-faith consultation and participation”—
share in consultation’s indeterminacy. Donald M. Goldberg & Tracy Badua, Do People Have Standing?
Indigenous Peoples, Global Warming, and Human Rights, 11 BARRY L. REV. 59, 70 (2008).
652 McGee, supra note 648, at 571 (explaining the Environmental Law Institute’s definition of
FPIC); see also Perrault et al., supra note 641, at 477 (“[C]ommunities have the right to give or withhold
consent at decision-making points during the project cycle.”).
653 McGee, supra note 648, at 635.
654 Id. at 603–26 (providing examples of the history of select referenda on specific projects
internationally); see also Bluemel, supra note 638, at 93–95 (discussing the significance of the
undemocratic, unrepresentative aspect of some indigenous groups’ leadership). But see Perrault et al.,
supra note 641, at 512 (noting that design and process problems can make referenda “vulnerable to
manipulation”).
655 Laplante & Spears, supra note 647, at 96.
656 See supra Part II.C.
657 Perrault et al., supra note 641, at 522.
658 Alex Page, Indigenous Peoples’ Free Prior and Informed Consent in the Inter-American Human
Rights System, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 16, 19 (2004).
659 Perrault et al., supra note 641, at 524.
660 See id. at 522 (“Consent does not necessarily mean that every member of affected
people(s)/communities must agree . . . .”).
651
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that project initiation is something indigenous peoples and communities do not do
or are not capable of doing. FPIC accords them the right to participate and even to
approve or disapprove projects, with the elements of FPIC designed to protect
communities from the harmful effects of such projects and perhaps enable them to
benefit in some way. But FPIC does not squarely address what rights indigenous
peoples have regarding environmentally destructive forms of development that they
propose. Sometimes this may be partly a matter of semantics: Is Desert Rock being
proposed by the Navajo Nation with the agreement of their partner, Sithe Global, or
is it the reverse? The assumption that indigenous communities are recipients rather
than doers, environmental victims rather than environmental harm-causers,
arguably goes against the applicability of FPIC when indigenous communities,
including Indian nations, are project proponents rather than the impacted
community. On the other hand, there would seem to be no proposal that better
meets the requirements of FPIC than community or Indian nation proposed
projects. In such situations the decision is being made freely, prior to project
commencement, with full information, and with the “consent” or approval of the
tribe or the chosen representatives of the tribe.
FPIC, although an imperfect mechanism from the standpoint of both
indigenous peoples and environmentalists, is the emerging international norm for
protecting indigenous peoples’ human rights to self-determination and land when it
comes to development proposals.661 The idea that, when it comes to natural
resource extraction or other forms of environmentally destructive development,
indigenous peoples “may legitimately choose to exercise self-determination and
other human rights in ways that are not commensurate with the optimal
environmental outcome as perceived by outsiders,” is only partly captured by
FPIC.662 The U.N. Commission on Human Rights final report on Indigenous
Peoples’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources supports a particularly
proindigenous peoples’ stance regarding the contents of their land rights.663 Special
Rapporteur Erica-Irene A. Daes writes, “Few if any limitations on indigenous
resource rights are appropriate, because the indigenous ownership of the resources
is associated with the most important and fundamental of human rights: the rights
to life, food, and shelter, the right to self-determination, and the right to exist as a
people.”664 The U.N. report probably overstates the rights indigenous peoples ought
661 Fergus MacKay, Coordinator of the Legal and Human Rights Programme at Forest Peoples
Programme, observes, “Indigenous peoples’ right to [FPIC] is gaining increasing currency in
international law, particularly in the jurisprudence of international human rights bodies.” MacKay, supra
note 604, at 43. MacKay goes on to describe the World Bank Group as a “notable exception” to the
increasing international acceptance of FPIC. Id. But while the Bank favors “consultation,” not “consent,”
even this is somewhat tempered by the Bank’s legal department interpretation of “meaningful consultation”
as necessarily including the right for consulted communities to say “no” in a way that approaches consent.
Robert Goodland, Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 66, 66 (2004).
662 Anaya, supra note 603, at 13; see also Pommersheim, Broken Landscape, supra note 481, at 279
(describing indigenous consultation rights as a “shadow or penumbral” right relative to the right of selfdetermination).
663 U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 620, ¶ 47.
664 Id. ¶ 48 (emphasis added). Daes goes on to link indigenous peoples’ natural resource rights with
rights to self-determination, culture, “and the enjoyment of other human rights” that cannot be realized
in situations of extreme poverty. Id. ¶ 58.
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to have. Put differently, to the question of whether indigenous people have an
absolute right “to allow—as well as prohibit—access to natural resources,” the
answer is no, and should be no.665 But the report’s strong position comes out of the
context of states routinely failing to respect basic rights of indigenous peoples’ to
self-determination and land.666 FPIC is similarly a product of the existing limited
role indigenous communities play in development decisions.667
The human rights of indigenous peoples, especially rights to
self-determination, have attained the level of acceptance and definition that should
guide how environmental organizations relate to Indian nations. One only has to
think of the right to health or housing to see that human rights concepts can be
nebulous and can reflect (utopian) ideals rather than standards to which actors will
be held accountable. The tireless work of indigenous peoples and their advocates,
however, has succeeded in bringing not only attention to but also concrete ideas
regarding implementation of the rights of indigenous peoples.668 FPIC is not
perfect, but it reflects the growing awareness that indigenous communities have a
right to more than token participation; generally speaking they have a right to
approve or disapprove projects. Human rights law ultimately holds greater promise
for guiding how environmental organizations relate to Indian tribes than does federal
primacy.
2. Tribal Acceptance and Responsibility
The wisdom and success of the various Indian policies of the United States
can somewhat accurately be summarized by looking only at the amount of say
Indian nations had in their implementation.669 When Indians have more say, the
results have been better; when policies are imposed, results have been poor.670
Tribal acceptance of the human rights framework is a necessary prerequisite before
tribes should have to relate to outsiders according to the norms of international
indigenous rights versus tribal sovereignty in its current form. This raises two sets
of questions regarding the relationship between Indians and environmentalists.
First, should Indian nations accept the applicability of international human rights
law, since at times it will constrain the powers Indian nations would have as
665

Perrault et al., supra note 641, at 490.
U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Permanent Sovereignty, supra note 620, ¶¶ 48, 58.
667 Perrault et al., supra note 641, at 493–94.
668 See G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 614, arts. 3, 8, 10, 11; Robert T. Coulter, The U.N. Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Historic Change in International Law, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 539,
543–45 (2009) (describing the efforts by indigenous peoples and their advocates leading to the
Declaration).
669 A brief history for those not in the Indian law field: The treaty-making period was characterized
by Indian participation (albeit under strain and with some duplicity by the other negotiating party), and
even centuries later rights originating out of the period are recognized. Allotment, with insignificant
Indian participation and implementation imposed, had disastrous results; so too with termination. The
Indian Reorganization Act—as well as the later Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§
1601–1629h (2006)—provided tribes a choice (singular) but not the opportunity to define their own
choice set, and results were mixed. The self-determination period has in contrast recognized the right of
Indian nations to a far greater spectrum of choice across more areas of governance, and the policy has
had better results.
670 See Coulter, supra note 668, at 543–45.
666
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nation-states? How would acceptance be manifest and what would acceptance
mean for tribal governance? Second, whether tribes accept or reject the human
rights framework, in light of indigenous peoples’ human rights, should the
opposition of environmental organizations to tribal projects still be channeled
through U.S. regulatory processes? Even though a change to the overarching
relationship between tribes and the U.S. government is deliberately being taken off
the table here so that the focus can be on the Indian-nation–environmentalistorganization relationship, a move by tribes or environmental organizations towards
a human rights approach could help delegitimize the existing federal framework.671
Caution is in order for tribal leaders contemplating acceptance of a human
rights approach in their relations with environmental organizations. Given that
recognizing indigenous peoples’ human rights entails recognizing selfdetermination rights, why should tribes hesitate to embrace human rights law and
norms? In some circumstances tribes may be more limited under international
human rights law than they are currently under federal Indian law. This can be seen
in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,672 in which the U.S. Supreme Court allowed a
form of tribal gender discrimination despite the Indian Civil Rights Act.673 The
plaintiff in the case was a tribal member challenging the tribe’s membership rules
on behalf of her child.674 According to the membership rules, when the father was a
tribal member and the mother a non-Indian, the child was considered a tribal
member; but, when the mother was a tribal member and the father a non-Indian, the
child was not considered a tribal member.675 Had the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights been able to hear the case, would that court have been as deferential
as the U.S. Supreme Court to Santa Clara Pueblo’s tribal membership rules?
Should the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples, a post currently held
by Professor Anaya and part of the United Nations’ human rights regime, ignore
gender discrimination in the name of self-determination?
Acceptance of human rights norms arguably would undo important aspects of
sovereignty relied upon by tribal governments. Although as discussed previously,
the collective nature of indigenous peoples’ human rights differs from human rights
law’s typical dynamic of individual versus the state,676 there is a limit on how far
this contrast should be extended. Suppose a resident of tribally owned housing was
evicted to make way for a relative of a tribal council member. Legal aid attorneys
representing such a resident today confront the wall of tribal sovereign immunity,
671 Although “skeptics argue that international human rights law is virtually irrelevant in the United
States,” Professor Tsosie’s response echoes the argument of this Part: “It is worth contemplating the
possibility of constructing a more just system of domestic law by investigating principles that are
emerging through international consensus.” Tsosie, supra note 591, at 1652.
672 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
673 See id. at 51–52 (holding that the Act cannot be read to allow gender discrimination actions
against a tribe or its officers).
674 Id. at 51.
675 Id. For an excellent summary of the case with citations to the extensive scholarly debate related to
the case, see Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 810–23 (2007);
see also Greg Rubio, Reclaiming Indian Civil Rights: The Application of International Human Rights
Law to Tribal Disenrollment Actions, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 1 (2009) (focusing on tribe violations of
tribal members’ international human rights, focusing on the controversial disenrollment of Cherokee
Freedmen).
676 See supra Part V.A.1.
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unless it has been waived with regard to tribal housing programs.677 But under a
human rights framework, a tribe would not be able to so easily dismiss the
resident’s complaint. The same could be said of tribes that fail to protect due
process rights of tribal members or that discriminate, along racial or other lines,
against particular member classes. If a tribe accepted the applicability of the human
rights approach with regards to the environment, would such acceptance spill over
to other aspects of reservation life? Put another way, should acceptance follow the
maxim in for a penny, in for a pound? Before tribes accept a human rights
framework for their relationship with environmental organizations, the scope and
impact of such acceptance must be carefully delineated.
Even if acceptance of a human rights approach could be limited to
environmental issues, tribes may lose some of their sovereignty. FPIC, for example,
might narrow the sovereignty of the Navajo Nation when it comes to the Navajo
government’s support of Desert Rock. If the indigenous community being impacted
is redefined not as the tribe as a whole, but as the tribal members located closest to
the proposed site, then arguably the community’s rights were violated.678 Although
copies of the draft environmental impact statement were available at local chapter
houses, the draft’s complicated format and failure to discuss crucial aspects of the
project—especially CO2 emissions—arguably denied tribal members their right to
be informed.679 Additionally, the unwillingness of both parties to make public the
contract between Sithe Global and the Navajo Nation is a clear violation of
FPIC.680 Perhaps more troubling from a protribal sovereignty perspective, if the
conception of the community impacted were broadened to include those
communities where visibility might be impacted by haze from the plant, then
arguably the community would not be limited to the tribe. If participation of all
impacted by development, not just the immediate, politically-defined community,
became an expectation of international human rights, Indian tribes may be required
to
permit
non-Indians, on and near the reservation, a formal role in tribal decision making
and the consent process.681
Despite the negative impact that acceptance of international human rights
could have on tribal sovereignty, many tribes have in one way or another embraced
677 See Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years,
34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 478–83 (1998) (discussing tribal sovereign immunity).
678 Notably, four of the five chapters near the proposed site passed symbolic resolutions opposing
Desert Rock. Tony Barboza, Pollution for Jobs: A Fair Trade?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Paonia, Colo.),
Sept. 5, 2005, at 4, 4.
679 See Perrault et al., supra note 641, at 522 (explaining that the information must be both
“accessible and understandable”).
680 See id. (“[P]otentially affected people(s)/communities must be fully informed of their own rights
and understand the legal processes guiding implementation of the project.”).
681 Reflecting the, at times, one-sided nature of pro-Indian advocacy, Jana L. Walker and Kevin
Gover complained that the Campo Band “confronted the bitter reality that Indian people suffer in
political fora which often are unresponsive to Indian interests,” but did not seem aware of the irony,
considering that non-Indians cannot participate in the election of tribal leaders, of highlighting the
Campo Band’s “extraordinary meansures to address the concerns of the local non-indian population.”
Walker & Gover, supra note 233, at 259. By noting the irony I am in no way suggesting that nonIndians should have the right to vote in tribal elections, but this is another example of how established
tribal rights may conflict with a human rights approach.
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human rights based efforts. Representatives of Indian tribes and tribal advocates
participated in the lengthy effort to finalize the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.682 At various points they worked to have international human
rights bodies censure the United States for violations of the rights of Indian tribes
and tribal members.683 Indigenous peoples have also testified before such bodies on
their unique connection to the land.684 The Navajo Nation is no different. For
example, in August 2009, Duane H. Yazzie, Chair of the recently formed Navajo
Nation Human Rights Commission (NNHRC), traveled to Geneva to address the
Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of the U.N. Human Rights
Council regarding the implementation of the Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.685 The Navajo Nation Council’s Intergovernmental Relations
Committee had passed a resolution authorizing the NNHRC “to advocate for
special recognition status” for the Navajo Nation, and Duane Yazzie’s comments
highlighted “Navajo Nation’s successes and difficulties in implementing
international standards and laws in the United States.”686 When Indian
representatives appear before human rights bodies, their position is unidirectional,
focusing on U.S. violations of their human rights and not on the possibility of
Indian nations being held accountable for violations of tribal members’ human
rights by those same bodies.687
Indian nations’ embrace of international human rights law and processes
should entail more than just denouncements of U.S. policy regarding the injustices
experienced by tribes; with the human rights embrace comes responsibility.
Professor Angela Riley argues that “indigenous peoples are taking advantage of the
‘human rights culture’ to secure their own place in the global community. A theory
of good native governance assumes that corresponding duties come along with
indigenous peoples’ exercise of their rights.”688 Good governance is hard, and for
most if not all tribal and non-tribal governments, is a work-in-progress,689 but
drawing upon the international human rights framework implies an obligation on
Indian nations to attempt to live up to that same framework. Professor Riley argues
convincingly that what counts as good governance for Indian nations does not have

682 See Coulter, supra note 668, at 543–45 (recounting the origin of the Declaration that began in
1976 and included hundreds of tribal representatives).
683 See, e.g., Christopher P. Cline, Note, Pursuing Native American Rights in International Law
Venues: A Jus Cogens Strategy After Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 591, 594 (1991) (describing the efforts of tribes to have the Office of American States
recognize a U.S. violation of the tribes’ human rights).
684 Tsosie, supra note 591, at 1666–67.
685 Press Release, Office of Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n, NNHRC Addresses Members of
the Expert Mechanism on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(Aug.
11,
2009),
available
at
http://www.nnhrc.navajo.org/press
releases/2009/aug09/Geneva%20PR.pdf.
686 Id.
687 See, e.g., id. (noting that Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission Chairperson Duane Yazzie’s
remarks focused on conditions the U.S. attaches to the right to self-determination).
688 Angela R. Riley, Good (Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1123 (2007) (citations
omitted).
689 See id. at 1052–53 (discussing international debate over the requirements of good governance).
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to reflect non-Indian ideas of good governance.690 After acknowledging that the
United States has played and continues to play a significant role in undermining
Indian nations, Professor Riley argues that nevertheless, “Indian tribes in a
contemporary world are in a position to more fully consider their obligations to
their citizens.”691 The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development
has done lots of work identifying institutional improvements that would improve
tribal governance and help tribes become more responsive to tribal members.692
Other scholars have recognized the need for “effective” tribal governments693 and
the related importance of “effective [environmental] programs.”694 The challenge
when considering changes to improve tribal governance and effectiveness is the
tribal specificity involved. So although articles and sample codes have been written
for everything from domestic violence to environmental review processes,695
resolving the obstacles faced by one tribe in effectively serving tribal members may
not be what is most needed by another tribe. And what works well for one tribe
may not work for others. But for those tribes that use international human rights
bodies to air grievances, it would be overly opportunistic to do so without
accepting some attendant governance responsibilities to their citizens.
Regardless of the stance of Indian nations regarding the acceptance of the
applicability of human rights standards, I believe environmental groups should stop
relying upon federal primacy and federal processes to block environmentally
destructive forms of development supported by tribal governments. Environmental
organizations’ disparate treatment of indigenous peoples, depending on whether
they are domestic or foreign, highlights both the singularity of federal primacy and
the existence of a better model for the relationship between indigenous peoples and
environmental organizations. FPIC provides one mechanism for ensuring
community involvement does not take away from indigenous peoples’ ability to
select their own representatives and to allow representatives to speak for them. The
objection may be made that if Indian tribes do not accept a human rights
framework, why should environmentalists? But such an objection reflects a failure
to appreciate the denial of Indian rights inherent in federal primacy. Environmental
organizations may fear that allowing development in Indian Country could be used
as precedent for the rest of the United States; however, just because a particular
level of pollution is allowed on a reservation does not mean that a higher standard

690 Id. at 1054–55 (arguing that native governance involves using “indigenous principles of
government” rather than requiring that “Indian nations either fully depart from or emulate the developed
West”).
691 Id. at 1107.
692 See The Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev., Overview of the Harvard Project,
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/hpaied/overview.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). Many of the Project’s
publications can also be found on its website.
693 Duane Champagne, Challenges to Native Nation Building in the 21st Century, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
47, 51 (2002) (describing making tribal governments effective as “[o]ne of the challenges of the twentyfirst century”).
694 Suagee, supra note 496, at 161 (“[I]f tribes do not want states asserting that they have jurisdiction
for environmental regulation in Indian country, tribes need to have effective programs in place.”).
695 See Tribal Court Clearinghouse, Tribal Laws/Codes, http://www.tribal-institute.org/
lists/codes.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (listing various tribal codes).
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should not be required elsewhere.696 Establishing the possibility that on-reservation
and off-reservation standards could differ would allow environmental organizations
to decide not to aggressively assert legal rights through federal processes when it
comes to tribal projects.697 To be clear, there is no legal requirement that
environmental organizations separate themselves from federal primacy and its
problematic assumption of U.S. superiority and related diminishment of Indian
sovereignty. But sometimes the right thing to do is to lay down one’s arms.
Recognition of indigenous rights according to international human rights law
by environmental organizations would involve a number of changes to the way
non-Indian environmental groups interact with Indian nations proposing harmful
projects. Such recognition would involve first prioritizing tribal processes of
decision making rather than the federal permitting scheme. The next generation of
696 Arguably, Indian tribes have a greater entitlement to pollute than other parts of the United States.
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states,

In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common
but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that
they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their
societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they
command.
Rio Declaration, supra note 613, princ. 7. The common-but-differentiated-responsibility principle is not
fully accepted by the U.S. government, perhaps primarily because it could impose a heavy cost on the
world’s foremost polluter. See generally TUULA HONKONEN, THE COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED
RESPONSIBILITY PRINCIPLE IN MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 253–58, 298 (2009)
(discussing the reluctance to fully adopt the common-but-differentiated-responsibility principle in
developed countries and focusing on the United States’s criticism of the Kyoto Protocol). But the
principle does suggest that the focus should be on off-reservation projects and that the Navajo Nation—
with a per capita income well below the World Bank’s line between developing and developed
economies—has more right to develop a coal-fired power plant than do other parts of the United States.
Yet, while Navajo Nation’s Desert Rock proposal was blocked, 36 coal-fired power plants are
progressing towards completion in the United States as of June 2009. Powerpoint: Erik Shuster, Office
of Sys. Analyses & Planning, Nat’l Energy Tech. Lab., Tracking New Coal-Fired Power Plants 6 tbl.1
(Oct. 8, 2009), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/coal/refshelf/ncp.pdf. In the second quarter of 2009
alone, four plants became operational, and there are an additional 47 plants announced or in early stages
of development. Id.
In light of the common-but-differentiated-responsibility principle, the Navajo Nation’s right to
development arguably deserves allowances not shared by the rest of the United States, at least until the
income gap closes. Furthermore, an argument can be made that U.S. environmental organizations should
get U.S. emissions in order before using a federally defined process of environmental oversight to block the
Navajo Nation. The Navajo Nation’s per capita income in 2004—the most recent available year—was
$7734 annually. CHOUDHARY, supra note 352, at T 49 tbl.21. Developed countries, according to the World
Bank, have per capita incomes above $11,906 per year. See WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK LIST OF
ECONOMIES
(2009),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/CLASS.XLS (defining developed as
“high income”); The World Bank, Data—Country Statistics, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piP
K:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). The U.S. per capita income, in
contrast, was $26,804 in 2007. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 8 tbl.1 (2008),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf.
697 The author thanks Professor Patrick Simms for his insight into how the precedent-setting aspects
of federal approval can make environmental organizations put aside their hesitation about interfering
with tribal sovereignty.
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tribal mining legislation notably supports prioritizing tribal processes: Under the
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005
(ITEDSDA), environmental review would be conducted by tribes, and public
comments, including those of environmental groups, “will be reviewed in light of
tribal values, priorities, and decisions, rather than filtered through a federal lens.”698
Fear among environmentalists that tribal oversight would mean lesser
environmental protection than would be true under federal oversight should not be
enough to justify federal primacy. Such fear mirrors assumptions made by
policymakers that federal management of tribal resources is better than tribal
control;699 yet, given the record of U.S. management, tribes probably “would do no
worse” than the United States has historically on either resource management or
environmental protection.700 The Navajo uranium experience and even the political
flip-flop on Desert Rock’s PSD permit by EPA after President Obama’s election
attest to shortcomings in federal oversight. Environmental organizations would
likely have less faith in federal permitting if the administration was still
Republican. Decolonization of Indian law involves getting rid of the “underlying
distrust of tribal governance” in EPA and among environmental organizations.701
The Navajo Nation provides avenues for project objections to be raised and it
is important that internal dissent not be misused or misrepresented by
environmentalists. Nearly every tribal government proposal—just like any U.S.
government proposal—will have detractors. But the consequences are particularly
acute for tribes, as “the age-old problem of internal disagreement . . . weakens tribal

698 Royster, supra note 96, at 1092. Tribal values would only be prioritized up to a point, because
under the statute the Secretary of the Interior retains a right to review tribal environmental
determinations. Id. at 1095–97. For this reason, the Navajo Nation objected to ITEDSDA as being a
reduction of the U.S. trust responsibility without truly turning over authority to Indian nations. Id. at
1098–99.
699 See generally Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of
Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 613 (1994) (highlighting that the federal
government has decided to let “the appropriate federal agency” regulate until the tribes are prepared to
administer the “federal [environmental] standards and programs”).
700 Maxfield, supra note 576, at 72. In his characteristically strong way of phrasing things, Ward
Churchill, responding to the fear of “restoration of native land rights precipitating some sort of
‘environmental holocaust,’” points to accounts by “early European invaders” of North America’s
“pristine wilderness” and writes, “[C]ontrast that reality to what’s been done to this continent over the
past couple of hundred years . . . and you tell me about environmental devastation.” WARD CHURCHILL,
STRUGGLE FOR THE LAND: INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO GENOCIDE, ECOCIDE AND EXPROPRIATION IN
CONTEMPORARY NORTH AMERICA 420 (1993). As a U.N. report on climate change’s effect on
indigenous peoples notes, “[T]he United States, with a population of 300 million, makes up only 4
[percent] of the total world population, but accounts for about 25 [percent] of world [greenhouse gas]
emissions.” U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Impact of Climate
Change Mitigation Measures on Indigenous Peoples and on Their Territories and Lands, ¶ 17, U.N.
Doc. E/C.19/2008/10 (Mar. 20, 2008) (prepared by Victoria Tauli-Corpuz & Aqqaluk Lynge), available
at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ GEN/N08/277/65/PDF/N0827765.pdf?OpenElement.
701 Clinton, supra note 101, at 152 (focusing in on the distrust evident in cases involving jurisdiction
over non-Indians). Distrust extends beyond Indian environmental programs; the preference of national
environmental organizations for national environmental protection is reflected in an “impassioned
rhetoric of distrust toward local self-determination,” whether exercised by western states or Indian
tribes. DANIEL KEMMIS, THIS SOVEREIGN LAND: A NEW VISION FOR GOVERNING THE WEST 158
(2001).
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governments and has historically worked against Indian people.”702 Non-Indian
governments have undercut tribes by supporting dissenting factions and either
signing agreements with them that purport to bind the entire tribe or using trumpedup tribal disagreement as a pretext for ignoring the will of the tribe.703
Environmental organizations should not do the same. To be concrete, while the few
Diné directly affected by Desert Rock are legitimately upset with the leadership of
the Navajo Nation, their complaints should not be bootstrapped by environmental
organizations or presented as the views of the Navajo people. The fact that “native
peoples have not been of one mind on resource issues” should not provide a pretext
for attempting to undercut tribal governments.704 Exploiting dissent in the Navajo
Nation fails to respect the will of the people—as expressed in the same way that it
is in the United States, through democracy—and denies the majority the right to
establish the balance between development and the environment through the
political processes and internal tribal mechanisms.
B. The Big Picture and Desert Rock
Let’s be clear: The world is in the midst of an environmental crisis that will
have far-reaching and global impacts. Environmental organizations and indigenous
peoples worldwide will both be called upon to deal with the challenges associated
with climate change, resource depletion, and sustainable development.705 And
construction of another coal-fired power plant in the Southwest would not
symbolize a new start as much as a continuation of the development and
consumption practices that are responsible for global warming. The development of
alternative energy sources is required, and Indian tribes have an important role to
play in how the United States powers itself and consumes resources.706
Indigenous peoples, globally and in the United States, are “among the most
vulnerable” to the effects of climate change.707 In 2007, the Natural Resources Law
Center at the University of Colorado Law School published a report entitled Native

702

FIXICO, supra note 142, at 181.
See, e.g., Ezra Rosser, The Nature of Representation: The Cherokee Right to a Congressional
Delegate, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 99–117 (2005) (exploring the nature of the leadership dispute
between John Ross and John Ridge in the context of the Treaty of New Echota and the way the United
States used the lack of a unified front).
704 KRECH, supra note 185, at 227.
705 See, e.g., Tsosie, supra note 591, at 1669 (“[I]ndigenous peoples hold particularly relevant
knowledge as to how to achieve [sustainability] due to their familiarity with certain environments
. . . .”).
706 For more on alternative energy development in Indian Country focusing on wind, see Patrick M.
Garry et al., Wind Energy in Indian Country: A Study of the Challenges and Opportunities Facing South
Dakota Tribes, 54 S.D. L. REV. 448 (2009); Kathleen R. Unger, Change Is in the Wind: SelfDetermination and Wind Power Through Tribal Energy Resource Agreements, 43 LOY. L. A.L. REV.
311 (2009); Victoria Sutton, Wind and Wisdom, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 345 (2007); Bob
Gough, Panel V: Revitalizing Economies, Preserving Cultures & Protecting the Environment: Striking
the Balance in South Dakota and Indian Country, 7 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 67 (2002).
707 JONATHAN M. HANNA, NATURAL RES. LAW CTR., UNIV. OF COLO. LAW SCH.,
NATIVE COMMUNITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: LEGAL AND POLICY APPROACHES FOR PROTECTING
TRIBAL LEGAL RIGHTS 31 (2007), available at http://www.colorado.edu/Law/centers/nrlc/
publications/ClimateChangeReport-FINAL%20_9.16.07_.pdf.
703
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Communities and Climate Change that captures the big picture regarding Indians
and their environment.708 The report goes region by region, exploring how climate
change will threaten Indian life ways and in the process covers everything from
treaty-based fishing rights to water rights.709 The report’s focus is outward; that is
to say, it is largely about how Indians are affected by climate change. Thus, the
report notes that tribes “are among the most vulnerable to impact from climate
change caused in large part by conventional fossil-fuel-based energy
development.”710 The outward focus of this report is shared by nearly all writing on
indigenous peoples and climate change and is easily justified. As the
U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues website states, indigenous peoples
have been “among the first to face the direct consequences of climate change.”711
The meeting report from the 2008 Copenhagen Conference on Indigenous Peoples
and Climate Change explains further that “while indigenous peoples bear the brunt
of the catastrophe of climate change, they have minimal access to resources to cope
with the changes.”712 The “survival of indigenous communities worldwide” is
threatened by climate change, “even though indigenous peoples contribute the least
to greenhouse emissions.”713
Given these facts, it is no wonder that the Native Communities and Climate
Change report looked outward, which is where most of the action is and where
most of the blame—for lack of a better word—can be found. Picking off the lowhanging fruit first makes sense, and is likely not going to be controversial among
fellow Indian law scholars. Nonindigenous peoples and governments do make for
good bad guys. The report however does include brief acknowledgment that
“climate change [will require] tribes to . . . consider the long-term sustainability of
[natural resource extraction].”714 Rhetorically and factually an outward looking
analysis makes sense, but there is also the need to engage with Indian complicity in
what could be described as the current U.S. indifference to both climate change
and intergenerational equity.715 As Shepard Krech III explains in The Ecological
Indian,
[C]ritics who excoriate the larger society as they absolve Indians of all blame sacrifice
evidence that in recent years, Indian people have had a mixed relationship to the
environment. They victimize Indians when they strip them of all agency in their lives
except when their actions fit the image of the Ecological Indian.716

708

Id.
See id. at 5, 8, 23–24.
710 Id. at 31.
711 U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/climate_change.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
712 Conference on Indigenous Peoples and Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den., Feb. 21–22, 2008,
Meeting Report, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2008/CRP.3 (Mar. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/E_C_19_2008_CRP3_en.pdf.
713 U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, supra note 711.
714 See HANNA, supra note 707, at 22.
715 As Dean Speth writes, “If there is one country that bears most responsibility for the lack of
progress on international environmental issues, it is the United States.” Speth, supra note 607, at 790.
716 KRECH, supra note 185, at 216; see also Deloria, supra note 1, at 205–06 (“But many scholars—
who note the romantic view of Indians in earlier stages of Euro-American history—have themselves
709
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The easy cases that seem to call for scholarly analysis and footnoted anger are
those that involve sympathetic tribes suffering as a result of non-Indian actions.
The hard cases involve tribes imposing harmful externalities on others. A Native
Alaskan village “in imminent danger of falling into the sea” because protective sea
ice is melting as a result of global warming that decides to sue ExxonMobil is an
easy case.717 As the complaint makes clear, climate change could well force the
villagers into environmental exile even though they “have contributed little or
nothing to global warming.”718 Let there be no mistake, Desert Rock is a hard case.
A nineteen year-old, Orion Yazzie, brought the issues raised by the Navajo
Nation’s choice to pursue Desert Rock into powerful relief: “Navajo sovereignty is
a lot of times brought up during this debate on the power plant . . . but it is a terrible
paradox that us Navajo people would be responsible for upsetting numerous other
indigenous people’s [lifeways] by contributing to global warming.”719
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no satisfying answer to whether the Navajo Nation should pursue
economic development through environmental destruction.720 But the choice to do
so is exactly that—a choice. Given the colonialism of federal Indian law and the
determinative role powerful mining interests played in prior natural resource
development, choice—not just the appearance of choice—itself is remarkable.
Simply saying that Desert Rock is a remnant of a coal past is not responsive
enough, partly because the United States continues its coal-fired habit, but mostly
because tribal administrative needs and reservation poverty demand more than
silence. Unfortunately, that is pretty much all that the Navajo Nation has gotten so
far from non-Indians, politicians, and others, regardless of political leanings. Such
disinterest in reservation conditions provides excuse, if not full justification, for
seeking out coal-fired revenue and employment.721 It would be great if the
U.S. government permitted the Navajo Nation to act according to the will of its
been blinded by the same romantic tradition today and deny us our political life and our humanity. . . .
We [Indians] have made mistakes, and you [Indian scholars] do us a disservice by almost uniformly
shifting the blame elsewhere.”).
717 Posting of Mark Walker to Am. Coll. of Envtl. Lawyers, Global Warming Litigation Heating
Up—Village
of
Kivalina
Lawsuit,
http://www.acoel.org/2008/08/articles/natural-resourcedamages/global-warming-litigation-heating-up-village-of-kivalina-lawsuit (Aug. 21, 2008) (last visited
Apr. 18, 2010) (quoting Complaint at 2, Native Village of Kivalina, Alaska v. ExxonMobile, 663 F.
Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C 08-1138 SBA)); see also Osofsky, supra note 637 (discussing the
significance of a climate change–based Inuit petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights); John H. Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 163, 191–92 (2009)
(summarizing the same petition); Tsosie, supra note 591, at 1669–74 (summarizing the same petition).
718 Complaint at 46, Native Village of Kivalina, Alaska v. ExxonMobile, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (No. C 08-1138 SBA). For a brief summary of the case and motivation to sue, see Felicity
Barringer, Flooded Village Files Suit, Citing Corporate Link to Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,
2008, at A16.
719 EPA Hearing III, supra note 442, at 57 (statement of Orion Yazzie, resident of Aztec, N.M.).
720 In general, Professor Tsosie notes that “tribal decisions on mining policy are not clearly ‘right’ or
‘wrong.’” Tsosie, supra note 71, at 302.
721 See SHERRY, supra note 124, at 11 (calling attention to the “striking disregard for adverse
environmental and social costs on local communities” caused by the Navajo Nation’s seizing upon “any
economic opportunities” to “support a large bureaucracy and a population that depends on it for jobs”).
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elected leadership, and though government policy change is improbable, it should be
expected that environmental organizations not ignore Indian sovereignty by making
use of federal review processes to block tribes.

